

**Research Briefing**

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By Library specialists

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# Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories March to November 2025: UK and international response

## Summary

- 1 Events in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2025
- 2 Proposals for post-conflict Gaza
- 3 UK Government statements and actions

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## Summary

On 18 March 2025, a hostage-ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, a designated terrorist organisation in the UK, ended. Armed conflict resumed in Gaza and continued until 13 October 2025 when a new agreement for the release of all hostages and a ceasefire began.

This briefing provides information on the situation in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) from March to November 2025, and the UK and international response. It also details proposals for post-conflict Gaza.

The [UK Government recognised the state of Palestine in September 2025](#), with [provisional borders](#) covering [lands occupied by Israel in the 1967 conflict](#). Final borders remain subject to agreement and equal land swaps between Palestinians and Israelis.

Notwithstanding, the [UK Government](#) considers that Israel's degree of control over Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem "amounts to occupation under international law", in line with [UN Security Council resolutions](#) and the [International of Court of Justice](#) (ICJ, the UN's highest court). Given the contested nature of Palestinian statehood during the period covered here and the assessment of occupation, this briefing uses the term "Occupied Palestinian Territories" to describe Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The Commons Library collection [Middle East instability in 2023-25](#) has more on the UK and international response to the conflict, [including the UK's statements on recognising a Palestinian state and its background](#), UK aid, as well as the conflicts in the Red Sea, Lebanon and between Israel and Iran.

## Resumption of conflict in March 2025

On 18 January 2025, a [three-stage agreement between Israel and Hamas](#) came into effect, modelled on a [UN Security Council resolution](#) passed in May 2024. Stage one was to last 42 days and allow the release of some hostages held in Gaza in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, and for aid to enter Gaza. [Negotiations on moving to stage two did not occur](#) until after stage one was planned to expire but fighting did not resume until 18 March.

On 18 March 2025, [Israel announced the renewal of military action](#) against Hamas, saying Hamas had refused to accept an extension of stage one of the January agreement. [Israel had stopped all aid entering Gaza on 2 March](#) (see below for the humanitarian situation).

On 18 May 2025, Israel launched an expanded offensive in Gaza. This followed reports of a [plan to “capture” land in Gaza](#), to “move” Palestinian civilians to “protect” them, and for non-UN groups to deliver aid into Gaza. In August, Israel announced [it would be preparing for “taking control of Gaza City”](#). This followed the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu’s, statement that [Israel “intends to” take control of all of Gaza to assure Israeli security and remove Hamas](#). Mr Netanyahu said that Israel did not intend to hold or govern Gaza but rather hand it to “Arab forces” (see below for post-conflict plans).

There has also been [ongoing violence in the occupied West Bank](#) and [Israeli military operations](#) targeting Hamas and other groups. The [Houthis in Yemen renewed their attacks on Israel](#) and [shipping in the Red Sea](#) after March.

## The October 2025 agreement

On 13 October 2025, all remaining living hostages in Gaza were released. This formed [part of a ceasefire-hostage agreement](#), mediated by the US. Terms of the agreement include:

- All military action is to end.
- The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are to withdraw to a set line in Gaza.
- All hostages, alive and dead, are to be released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners held in Israel.
- More aid is to enter Gaza, under UN auspices.
- Further talks are to take place on later stages (see next section).

President Donald Trump [said the “war is over”](#) and [Prime Minister Netanyahu said the agreement “marks the end of two years of war”](#). Hamas is expected to disarm under the agreement, though it has not agreed to do so and has been [deploying members across non-IDF controlled parts of Gaza](#) and [attacking opponents](#). [Israel](#) and the [US](#) have said Hamas must disarm now.

The [UK welcomed the agreement](#). Prime Minister Keir Starmer said UK efforts would focus on three elements:

- supporting reconstruction
- reforming the Palestinian Authority
- disarming Hamas, and planning for an international stabilisation force.

(See below for humanitarian plans under the agreement).

## The September/October 2025 framework

The October 2025 hostage-ceasefire agreement is described as the “first phase” of a [20-point framework published by the Trump administration in September 2025](#). Many aspects of the plan continue to be negotiated and some aspects, such as the disarmament of Hamas, [are not yet agreed](#).

The framework was [endorsed by the UN Security Council in November](#).

The [framework](#) envisages Hamas ceding governance of Gaza (as it has agreed to do, though it [opposes any foreign governance](#)) to a technocratic committee of Palestinians and international experts, supervised by a “Board of Peace” chaired by President Trump. An international stabilisation force will take over security in Gaza as the IDF withdraws. The framework also says Israel will not annex any parts of Gaza, and that no Palestinian will be forced to leave. It has also said there will be support for reconstruction. The West Bank is not mentioned in the framework. There is no timetable for these actions in the framework aside from those in the “first phase”.

[Israel said it backed the framework](#), saying it allows for the retention of the IDF in Gaza, that neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority will govern Gaza, and it does not include a plan to recognise a Palestinian state. However, several coalition parties in the ruling Israeli coalition voted against the October agreement and [have called for continuation of military action against Hamas](#). [The Palestinian Authority also welcomed the framework](#), which “recognise[s] [statehood] as the aspiration” of Palestinians and says that, with sufficient reforms, the Authority will be able to govern Gaza.

Foreign ministers of states including [Qatar, Jordan, United Arab Emirates \(UAE\), Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have welcomed the framework](#). [Which countries will contribute to the international stabilisation force is uncertain](#), though [Italy has offered to contribute](#). Hamas has said if the force is engaged in disarming the group, [it will not have “neutrality”](#).

## What has been the humanitarian situation?

### Casualties

Citing Israeli authorities and the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) says that [since 7 October 2023 over 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals have been reported killed in Israel and around 5,400 injured](#).

[At least 69,185 Palestinians have been reported killed and 170,698 injured \(as of 12 November 2025\)](#). In the West Bank, [there have been 38 Israeli and 690 Palestinian fatalities](#) from January 2024 to 30 September 2025.

## Aid to Gaza in early 2025

Citing Hamas' refusal to extend stage one of the 2025 agreement, on 2 March [Israel stopped all aid into Gaza](#) and, [from 9 March, Israel cut off all of Gaza's electricity supply](#). UNOCHA warned [essential supplies were running low](#) and of [aid worker deaths](#).

[Israeli legislation banning engagement with UNRWA](#) has [created challenges in coordinating aid delivery in the OPTs](#).

## Food insecurity and famine determination in mid-2025

On 18 May 2025, Israel [announced that "a basic quantity of food" would be allowed to enter Gaza](#), to "make certain that no starvation crisis develops". This coincided with its [expanded military operation](#).

However, [UN agencies continued to report insufficient aid distribution](#) in Gaza. In August 2025, the UN-backed Integrated Food Security Phase (IPC) [said that "famine, with reasonable evidence, is confirmed in \[the\] Gaza governorate"](#) and that the threshold would be crossed in other parts of Gaza "in the coming weeks". The IPC said that the "famine is entirely man-made" and "can be [...] reversed".

This determination followed IPC analysis in July that had warned "[a "worst case scenario of famine" was "unfolding" in Gaza](#)". The UK Government said [the famine was the result of the "Israeli government's refusal to allow \[in\] sufficient aid"](#) and [it backed the IPC findings and its methodology](#), together with all members of the 15-strong UN Security Council, [save for the US](#).

[Israel has been critical of past IPC reports](#) and in August [its Foreign Ministry said "there is no famine in Gaza"](#) and that the IPC "ignored its own criteria just to produce false accusations against Israel".

Prime Minister Netanyahu had also [accused Hamas of "deliberately starving"](#) both hostages and Palestinians in Gaza and says [UN aid efforts are insufficient](#). In July, President Trump said [there is "real starvation" in Gaza](#), and the US would be supporting the establishment of further food distribution centres.

## Gaza Humanitarian Foundation

The UN, UK Government and others have also been critical [of the US/Israeli-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation](#) (GHF) as an alternative to UN-led distribution. The [UK](#) and [UNOCHA](#) report many hundreds of Palestinians have been killed trying to access [one of the four GHF food distribution sites](#) in Gaza. The UK's International Development Minister, Baroness Chapman, [says the GHF has "failed"](#). The [UN-led system had around 400 sites during the January-March ceasefire](#).

## Aid under the October 2025 agreement

Under the October 2025 agreement, [around 600 aid trucks are planned to enter Gaza each day](#), and be organised under an UN-led system. The degree to which UNRWA will form part of these efforts, given [Israeli legislation banning its operation in Israel and East Jerusalem in 2025](#), is uncertain, but UNRWA said in November it [has not delivered aid into Gaza](#). The [UN expects all its agencies to participate](#). [The GHF says it has suspended work](#).

## What has been the UK, US and EU response?

### UK support for negotiations

The [UK Government backed the January 2025 agreement](#) and said [the agreement should be implemented in full](#). During the aid pause of March to May 2025, the government expressed concern that [Israel was “at risk” of breaching international law](#) in its blocking of aid. The government has reiterated that it is [opposed to any forced displacement of Palestinians](#), loss of territory within the Gaza Strip, or [annexation by Israel](#).

The government also welcomed the October 2025 agreement (see above).

The UK Government [did not back the resumption of Israeli military action in March](#) or its [expansion in May](#) or [August](#). On 20 May, the government announced [it would pause talks on a free trade agreement with Israel](#) and review the 2023 road map on UK-Israel relations. [UK cooperation against Iran will be unaffected](#).

### UK sanctions

In May, the UK also [announced a new round of sanctions](#) against organisations and individuals involved in settler violence in the West Bank. This is the fourth series of sanctions announced since October 2023. In September, it also said [it was planning new sanctions against Hamas](#).

In June, the UK, together with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway, announced an [asset freeze and travel ban against Israeli ministers Ben Gvir and Smotrich](#). The UK said the two were “sanctioned for their repeated incitement of violence against Palestinian civilians”. The Israeli Foreign Minister [said the UK action was “unacceptable”](#). [The US “condemn\[ed\]” the decision on sanctions](#).

These actions follow a [joint statement issued by the governments of France, Canada and the UK](#) on 19 May which said that they were prepared to take “further concrete action” in response to a “wholly disproportionate” Israeli military action and the lack of aid entering Gaza since March 2025.

## European Union response

In May 2025 European Union leaders announced that [they would review the EU-Israel trade agreement](#), and said more aid must enter Gaza immediately. However, while [some proposals to amend EU-Israel engagement have been discussed](#), [no changes in EU policy have been announced](#).

In August, French President, Emmanuel Macron, described the expanded IDF operations as a “drift towards a never-ending war” and said [a UN-mandated international commission should be established](#) to stabilise Gaza. This was also [an outcome of the July 2025 two-state solution conference](#); it will need the support of the UN Security Council.

In August, Germany also [announced an embargo on military equipment](#) that could be used by Israel in Gaza. [Germany is the second-largest exporter of arms to Israel](#), behind the US.

## United States response

In the US, the Trump administration has said  [Hamas “cannot continue to exist”](#) and that “we stand with Israel and their efforts to defend themselves”. It expects all parties to comply with international humanitarian law. It told the UN Security Council in March that [“Hamas bears full responsibility for \[...\] the resumption of hostilities”](#) and the [hostages must be released immediately](#).

The [United States has backed the GHF](#) and has previously called on the UN and others to work with the GHF and Israel to deliver aid. The US said the decision of Israel to expand its operations in August followed “Hamas’ intransigence” in talks and that “Israel has a right to decide what is necessary for its security”. The US also [backed Israel’s expanded offensive against Gaza City](#) in September 2025, in the absence of Hamas agreeing to release all the hostages held in Gaza.

## Statements on recognising a Palestinian state

In September 2025 [the UK was among ten states to confirm their decision](#) to recognise a Palestinian state. The UK said that [“two states is the only path to security and lasting peace for Israelis and Palestinians alike”](#) and argued that the UK action “has helped cement the rejection of Hamas across the Arab world”. The UK and Canadian actions also included some conditions.

More than [140 countries currently recognise a Palestinian State](#). The UK is the first G7 state to do so along with Canada and France. Canada [cited the proposed E1 settlement plan \(see below\) as one reason for its action](#).

The United States has argued [the decisions to recognise a Palestinian state have “encouraged” Hamas not to participate in ceasefire-hostage talks](#). Israel argues recognition [“rewards terror”](#).

The separate Commons Library research briefing, [UK, Canada, France statements on recognising a Palestinian state 2025](#), has further information on the announcements, their conditions, and the Israeli, Palestinian and international reaction.

## What has been the response at the UN?

The [UN Secretary General has welcomed the October 2025 agreement](#), and called for the ramping-up of aid and release of all hostages. The UN's relief coordinator, Tom Fletcher, says [the UN has a "60 day" plan to increase aid into Gaza](#), and has called for steps to be taken to facilitate this. This includes the opening up of more aid corridors into Gaza and infrastructure repair. [He has opposed the role of the GHF](#).

On 4 June 2025, [the US vetoed](#) a UN Security Council Resolution [demanding an immediate and permanent ceasefire and the release of hostages](#). All other council members, including [the UK, voted in favour of the resolution](#). In November 2025, [a resolution passed which endorsed the US-proposed framework for Gaza](#), including an international stabilisation force.

## West Bank E1 settlement plan, August 2025

In August 2025, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced that [Israel would approve the "E1" settlement plan in the occupied West Bank](#). The plan is for around 3,000 homes to be built to the east of occupied East Jerusalem. The UK government said [that the plan "would divide a Palestinian state in two"](#), represent a "breach of international law" and "critically undermine the two-state solution". The [UK Government also summoned the Israeli ambassador](#).

Minister Smotrich said that [the approval "buries the idea of a Palestinian state"](#). In July, the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) had [passed a non-binding motion calling for the West Bank to be annexed](#). Israel has argued the West Bank is "disputed", not "occupied" territory and [its future remains subject to negotiation](#). US ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, said [decisions over whether to proceed with the E1 plan are a matter for Israel](#). The US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, has said the expansion of settlements [is a "counter reaction"](#) to the decision of some countries to recognise a Palestinian state.

## Earlier proposals for post-conflict Gaza

In August 2025, the Israeli Security Cabinet agreed [five principles for concluding the conflict](#): 1) the disarming of Hamas 2) the return of all

hostages 3) the demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip 4) Israeli security control of the Strip and 5) the establishment of an alternative administration in Gaza that is neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority. Previously, Prime Minister Netanyahu had said [that the implementation of President Trump's plan for Gaza \(see below\) was a condition for ending the conflict](#).

Israel, the [UK](#) and the [United States](#) are among those that say Hamas can no longer govern Gaza. [Israel also opposes a role for the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA](#). In 2025, some [Hamas officials have said they are willing to step down from governing Gaza](#), but have said [the group will not disarm until a Palestinian state is established](#).

In March 2025, the Arab League [agreed a plan for Gaza](#), over three stages. The first would last six months and focus on reconstruction. Gaza would be run by a temporary technocratic committee (excluding Hamas and the Palestinian Authority). In May, they also said [an international fund should be established](#). [Germany, France, Italy and the UK welcomed the plan](#). In July 2025, the Arab League also [called on Hamas to disarm](#).

The Arab League's plan is seen as a counter to the statements by President Trump for [Palestinians to leave Gaza, either temporarily or permanently, to enable US-led reconstruction](#). [No US troops or funding would be used](#). In March, [President Trump also said that "nobody's expelling any Palestinians"](#).

The UN Secretary-General said that ["it is vital to stay true to the bedrock of international law. It is essential to avoid any form of ethnic cleansing"](#). [Jordan](#) and [Egypt](#), likely recipients for any refugees, have strongly criticised the President's statement, as has the [Arab League](#) and [Palestinian Authority](#). The UK Government says that [there must be no forced displacement from Gaza](#) and [Palestinians have the right to return](#) to their homes.

[Israel and the US rejected the Arab League plan](#), though a later US statement said the plan was a ["good faith first step"](#). The Israeli Government said [the US plan "should be encouraged"](#), and in March established an office to prepare and enable ["voluntary departure \[of Palestinians\] to third countries"](#).

# 1 Events in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2025

## 1.1 2023 to 2025: Hamas assault, hostages, military action, and January 2025 agreement

### Events since 7 October 2023 and in the wider Middle East

Section 1 provides a summary of events from March to October 2025. It is not intended to provide detailed information on fast-moving events.

For the January 2025 agreement and events on and since 7 October 2023, see the Commons Library collection page, [Middle East instability in 2023 to 2025](#). The collection also has research briefings on the UK, UN and international response to the conflicts between Israel and Hamas, Israel and Hezbollah, Israel and Iran, and Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping. It includes a briefing on the position and funding of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and UK aid to the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

### Verification and journalist access

During active conflicts, statistics and reports on specific events can be difficult to verify. This is because journalists, researchers and civil society organisations face challenges accessing conflict zones. In the case of Gaza, during the 2023–25 conflict, international journalists have had only limited access, generally entering alongside the Israeli military. Locally employed journalists for major news agencies such as Reuters, Agence France-Presse and the BBC, have remained. In 2025, Reporters without Borders and 200 media outlets have requested increased independent access to verify the situation in Gaza.<sup>1</sup> The UK Government has joined 26 countries in requesting the same.<sup>2</sup>

On 7 October 2023, the Palestinian group Hamas, officially designated a terrorist organisation by the Israeli, United States and UK governments,

<sup>1</sup> RSF, [Gaza: RSF, CPJ and over 200 media outlets call for opening the Strip \[...\]](#), 12 June 2025

<sup>2</sup> Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), [Media freedom coalition statement on foreign media access to Gaza](#), 21 August 2025

commenced an armed assault against Israel.  [Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups](#) (including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, also a designated terrorist organisation in the UK) launched several thousand rockets into Israel and conducted attacks in border areas. They killed around 1,200 civilians and took 251 hostages (a further four hostages were already being held in Gaza).<sup>3</sup>

As of September 2025, the Israeli Government said that 48 hostages remained in Gaza. It believed 20 be alive.<sup>4</sup> Before the October 2025 agreement, 148 hostages had been returned alive: 140 under ceasefire-hostage agreements and 8 by Israeli military action.<sup>5</sup> In August, the Israeli Government had accused Hamas of “deliberately starving” both the hostages and local population in Gaza.<sup>6</sup>

In response to the assault, on 8 October 2023 Israel’s security cabinet declared war on Hamas and said it would launch “significant military activities” against it.<sup>7</sup> On 28 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) commenced a ground offensive in Gaza.<sup>8</sup> This continued, aside from a pause between 24 November and 1 December 2023, until 19 January 2025, when a ceasefire-hostage agreement came into force.<sup>9</sup>

For general information on the military conflict, the humanitarian situation and access to Gaza from October 2023 to March 2025, see section 1 of the Commons Library research briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict July 2024 to March 2025](#).

On 15 January 2025, Qatar, Egypt and the United States announced they had mediated a three-stage agreement between Israel and Hamas. Details on the agreement can be found in section 1.6 of the Commons Library research briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict from July 2024 to March 2025](#). The first stage involved plans for:<sup>10</sup>

- [Hamas to release 33 hostages](#). They included children, women, people over 50 and the wounded. They would be released in stages, with three to four hostages released each week, over six weeks.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Home Office, [Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations](#), updated 26 April 2024; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Swords of Iron: hostages and missing persons report](#), updated 22 June 2025

<sup>4</sup> Times of Israel, [Netanyahu says he still believes there are 20 hostages alive in Gaza, out of 48 total](#), 28 September 2025

<sup>5</sup> CNN, [Who are the hostages freed during the Israel-Hamas conflict?](#), 1 July 2025

<sup>6</sup> Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, [PM’s office announcement](#), 3 August 2025

<sup>7</sup> Times of Israel, [Security Council confirms Israel at war \[...\]](#), 8 October 2023

<sup>8</sup> Times of Israel, [Oct. 28: Israel expands ground offensive inside Gaza](#), 28 October 2023

<sup>9</sup> See Commons Library, [Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024](#), section 1, and [Israel and the OPTs: UK response to the conflict from July 2024 to March 2025](#), section 1, for the military action and humanitarian situation during these earlier periods.

<sup>10</sup> AP, [A look at the terms—and tensions—in the Israel-Hamas draft ceasefire deal](#), 15 January 2025 and Times of Israel, [Text of the hostage-ceasefire agreement](#), 16 January 2025; BBC News, [What we know about the Gaza ceasefire deal](#), 19 January 2025

<sup>11</sup> Times of Israel, [These are the 33 hostages set to be returned in phase one of the Gaza ceasefire](#), 17 January 2025; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [First hostages return home](#), 19 January 2025

- Around 1,800 to 1,900 Palestinians detained by Israel to be released. This included members of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Fatah, and those detained during Israeli military operations in Gaza since 8 October 2023 (it does not include any who participated in the 7 October assault).<sup>12</sup>
- The IDF to deploy away from populated areas of Gaza, in preparation for withdrawal from all areas in stage two. While the IDF reducing its presence in the Philadelphi corridor was part of stage one, this did not take place.<sup>13</sup>
- The Rafah crossing to reopen, and displaced Palestinians to be able to use a coastal road (Rasheed Street) to return to their homes.<sup>14</sup>
- Between 500 and 600 aid trucks to be allowed to enter Gaza each day.<sup>15</sup>

On 19 January 2025, the then US President, Joe Biden, said negotiations over stage two of the agreement would include the “permanent end of the war without Hamas in power [in Gaza] or able to threaten Israel”.<sup>16</sup>

In February 2025, the Israeli Minister of Defense, Israel Katz, said that the IDF would not withdraw from the Philadelphi corridor between Gaza and Egypt, as had been planned for stage one, and said that the corridor would “remain a buffer zone just like [Israel’s borders with] Lebanon and Syria” (Israel holds some sites in both [Lebanon](#) and [Syria](#) in 2025).<sup>17</sup>

During stage one of the agreement, 33 hostages and around 1,900 Palestinian prisoners were released.<sup>18</sup>

Negotiations to move from stage one to stage two of the agreement were intended to begin on day 16 of stage one, but these did not start before the intended end date of stage one had passed. There were no formal announcements on extending stage one, though fighting did not resume until later.<sup>19</sup>

Issues reportedly being discussed as part of mediation proposals by the US, Qatar and Egypt included the timing of the hostage releases, the future of Hamas, including its disarmament, and the governance of Gaza. Hamas officials signalled a willingness to cede political control to other Palestinian groups in Gaza, but not to disarm unless a Palestinian state is established.<sup>20</sup> Hamas had been calling for negotiations to centre on moving to stage two, which would involve Israeli troops withdrawing from Gaza, while the US

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<sup>12</sup> Times of Israel, [Israel to free up to 1,904 Palestinians in 1<sup>st</sup> stage \[...\]](#), 18 January 2025

<sup>13</sup> Times of Israel, [PM claims number of troops along Philadelphi route to increase \[...\]](#), 18 January 2025; Egypt Today, [President Sisi welcomes reaching ceasefire agreement in Gaza](#), 15 January 2025

<sup>14</sup> HC Deb, [16 January 2025](#), c525; Reuters, [Gaza residents start to return to north](#), 26 January 2025

<sup>15</sup> HC Deb, [16 January 2025](#), c512; US State Department, [Press briefing](#), 15 January 2025

<sup>16</sup> White House, [Remarks by President Biden on the ceasefire and hostage deal](#), 19 January 2025

<sup>17</sup> AA, [Philadelphi corridor on Gaza-Egypt border to remain “buffer zone”: Israel](#), 27 February 2025

<sup>18</sup> BBC News, [Israel blocks entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza](#), 2 March 2025

<sup>19</sup> BBC News, [Is the war starting again in Gaza?](#), updated 18 March 2025

<sup>20</sup> NBC News, [Hamas ready to cede control of Gaza, official says](#), 27 February 2025

(under the Trump administration) and Israel backed an extension of stage one and the release of more hostages.<sup>21</sup>

For the agreement implemented from 13 October 2025 see below, section 1.4. For President Trump's wider 20-point framework for Gaza, see section 2.2.

## 1.2

## Renewal of Israeli action in March 2025

### Israel announces renewed operations in March

On 18 March 2025, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, announced the renewal of military action against Hamas.

He cited Hamas's refusal to agree to a US proposal to extend stage one of the January 2025 agreement (see section 1.1) and said Israel was only targeting "Hamas terrorists" and civilians should "avoid any contact with Hamas terrorists, and [...] get out of harm's way".<sup>22</sup>

The Prime Minister also said that "from now on, negotiations will be conducted only under fire".<sup>23</sup> On 30 March, he said the military action had produced "cracks" in the Hamas negotiating position.<sup>24</sup>

The Israeli Minister of Defense, Israel Katz, said on 25 March that the IDF's "main goal now is to return all the kidnapped people home".<sup>25</sup>

[Itamar Ben-Gvir](#), whose party left the ruling Israeli coalition in January 2025 following the Israel-Hamas agreement, rejoined the government and "welcomed the return [...] to intense fighting".<sup>26</sup>

The Israeli Hostages and Missing Families Forum, which represents families of people taken hostage by Hamas, criticised the renewal of military action as risking the lives of the hostages.<sup>27</sup>

### Analysis on the renewal of conflict from March 2025

- Armed Conflict and Event Location Data (ACLED), [Two years since 7 October: Israel's forever wars across the Middle East](#), 7 October 2025

<sup>21</sup> France 24, [Hamas pushes for phase two of truce](#), 9 March 2025; Times of Israel, [Witkoff reportedly presents new proposal for Gaza truce extension to Israel, Hamas](#), 13 March 2025

<sup>22</sup> Israeli Prime Minister's Office, [Statement by PM Netanyahu](#), 18 March 2025

<sup>23</sup> Times of Israel, [Vowing to press Gaza strikes, Netanyahu says hostage talks \[...\]](#), 19 March 2025; Times of Israel, [Sa'ar says Gaza strikes to continue "over coming days"](#), 18 March 2025

<sup>24</sup> Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [PM Netanyahu remarks at the start \[...\]](#), 30 March 2025

<sup>25</sup> I 24 News, [Several fatalities reported in alleged IDF strike](#), 25 March 2025

<sup>26</sup> Times of Israel, [With resumption of war in Gaza, Ben Gvir's party to return \[...\]](#), 18 March 2025

<sup>27</sup> Times of Israel, [Hostage forum: government has chosen to "give up \[...\]"](#), 18 March 2025; Times of Israel, ["Israel choosing "endless war" \[...\]"](#), 21 March 2025

- Crisis Group, [The Gaza starvation experiment](#), 6 June 2025
- Chatham House, [Gaza: war, hunger and politics](#), 23 May 2025
- Italian Institute for International Political Studies, [Israel and its neighbours: teetering on the brink of isolation](#), 22 May 2025
- Armed Conflict Location Event Data, [What do Israel's shifting targets in Gaza tell us about what's ahead?](#), 19 May 2025
- Crisis Group, [Is the Gaza war approaching its endgame?](#), 18 April 2025
- Foreign Policy, [The old war is over in Gaza, and a new one is underway](#), 10 April 2025
- Center for Strategic and International Studies, [The Gaza war resumes](#), 18 March 2025
- Atlantic Council, [The Gaza cease-fire is over. What's next from Israel, Hamas and the US?](#), 18 March 2025
- Foreign Policy, [Why did Israel restart the war in Gaza?](#), 18 March 2025
- European Council on Foreign Relations, [Israeli strikes have reignited Gaza—now Europeans must take action](#), 19 March 2025

## Israeli statements on civilians and territory, March 2025

On 19 March 2025, Israel's Minister of Defense, Israel Katz, said to the "residents of Gaza" that they should "remove Hamas" and consider leaving Gaza:

Take the advice of the president of the United States. Return the hostages and remove Hamas, and other options will open up for you—including the possibility of leaving for other places in the world for those who want to [...] The alternative is total destruction and ruin.<sup>28</sup>

Section 2.1 details President Trump's statements in 2025 that Palestinians in Gaza be encouraged to leave as part of a reconstruction process. Under the October 2025 framework, no Palestinian is to be forced to leave Gaza.

Mr Katz also said on 21 March that "the more Hamas persists in its refusal to release the hostages, the more territory it will lose, which will be annexed to Israel" and the "removal of Hamas and the immediate release of all Israeli hostages is the only way to end this war".<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Times of Israel, [IDF ground forces operating in Gaza](#), 19 March 2025

<sup>29</sup> Jerusalem Post, [IDF will seize Gaza land permanently until Hamas releases hostages](#), 21 March 2025; Israel Katz on Twitter/X, [Residents of Gaza \[...\]](#), 26 March 2025

## Launch of operations in March and Hamas response

Israeli military action began with air strikes on 18 March 2025. These killed 404 people and injured 562 people, according to the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health. These air strikes then continued.<sup>30</sup>

On 19 March, the IDF said it had begun “targeted ground activities” to create a “partial buffer zone between northern and southern” Gaza.<sup>31</sup>

On 20 March, Hamas began launching missiles against Tel Aviv.<sup>32</sup> On 31 March, a Hamas official said that “anyone who can bear arms [...] must take action” against Israel.<sup>33</sup> BBC Monitoring and the Armed Conflict and Event Location Data (ACLED) organisation reports that the published claims of attacks by Hamas were much lower than during previous stages of the conflict.<sup>34</sup> One of the largest Hamas rocket attacks occurred on 6 April, when ten rockets were fired. They injured one person in Israel.<sup>35</sup>

The Houthis in Yemen also launched missiles against Israel since hostilities resumed and said that they would target Israeli airports.<sup>36</sup>

## Protests against Hamas and its strength in Gaza, 2025

Polling suggests there was some continuing support for Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza in 2024, but in March 2025 some protests against Hamas were held in northern Gaza following the renewal of armed conflict.<sup>37</sup> Further protests were reported in April and May 2025. BBC Monitoring reports that these were the largest anti-Hamas protests since 2023.<sup>38</sup> Hamas called the protests “suspicious”. Violence by Hamas was reported in response to some protests.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> UNOCHA, [Humanitarian situation update 273 Gaza Strip](#), 18 March 2025

<sup>31</sup> BBC News, [Israel resumes ground operations in Gaza \[...\]](#), 19 March 2025; IDF on Twitter/X, [IDF troops began targeted ground activities in central and southern Gaza \[...\]](#), 19 March 2025

<sup>32</sup> Reuters, [Hamas armed wing says it fired rockets against Tel Aviv](#), 20 March 2025; Wall Street Journal, [A weakened Hamas struggles to respond to Israel’s attacks](#), 20 March 2025

<sup>33</sup> France 24, [Hamas issues call to arms against displacement \[...\]](#), 31 March 2025

<sup>34</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Israel strikes kill over 100 Palestinian in Gaza, Hamas silent](#), 4 April 2025; ACLED, [Gaza update and interactive map 7 October 2023 to present](#), last updated 23 May 2025

<sup>35</sup> Times of Israel, [Hamas fires ten rockets at southern Israel \[...\]](#), 7 April 2025

<sup>36</sup> Times of Israel, [Houthi missile triggers sirens in central Israel \[...\]](#), 30 March 2025; Reuters, [Yemen’s Houthis announce campaign targeting Israeli airports](#), 5 May 2025

<sup>37</sup> FT, [What is left of Hamas?](#), 4 November 2024; Palestinian Center for Policy and survey Research, [Public opinion poll](#) 95, 6 May 2025, Tony Blair Institute, [New polling by Zogby research](#), 23 September 2024

<sup>38</sup> Reuters, [Hundreds of Palestinians in Gaza protest against Hamas \[...\]](#), 26 March 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Palestinian Authority and Israeli media amplify anti-Hamas protests](#), 26 March 2025; BBC News, [Anti-Hamas protests on rise in Gaza as group’s iron grip slips](#), 24 April 2025; BBC News, [Anti-Hamas protests in Southern Gaza enter third day](#), 21 May 2025

<sup>39</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Hamas responds to “suspicious” protests](#), 28 March 2025; As above

The US annual intelligence assessment, published in March 2025, judged that while Hamas's popularity had declined in Gaza, its popularity in the West Bank "remains high [...], especially relative to the Palestinian Authority".<sup>40</sup>

The military strength of Hamas is uncertain, with reports that it may have been able to replace all the fighters it had lost during the conflict by early 2025, but also that it had been unable to assert its control over large parts of Gaza. Rocket fire from Gaza into Israel has been limited in 2025.<sup>41</sup> Monitoring group ACLED had reported the group largely shifted to "guerilla tactics" in 2025 rather than entering set-piece battles, with its focus being on survival.<sup>42</sup>

Media reports suggest that Hamas has been under increasing financial strain in 2025, being unable to pay its fighters and officials (such as tax collectors and police officers) in full, and that it has been cutting back on some wider social services provided to the local population.<sup>43</sup>

Following the October 2025 agreement, Hamas deployed a large number of members across Gaza in areas without IDF control, saying it was establishing security and would act against "collaborators" with Israel.<sup>44</sup> There have been reports of Hamas attacking its opponents in Gaza, including the [Doghmarsh clan and other armed groups](#), as it seeks to reassert control.<sup>45</sup> Several armed anti-Hamas groups have emerged in the conflict or strengthened their position during it, sometimes with Israeli backing.<sup>46</sup> Under the 20-point framework of October 2025 Hamas must disarm but the group has not agreed to do this. President Trump has suggested Hamas will have temporary security control but also that the group must be disarmed (see section 2.2).

There have also been reports of Palestinian groups, including Hamas, killing individuals accused of "collaboration" with Israel.<sup>47</sup> The Palestinian Authority has condemned the reported executions.<sup>48</sup>

Hamas has also been reestablishing the provision of services and aid in October, though has committed to cede governance of Gaza.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Director of National Intelligence, [Annual threat assessment \[...\]](#), March 2025, p25

<sup>41</sup> See Commons Library research briefing, [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict July 2024 to March 2025](#), April 2025, p16; BBC News, [Hamas security officer says group has lost control over most of Gaza](#), 6 July 2025; Reuters, [Battling to survive, Hamas faces defiant clans and doubts over Iran](#), 27 June 2025; BBC News, [Hamas fires rockets at Tel Aviv as Israel renews Gaza ground campaign](#), 20 March 2025

<sup>42</sup> ACLED, [As Israel expands control and sows chaos, Hamas adapts to survive](#), 17 September 2025

<sup>43</sup> Washington Post, [Hamas facing financial and administrative crisis \[...\]](#), 21 July 2025; BBC News, [The secret system Hamas uses to pay government salaries](#), 6 August 2025

<sup>44</sup> BBC News, [Hamas mobilises fighters in Gaza as fears of internal violence mount](#), 11 October 2025

<sup>45</sup> CNN, [Hamas asserts control in Gaza](#), 12 October 2025; Reuters, [Hamas fighters tighten grip in Gaza, clouding future of ceasefire](#), 14 October 2025; ACLED, [Clan violence in Gaza](#), 15 October 2025

<sup>46</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Who are the Israeli-backed armed groups challenging Hamas in Gaza?](#), 15 October 2025

<sup>47</sup> BBC News, [Footage shows public executions in Gaza City street](#), 22 September 2025; BBC News, [Public executions deepen fear and division in Gaza](#), 14 October 2025

<sup>48</sup> WAFA News Agency, [Presidency statement on field executions \[...\]](#), 15 October 2025

<sup>49</sup> BBC Monitoring, [After ceasefire deal, who is in control of Gaza?](#), 15 October 2025

## International and UK response in March 2025

The UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, called for a return to the January agreement, an increase in aid, and the release of hostages.<sup>50</sup> In April, he said that “Gaza is a killing field – and civilians are in an endless death loop” and cited UN agency warnings that food “commodities are running extremely low” in Gaza.<sup>51</sup>

The Israeli Foreign Ministry accused the UN Secretary-General of “slander” in his April remarks, saying sufficient aid entered Gaza during the ceasefire.<sup>52</sup> See section 1.5 below for more information on the humanitarian situation.

At a meeting of the UN Security Council in March, the Palestinian Authority called upon the council to take action to stop the Israeli action and for it to support the Arab plan for reconstruction of Gaza (see section 2.3 below). France, China and Russia told the same meeting they wanted a return to a ceasefire.<sup>53</sup>

The United States, whose negotiators had focused on extending stage one of the agreement, told the council that “the blame for the resumption of hostilities lies solely with Hamas”. The US said Hamas had “steadfastly refused every proposal deadline” and said the group should release the Israeli hostages immediately.<sup>54</sup> On 20 March 2025, the White House Press Secretary said that the US “fully supports Israel and the IDF and the actions that they have taken in recent days”.<sup>55</sup>

The UK told the March meeting that a return to fighting “will only result in the deaths of further Palestinian civilians, Israeli hostages and IDF soldiers” and that the conflict “cannot be resolved through military means”.<sup>56</sup> The UK said that “we oppose any attempt to forcibly annex land in Gaza”.<sup>57</sup>

In March, the UK also issued a statement with Germany and France calling for a return to the three-stage ceasefire process that began in January 2025.<sup>58</sup>

## 1.3 IDF military operations, May to August 2025

### Announced plan to expand operations from May 2025

On 5 May 2025, the Israeli Security Cabinet voted to expand IDF operations. Unnamed officials cited in the media suggested the IDF would capture and

<sup>50</sup> UN Geneva on Twitter/X, [AntonioGuterres is shocked \[...\]](#), 18 March 2025

<sup>51</sup> UN, [Secretary General’s press encounter on Gaza](#), 8 April 2025

<sup>52</sup> [Gaza is a “killing field” says UN Chief \[...\]](#), BBC News, 8 April 2025

<sup>53</sup> UN, [“Abject fear” returns to Gaza, Security Council hears](#), 18 March 2025

<sup>54</sup> US Mission to the UN, [Remarks at UNSC briefing on the situation in the Middle East](#), 18 March 2025

<sup>55</sup> [White House says Trump “fully supports” \[...\]](#), Times of Israel, 20 March 2025

<sup>56</sup> FCDO, [Aid should never be used as a political tool \[...\]](#), 18 March 2025

<sup>57</sup> FCDO, [The UK opposes any attempt to forcibly annex land in Gaza \[...\]](#), 21 March 2025

<sup>58</sup> FCDO, [Joint statement from the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the UK](#), 21 March 2025

hold significant parts of Gaza and not withdraw, for an unspecified length of time. Prime Minister Netanyahu also said that Palestinians in Gaza “will be moved, to protect [them]” and the IDF would “not enter [territory] and come out”.<sup>59</sup> He also reportedly told Israeli parliamentarians that the IDF was “destroying more and more houses [in Gaza]” and “the only obvious result will be Gazans choosing to emigrate outside of the Strip”.<sup>60</sup>

The action follows statements in April by Defence Minister Israel Katz who said that the IDF would “capture extensive territory that will be added to the State of Israel’s security areas”.<sup>61</sup> Also in April, Mr Netanyahu had said Israeli forces would be “dividing the [Gaza] strip and increasing the pressure step by step, so that they will give us our hostages”.<sup>62</sup> On 16 April, the Defense Minister also said that “the IDF will remain [...] as a buffer between the enemy and [Israeli] communities in any temporary or permanent situation in Gaza - as in Lebanon and Syria”.<sup>63</sup>

Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said that “we are finally going to conquer Gaza” and that “victory” would represent “civilians [being] sent to... the south to a humanitarian zone without Hamas or terrorism, and from there they will start to leave in great numbers to third countries”.<sup>64</sup>

[Israeli troops occupied Gaza](#) from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War/Six Day War before disengaging in 2005.

## UN Security Council Resolution 2735 (2024), June 2024

Passed by the UN Security Council in June 2024, [UN Security Council Resolution 2735](#) “rejects any attempt at demographic or territorial change in the Gaza Strip, including any actions that reduce the territory of Gaza”. Aside from Russia, all members of the UN Security Council voted in favour.

Israeli media report concerns among the IDF that an expanded operation could risk the lives of hostages in Gaza. The Hostages and Missing Families Forum have said the hostages must be prioritised.<sup>65</sup>

In July 2025 media reports suggested that the Israeli Government was considering whether to begin annexing parts of Gaza if Hamas did not agree

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<sup>59</sup> BBC News, [Israel security cabinet approves plan to “capture” Gaza, official says](#), 5 May 2025; AP, [Israel plans to seize Gaza under a new plan, officials say](#), 5 May 2025; Reuters, [Israel may seize all Gaza in expanded operation, officials say](#); 6 May 2025

<sup>60</sup> Times of Israel, [PM said to tell MKs: Israel destroying homes in Gaza](#), 13 May 2025

<sup>61</sup> Reuters, [Israel to seize parts of Gaza as military operation expands](#), 2 April 2025

<sup>62</sup> CNN, [Israel announces expansion of military operations in Gaza](#), 2 April 2025

<sup>63</sup> BBC News, [Israeli troops will remain in Gaza “security zones” after war \[...\]](#), 16 April 2025

<sup>64</sup> CBS News, [Israeli official says Gaza will be “entirely destroyed”](#), 6 May 2025

<sup>65</sup> Times of Israel, [Report: IDF chief warned Israel “could lose” Gaza hostages if it launches major operation](#), 4 May 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Israel approves plans to expand military \[...\]](#), 5 May 2025

to a hostage-ceasefire agreement (echoing some earlier statements made in April; see above).<sup>66</sup> See below for the position agreed in August and October.

## Commencement of expanded operation on 18 May 2025

On 18 May the IDF began its expanded operation. Mr Netanyahu said that Israel would “take control of all” the Gaza Strip and would allow some basic aid to enter in order to enable to military action (for more on the aid announcement, see section 1.5).<sup>67</sup> The IDF aimed to expand the amount of Gaza it controls from around 40% in May to 75% of the Strip within two months, and for Palestinian civilians to move to specific parts of Gaza.<sup>68</sup>

In July 2025 the Israeli Defence Minister, Israel Katz, also proposed plans for a “humanitarian city” in the south, in Rafah, where all the civilian population of Gaza would be congregated. Civilians would not be allowed to return to other parts of Gaza. The proposal was reportedly discussed by the Israeli cabinet but was not publicly confirmed or adopted.<sup>69</sup> Israeli Opposition Leader Yair Lapid and other political leaders criticised the proposal.<sup>70</sup>

In July, the UK Government said that it was “appalled [by] comments on forced displacement of Palestinians to Rafah” and that “this would contravene the fundamental principles” of the UN.<sup>71</sup> Reports suggest that IDF lawyers have also been critical of the proposal as a breach of international law, with some Israeli legal scholars publishing similar conclusions.<sup>72</sup>

## Further expansion of military operations, August 2025

On 8 August, the Israeli Security Cabinet agreed new operations in Gaza which would target the “two remaining strongholds” of Hamas: Gaza City and the Central Camps and Moasi. The IDF would initially “tak[e] control of Gaza City”. Palestinian civilians were planned to be given aid outside the combat zones, and the IDF said it would be distributing tents and shelter equipment before moving civilians to the “safe zones” in the south.<sup>73</sup> Prime Minister Netanyahu said that “our goal is not to occupy Gaza. Our goal is to free Gaza [from Hamas]” and the action was the “best way to end it speedily”.<sup>74</sup> In a

<sup>66</sup> ABC News, [UK to recognise Palestinian state as Netanyahu considers annexing \[...\]](#), 29 July 2025; Haaretz, [Netanyahu Proposes to Annex Parts of Gaza \[...\]](#), 28 July 2025

<sup>67</sup> Israel Prime Minister’s Office, [Prime Minister’s remarks at a press conference](#), 21 May 2025; France 24, [Israel PM vows to “take control of all” of Gaza](#), 19 May 2025

<sup>68</sup> Times of Israel, [IDF aims to capture 75% of Gaza Strip in two months](#), 25 May 2025

<sup>69</sup> Reuters, [Amid heated debate, no real plan for Israel’s “humanitarian city” in Gaza](#), 16 July 2025

<sup>70</sup> Times of Israel, [Lapid leads opposition pushback to “crazy” plan for humanitarian city](#), 14 July 2025

<sup>71</sup> FCDO, [With each day that passes, the suffering increases \[...\]](#), 16 July 2025

<sup>72</sup> Wall Street Journal, [Israel military lawyers raise concerns about new plan \[...\]](#), 11 July 2025; Just Security, [Manifestly Illegal: Israeli International Law Scholars on the Stated Plan to “Concentrate” the Palestinian Population in South Gaza](#), 11 July 2025

<sup>73</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Israel prepares to relocate Palestinians to ‘safe zones’ \[...\]](#), 16 August 2025

<sup>74</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [PM office’s announcement](#), 8 August 2025 and [PM Netanyahu holds press conference for foreign media](#), 10 August 2025

separate statement, he also said that Palestinians would “be allowed to exit” Gaza if other countries “open their gates”.<sup>75</sup>

On 22 August, Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that he had both approved IDF plans to take control of Gaza City and for negotiations with Hamas on the release of all hostages and an end to the conflict.<sup>76</sup> Defence Minister Katz said that if Hamas does not agree, “Gaza, the capital of Hamas, will become Rafah and Beit Hanoun” (both Rafah and Beit Hanoun have [experienced substantial destruction](#)).<sup>77</sup>

On 29 August, the IDF announced a halt to the daily humanitarian pauses around Gaza City.<sup>78</sup> On 15 September, it launched its ground campaign to capture the city. Around 800,000 Palestinians were estimated to have been in and around Gaza City, according to the UN, many of whom have been displaced before.<sup>79</sup> Israeli officials estimated that around 350,000 had moved south before the IDF operation, and that there had been between 2,000 and 3,000 Hamas fighters in the city.<sup>80</sup>

The decision followed Mr Netanyahu’s statement that Israel “intends to” take control of all of Gaza to assure Israeli security and remove Hamas. Mr Netanyahu said that Israel does not intend to hold or govern Gaza but rather hand it to “Arab forces” (see section 2 for post-conflict plans).<sup>81</sup>

Israeli media reports suggested opposition from the IDF Chief of Staff to the plan, who argued that full occupation of Gaza could risk the lives of the remaining hostages and suggested instead a gradual approach.<sup>82</sup> Israel’s Hostages and Missing Families Forum also said that the new offensive represented an “official declaration of the abandonment of the hostages”. Opposition leader, Yair Lapid, criticised the expanded action as a threat to the lives of hostages and IDF personnel. Another opposition leader, Benny Gantz, suggested Israel propose a permanent ceasefire in exchange for the release of hostages.<sup>83</sup>

Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich, also criticised the plan and said he had “lost faith that the Prime Minister is able and wants to lead the IDF to a decisive victory” and called for any partial ceasefires to be ruled out and for

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<sup>75</sup> Reuters, [Israel says Gazans free to exit \[...\]](#), 13 August 2025

<sup>76</sup> Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, [PM Netanyahu at the Gaza division](#), 21 August 2025

<sup>77</sup> BBC News, [Gaza city will be raised if Hamas does not agree our terms \[...\]](#), 21 August 2025

<sup>78</sup> Times of Israel, [IDF nixes daily humanitarian pauses in Gaza City \[...\]](#), 29 August 2025

<sup>79</sup> UN, [Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas: Briefing to the Security Council on the situation in the Middle East \[...\]](#) (PDF), 10 August 2025

<sup>80</sup> BBC News, [Israel launches ground offensive on Gaza City](#), 15 September 2025; CNN, [Israeli military estimates up to 3,000 Hamas militants in Gaza City](#), 17 September 2025

<sup>81</sup> Fox News, [Netanyahu vows to take full control of Gaza Strip \[...\]](#), 7 August 2025, from 1:00

<sup>82</sup> Times of Israel, [Military chief said to clash with Netanyahu over plans \[...\]](#), 6 August 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Israeli army chief warns against Gaza City occupation](#), 2 September 2025

<sup>83</sup> Times of Israel, [Lapid urges government supporters to join Sunday’s general strike](#), 12 August 2025; Times of Israel, [Opposition, world leaders, families of hostages blast Gaza city \[...\]](#), 8 August 2025

the “annexation of large parts of the Gaza Strip and opening its gates to voluntary migration”.<sup>84</sup>

The Palestinian Authority argued in August that the planned IDF action was “not to end Hamas rule or disarm it, but to prevent independent Palestinian statehood” by “forced transfer and massacres”.<sup>85</sup>

## International response to May and August 2025 IDF operations

The UK, France and Canada issued a joint statement in opposition to the expanded operations on 19 May.<sup>86</sup> In a separate statement the German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, also said Germany “no longer sees any logic as to how [IDF action] serve[s] the goal of fighting terror and freeing the hostages”. Germany has been one of the less critical European voices of Israel in the 2023 to 2025 conflict.<sup>87</sup>

The UK Government opposed an expansion to military operations, and in May announced it would suspend talks with Israel on a free trade agreement and review its roadmap on bilateral relations with the country. The EU was also reviewing its relations with Israel (see below, section 3.3). In July 2025 the UK Government said it was willing to take further steps against Israel to ensure an increase of aid into Gaza. Section 3.3 has more on these actions.

The UK reiterated its opposition to proposed IDF action in August alongside countries including Canada, France, Germany and Italy.<sup>88</sup> The UK backed an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the announcement and “condemned” Israeli plans.<sup>89</sup> France called for an international mission under a UN mandate to stabilise Gaza (also [an outcome of the July 2025 two-state solution conference](#); it would require the support of the UN Security Council).<sup>90</sup> Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper described the September offensive as “reckless and appalling”.<sup>91</sup>

A spokesperson for the UN Secretary General described the August decision as a “dangerous escalation” and restated his call for the immediate release of hostages, a permanent ceasefire, and unimpeded humanitarian access.<sup>92</sup>

The European Union President, António Costa, said the decision to proceed with the operation “must have consequences for EU-Israel relations, to be

<sup>84</sup> Times of Israel, [Smotrich says he’s “lost faith” in PM’s desire to win war \[...\]](#), 9 August 2025

<sup>85</sup> WAFA, [Addressing UNSC: Palestine’s permanent observer to UN stresses Israel \[...\]](#), 10 August 2025

<sup>86</sup> Prime Minister’s Office, [Joint statement from the leaders of UK \[...\]](#), 19 May 2025

<sup>87</sup> CNN, [Germany’s leader has criticised Israel’s conduct in Gaza](#), 27 May 2025

<sup>88</sup> FCDO, [Joint Foreign Ministers’ statement on Gaza](#), 8 August 2025

<sup>89</sup> FCDO, [Joint statement of the Government of Israel’s decision to expand \[...\]](#), 10 August 2025

<sup>90</sup> Reuters, [Macron slams disaster waiting to happen in Gaza](#), 11 August 2025

<sup>91</sup> Yvette Cooper MP on Twitter/X, [“The new IDF assault on Gaza \[...\]”](#), 16 September 2025

<sup>92</sup> UN, [Statement attributable to the spokesperson of the Secretary General](#), 8 August 2025

assessed by the Council”. The EU has previously announced a review into its relations with Israel; see below, section 3.3.<sup>93</sup>

The US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said in August that “it’s up to Israel to decide what they need to do for their own security”. He said that while “we want to do everything” to address the humanitarian situation, “not enough attention” is being paid to the hostages held in Gaza or “how Hamas needs to be disarmed and disbanded”.<sup>94</sup> In September, in response to the launch of IDF operations in Gaza City, Mr Rubio said that he believed Israel did not wish to conduct the offensive but in the absence of diplomatic agreement “it’s going to have to end [referring to the release of hostages and removal of Hamas] through a military operation”.<sup>95</sup>

## 1.4 Negotiations and October 2025 agreement

### Negotiations on a hostage-ceasefire agreement in 2025

Israel and Hamas, with US, Qatari and Egyptian mediation, continued to negotiate on a new ceasefire-hostage proposal from March 2025.

Proposals under consideration reportedly included the release of some hostages and Palestinian prisoners in exchange for a time-limited ceasefire (of up to two months, depending on the proposal) and stage one conditions. Other plans included the release of hostages and Palestinian prisoners, a complete IDF withdrawal from Gaza, and ceasefire for five to seven years.<sup>96</sup>

Other aspects of negotiation included Israeli requests that Hamas disarm, and Hamas wanting Israel to withdraw from Gaza.<sup>97</sup>

In August 2025, Prime Minister Netanyahu said a partial agreement was “behind us” and Israel was seeking the release of all hostages in one event.<sup>98</sup>

In August, the Israeli Security Cabinet also agreed five principles to end the conflict. These were:

1. The disarming of Hamas.
2. The return of all the hostages – the living and the deceased.

<sup>93</sup> António Costa on Twitter/X, [“I strongly urge the Israeli government to reconsider its decision to take over Gaza City”](#), 8 August 2025

<sup>94</sup> US DoS, [Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Larry Kudlow \[...\]](#), 6 August 2025

<sup>95</sup> US DoS, [Secretary of state Marco Rubio with Gillian Turner of Fox News](#), 15 September 2025

<sup>96</sup> BBC News, [New Israel-Gaza ceasefire plan proposed, Hamas source tells BBC](#), 22 April 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Hamas says under “pressure” to accept partial ceasefire deal](#), 8 May 2025

<sup>97</sup> BBC Monitoring [Pan-Arab outlet reports details of new Gaza ceasefire proposal](#), 15 April 2025; BBC News, [Hamas rejects Israeli ceasefire disarmament proposal, Palestinian official says](#), 15 April 2025

<sup>98</sup> AP, [Netanyahu hints that Gaza ceasefire talks \[...\]](#), 13 August 2025

3. The demilitarization of the Gaza Strip.
4. Israeli security control in the Gaza Strip.
5. The establishment of an alternative civil administration that is neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority.<sup>99</sup>

Hamas officials have suggested the group is willing to cede the governance of Gaza but not disarm without the establishment of a Palestinian state (see section 2 below).<sup>100</sup>

In July 2025, the then UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy said the four main “sticking points” in negotiations were a 60-day or permanent ceasefire (the latter being the UK preference), the degree to which the IDF will withdraw from Gaza, the aid architecture, and coordinating the release of hostages.<sup>101</sup> Mr Lammy had said that he hoped that once the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) rose for the summer (on 22 July), an agreement could be reached.<sup>102</sup>

Media reports in May 2025 suggested that the Trump administration had been urging Israel to bring its military operations to a close, to secure the release of hostages, and deliver aid into Gaza. Neither President Trump nor Vice President JD Vance visited Israel while in the region for talks in May 2025.<sup>103</sup>

## Israeli strike on Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, September 2025

### Israeli actions, background and statements

Qatar has long hosted members of Hamas in order to facilitate negotiations with the group, though the Biden administration had signalled that at the end of the conflict Qatar’s relationship with Hamas would have to change.<sup>104</sup>

On 9 September 2025, the IDF launched an airstrike targeting Hamas negotiators in Qatar. Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, said that “Israel initiated it, Israel conducted it, and Israel takes full responsibility”.<sup>105</sup> He said that Israel was “pass[ing] a message to the terrorists [Hamas], that they are not immune anywhere in the world” and that the strike was also a response to an attack in Jerusalem that killed six Israelis (Hamas claimed

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<sup>99</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [PM office’s announcement](#), 8 August 2025

<sup>100</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Hamas says “no point” to talks with Israel under “genocide”](#), 28 July 2025

<sup>101</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee, [Oral evidence: the work of the FCDO](#), 8 July 2025, Q253

<sup>102</sup> HC Deb, [21 July 2025](#), c606

<sup>103</sup> Arab Center Washington DC, [President Trump’s Gulf trip: post-visit observations](#), 20 May 2025; The Telegraph, [JD Vance “skipped Israel visit over Gaza onslaught concerns](#), 19 May 2025

<sup>104</sup> See Commons Library research briefing, [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2023/24: US, EU and Middle East response](#), December 2024, section 5.6

<sup>105</sup> Times of Israel, [‘Israel takes full responsibility’ \[...\]](#), 9 September 2025; Times of Israel, [Katz: We’ll hit our enemies anywhere](#), 10 September 2025

responsibility for the attack).<sup>106</sup> Six people were killed in the Israeli strike, including five Hamas members and one Qatari.<sup>107</sup>

From 2023 to 2025, Israel also targeted Hamas members throughout the region outside Gaza, including in the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon and Iran.<sup>108</sup>

Qatar's Prime Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani, condemned the airstrike and said it "undermined any chance of stability, any chance of peace". He said Qatar had been reviewing its role as mediator, and Israel had not been "serious about anything" in negotiations. However, Qatar later confirmed it would continue its mediation role.<sup>109</sup>

On 29 September 2025, following intervention from President Trump, Mr Netanyahu spoke to the Qatari Prime Minister and told him that "Israel regrets that one of your citizens was killed in our strike" and that "Israel has no plan to violate your sovereignty again in the future".<sup>110</sup>

### UK and international response

On 11 September 2025, all 15 members of the UN Security Council, including the United States, issued a joint presidential statement in which they set out their "condemnation" of the strike on Qatar and "underscored" their support for the country as a mediator in the conflict.<sup>111</sup>

The US told the Security Council that "eliminating Hamas [...] is a worthy goal" but "unilateral bombing inside Qatar – a sovereign nation working very hard [...] to broker peace – does not advance Israel's or America's goals".<sup>112</sup>

Alongside France and Germany, the UK "condemned" the Israeli strike as a violation of Qatari sovereignty, a threat to regional stability and a risk to achieving a negotiated solution to the Israel-Hamas conflict. The three states backed Qatar's role as a mediator.<sup>113</sup> Prime Minister Keir Starmer also raised the same issues in conversations with the Qatari Emir and Israeli President.<sup>114</sup>

<sup>106</sup> US DoS, [Secretary Rubio with Prime Minister Netanyahu](#), 15 September 2025; BBC News, [Hamas claims leadership survived Israeli attack in Doha, but confirms six deaths](#), 10 September 2025

<sup>107</sup> Al Jazeera, [Qatar holds funeral for victims of Israeli attack \[...\]](#), 11 September 2025

<sup>108</sup> Arab News, [3 dead in north Lebanon strike that Israel says hit Hamas militant](#), 8 July 2024; BBC News, [Israeli strike kills Hamas commander in occupied West Bank](#), 3 October 2024; BBC News, [Israel confirms it killed Hamas leader Haniyeh in Tehran](#), 23 December 2024; Reuters, [Israeli military says it struck Hamas member in southern Syria](#), 8 June 2025

<sup>109</sup> CNN, [Qatari prime minister says Netanyahu 'killed any hope' \[...\]](#), 24 September 2025

<sup>110</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [PM Netanyahu speaks with the Qatari Prime Minister](#), 29 September 2025

<sup>111</sup> UN, [Security Council press statement on Doha strikes](#), 11 September 2025. For the separate UK statement, see FCDO, [Israel's strikes on Doha are a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Qatar](#), 11 September 2025. Security Council Report (not affiliated with the UN), [Urgent briefing on Israel's strike on Qatar](#), 10 September 2025

<sup>112</sup> US Mission to the UN, [Remarks by Ambassador Dorothy Shea \[...\]](#), 11 September 2025

<sup>113</sup> FCDO, [F3 Foreign Ministers statement on Israeli strikes in Doha](#), 12 September 2025

<sup>114</sup> PMO, [PM call with the Amir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani](#), 9 September 2025 and [PM meeting with President Herzog of Israel](#), 10 September 2025

The Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (a collection of Arab states and states with significant Muslim populations) also called on all governments to “prevent Israel from continuing its actions against the Palestinian people” and “review [their] diplomatic and economic relations with it”.<sup>115</sup> Media reports suggest Egyptian officials were also concerned that Israel could target Hamas members and negotiators in Egypt.<sup>116</sup>

### Further reading on the strike on Doha, Qatar

- Foreign Policy, [Israel’s strategic declaration](#), 9 September 2025
- Center for Strategic and international Studies, [Israel strikes Hamas in Qatar](#), 9 September 2025
- Arab Center Washington DC, [Striking a US ally: Israel’s attack on Qatar and the erosion of regional stability](#), 9 September 2025
- Washington Institute, [Israel strikes Qatar: Implications for Gaza diplomacy, gulf relations, and US policy](#), 10 September 2025

## October 2025 agreement

On 8 October 2025, President Trump announced that Israel and Hamas had reached an agreement on the “first phase” to ending the conflict. This would cover the release of all remaining hostages, a ceasefire, and Israeli withdrawal from parts of central Gaza. It came into effect on 10 October.<sup>117</sup>

The agreement was reached following the publication of 20-point proposal by the United States (see section 2.2) and further regional talks.

President Trump has announced that “the war is over” and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the agreement “marks the end of two years of war”.<sup>118</sup> The Israeli Foreign Minister, Gideon Sa’ar, also said he believed the agreement opens up the potential for renewed Arab-Israeli engagement, as had occurred with the [four Abraham Accord states in 2020](#).<sup>119</sup>

On 10 October Mr Netanyahu said Hamas must be disarmed and Gaza demilitarised, and Israel was prepared to “achieve [this] the hard way” if it could not be achieved otherwise.<sup>120</sup> He also said “the campaign is not over [...] some of our enemies are trying to rebuild themselves to attack us

<sup>115</sup> Qatar News Agency, [Final communique issued by Arab-Islamic \[...\] summit](#), 15 September 2025

<sup>116</sup> Chatham House, [Egypt now sees Israel as an imminent threat](#), 17 September 2025

<sup>117</sup> Reuters, [Israel and Hamas agree to first phase of Trump’s Gaza ceasefire plan](#), 9 October 2025

<sup>118</sup> Reuters, [Trump says Gaza war has ended](#), 12 October 2025; Times of Israel, [Netanyahu, in speech next to Trump, says today ‘marks the end of two years of war’](#), 13 October 2025; Times of Israel, [Full text of Trump’s Knesset speech](#), 14 October 2025

<sup>119</sup> Israeli Foreign Office, [FM Sa’ar on the hostage release agreement](#), 9 October 2025

<sup>120</sup> Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, [Statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu](#), 10 October 2025

again”.<sup>121</sup> Israel has continued to target Hezbollah in Lebanon since the [November 2024 ceasefire, citing the need for Hezbollah to disarm](#), as well as the Houthis in Yemen, whose attacks on Israel continued in 2025.<sup>122</sup>

On 15 October, Israeli Defence Minister, Israel Katz said that if Hamas did not adhere to the agreement, “Israel, in coordination with the US, will return to fighting and work to completely defeat Hamas, change the reality in Gaza and achieve all the goals of the war”.<sup>123</sup>

### What are the “first phase” steps in the agreement?

The agreement was described as covering the “first phase” of ending the conflict. It is based on the 20-point Middle East plan put forward by the Trump administration in September/October 2025. The full details of the first phase have not been published but include:<sup>124</sup>

1. All military action being suspended. The IDF will withdraw to set lines in Gaza.
2. Hamas has “approval for a period of time” to manage security in Gaza but it must disarm soon, either voluntarily or by force.
3. All hostages held in Gaza, alive and deceased, will be released. This will occur within 72 hours of agreement being reached (13 October, though it the agreement says it may take longer to identify the bodies of the hostages that have been killed).
4. Hostages will be released in exchange for Palestinians detained in Israel. The 20-point plan says this will include “50 life sentence prisoners plus 1,700 Gazans who were detained after 7 October 2023, including all women and children detained in that context”. It also says that, “for every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release the remains of 15 deceased Gazans”.
  - Hamas reportedly sought the release of [Marwan Barghouti](#), a senior figure in Fatah, which is the dominant political group in the West Bank and who is seen as a potential successor to President Abbas,

<sup>121</sup> Israeli Foreign Office, [Statement by PM Netanyahu](#), 12 October 2025

<sup>122</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Israeli warplanes launch fierce overnight raids \[...\]](#), 11 October 2025; ACLED, [Two years since 7 October: Israel’s forever wars across the Middle East](#), 7 October 2025

<sup>123</sup> Times of Israel, [After signing Gaza deal, PM threatens return to war if demands not met \[...\]](#), 10 October 2025

<sup>124</sup> From Israel National News, [‘Comprehensive End of Gaza War’: Document outlining Israel-Hamas agreement revealed](#), 10 October 2025; BBC News, [What does wording of Gaza ceasefire agreement tell us?](#), 10 October 2025; Times of Israel, [Officials say GHF aid sites being shut down, in accordance with Gaza deal](#), 13 October 2025; Haaretz, [Israel finalizes list of Palestinian prisoners to be released under Gaza cease-fire](#), 10 October 2025; Reuters, [Details of the Gaza ceasefire agreement](#), 10 October 2025; Reuters, [Trump suggests Hamas has approval for internal security operations in Gaza](#), 13 October 2025; Reuters, [Trump says Hamas must disarm or be disarmed, perhaps violently](#), 14 October 2025; Reuters, [Israel cuts agreed aid into Gaza over slow release of hostage bodies](#), 14 October 2025; New York Times, [Hamas says it has returned all hostage remains it can recover](#), 15 October 2025

and [Ahmad Saadat](#), leader of the [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine](#). Both have been convicted in Israel of being involved in attacks that led to civilian deaths. Neither are named as among those planned to be released.<sup>125</sup> However, President Trump says he is considering Barghouti's release.<sup>126</sup>

5. Humanitarian aid will be delivered under the same terms as the January 2025 agreement and the 20-point plan (for a summary see above, section 1.1). Around 600 trucks of aid will enter Gaza each day, and be organised under the UN system. The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF, see page 44) has suspended its operations.
6. The Rafah crossing will be reopened and civilians in Gaza will be allowed to leave for Egypt through it and return via the same crossing. This will be done in coordination with Egypt, and subject to Israeli approval and under supervision of an EU delegation.
7. A multinational group, including representatives from the United States, Qatar, Egypt, Turkey and other countries will oversee and coordinate the implementation of the initial agreement.

Wider issues in the 20-point plan and their timing, such as Hamas disarming, the IDF fully withdrawing from Gaza, and the Palestinian Authority taking control of Gaza remain issues of discussion. See below, section 2.2.

## Implementation

All 20 living hostages were released on 13 October. As of 14 November, the bodies of three hostages remain in Gaza.<sup>127</sup> The International Committee of the Red Cross said the recovery of the bodies is a “massive challenge” and may take several more days or weeks.<sup>128</sup> On 15 October Hamas said that it had “handed over everyone it had in terms of living captives and what it had in terms of bodies that it could recover” and “specialist equipment” would be required to identify the remainder.<sup>129</sup>

Israel has withdrawn to around the first withdrawal line, known as the “yellow line” (see the map in section 2.2). The IDF retains control of 53% of Gaza.<sup>130</sup>

On 14 October, Israel said it would not allow the reopening of the Rafah crossing and would only allow the UN to deliver 300 trucks of aid into Gaza, in response to delays in releasing the bodies of hostages that had been killed.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> BBC News, [Hamas presses Israel to free prominent prisoners as part of Gaza deal](#), 11 October 2025

<sup>126</sup> Reuters, [Trump mulls whether Israel should free jailed Palestinian political figure](#), 23 October 2025

<sup>127</sup> Reuters, [Israel receives another deceased hostage from Hamas, Islamic Jihad](#), 13 November 2025

<sup>128</sup> Reuters, [Returning hostage bodies from Gaza may take time, Red Cross says](#), 14 October 2025

<sup>129</sup> New York Times, [Hamas says it has returned all hostage remains it can recover](#), 15 October 2025

<sup>130</sup> BBC News, [Israel's 'yellow line' in Gaza gives Netanyahu room for manoeuvre](#), 21 October 2025; BBC News, [Israel maintaining control deeper inside Gaza than expected, new boundary markers suggest](#), 23 October 2025

<sup>131</sup> Times of Israel, [Israel won't reopen Rafah crossing, will limit aid](#), 14 October 2025; Reuters, [Israel cuts agreed aid into Gaza over slow release of hostage bodies](#), 14 October 2025

On 18 October, Israel said that the Rafah crossing will remain closed until Hamas “implements its part in returning the deceased hostages”.<sup>132</sup>

The extent of the UN aid mission in Gaza is uncertain. In 2024, [Israel passed legislation against UNRWA operating](#) in Israel and occupied East Jerusalem. The UNRWA Commissioner General has called for Israel to lift the ban.<sup>133</sup> For more on the UN’s aid plans, see below, section 1.5.

Some armed conflict has continued between the IDF and some armed Palestinian groups. On 19 October, two IDF soldiers were killed and the Israeli air strikes that followed killed a reported 26 Palestinians.<sup>134</sup> President Trump said that “rebels” rather than Hamas were responsible for the attack. Hamas denied responsibility.<sup>135</sup> US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that “all the mediators” to the agreement “agree” that the IDF can take action to protect its personnel.<sup>136</sup>

Hamas also accuses Israel of violations of the agreement, including obstructing aid distribution and continuing some military activity.<sup>137</sup>

However, sustained conflict has not resumed.

Some Hamas forces also remain in tunnels in IDF-controlled areas of Gaza. The US has reportedly requested Israel allow them passage, to avoid an outbreak of armed conflict.<sup>138</sup>

## UK and international response

In a statement to the Commons on 14 October, the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, welcomed the agreement, the release of hostages, and said it “what matters now is implementation and getting help in as quickly as possible”. He said the UK would focus on supporting reconstruction, reforms to the Palestinian Authority and planning for an international stabilisation force.<sup>139</sup> For more on the UK response, see below sections 2.2 and 3.

The UK, France and Germany have also said that the UN Security Council should “give its full backing to the plan and support its implementation”. They also said that humanitarian aid should be sent through UN agencies.<sup>140</sup> The EU has made a similar statement of support.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Prime Minister's Office announcement](#), 18 October 2025

<sup>133</sup> UNRWA, [UNRWA Commissioner-General on Gaza: A welcome and rare momentum](#), 4 October 2025

<sup>134</sup> Reuters, [Israel says ceasefire and aid to resume after airstrikes kill 26 in Gaza](#), 19 October 2025

<sup>135</sup> Times of Israel, [Trump says 'rebels' staged deadly attack on IDF troops in Gaza](#), 20 October 2025

<sup>136</sup> Asharq Al-Awsat, [Rubio says Israeli strike on Gaza didn't violate ceasefire](#), 27 October 2025

<sup>137</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Hamas lists Israeli 'violations' of Gaza ceasefire deal](#), 20 October 2025

<sup>138</sup> BBC Monitoring, [US reportedly pressuring Israel to allow passage for Hamas members](#), 6 November 2025; Axios, [US sees Rafah tunnels crisis as potential model for disarming Hamas](#), 5 November 2025

<sup>139</sup> HC Deb, [14 October 2025](#), c218

<sup>140</sup> FCDO, [Joint E3 leaders statement](#), 10 October 2025; Prime Minister's Office, [PM statement on the release of hostages](#), 13 October 2025

<sup>141</sup> European Council, [Israel/Palestine: statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union \[...\]](#), 10 October 2025

Leaders, including President Trump and Prime Minister Keir Starmer, met at a summit in Egypt on 13 October to discuss next steps. The United States, Qatar, Egypt and Turkey signed a document in which they “pledge[d] to work collectively to implement and sustain” peace in the region. However, it included no further details on implementation.<sup>142</sup> Neither Israel nor Hamas were represented at the summit. Palestinian Authority President, Mahmoud Abbas, did attend and met with President Trump (the US had revoked Mr Abbas’ visa to attend the UN General Assembly at New York in September).<sup>143</sup>

The UK also separately hosted a three-day conference on reconstruction in Wilton Park from 13 October. The conference brought together representatives from businesses, civil society and governments (see below, section 3.2).<sup>144</sup>

### Further reading on the October 2025 agreement

- Center for Strategic and International Studies, [What comes next for Israel-Hamas ceasefire?](#), 9 October 2025
- Foreign Policy, [The biggest hurdles to the next phase of Trump’s Gaza deal](#), 9 October 2025
- Foreign Affairs, [Hamas is not done fighting](#), 14 October 2025
- Washington Institute, [The ceasefire in Gaza: views on security, Palestinian governance, and regional dynamics](#), 14 October 2025

See section 2.2 below, for information on the other provisions in the Trump administration’s 20-point plan and further reading.

## 1.5

## Humanitarian situation and access in Gaza

### Further reading on the humanitarian situation in Gaza

The [UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs](#) (UNOCHA) publishes regular updates on the humanitarian situation in Gaza, including the level of

<sup>142</sup> New York Times, [Trump touts ‘very important signing,’ but details are few](#), 13 October 2025; White House, [The Trump declaration for enduring peace and prosperity](#), 13 October 2025

<sup>143</sup> New York Times, [Trump and Abbas share moment of rapprochement in Egypt](#), 13 October 2025

<sup>144</sup> Prime Minister’s Office, [Prime Minister pledges UK leadership in Gaza’s reconstruction](#), 12 October 2025; FCDO, [Minister for the Middle East speech at Wilton Park conference](#), 13 October 2025

humanitarian need, casualties, damage to infrastructure, and aid access (browse its [homepage](#) for ‘situation report’ and ‘impact snapshot’).

The UN, EU and World Bank published an [Interim Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment of Gaza](#) in February 2025. The assessment estimated that 95% of hospitals were non-functional, 91% of the population (1.8 million people) had high levels of acute food insecurity, and 100% of education facilities were fully destroyed or partially damaged.

## Humanitarian aid delivery, January to March 2025

When the hostage-ceasefire agreement came into force on 19 January 2025, crossing points were reopened into Gaza and a target of 500 to 600 aid trucks a day was set. In February, an EU civilian border assistance mission was deployed to Rafah to monitor the border crossing with Egypt.<sup>145</sup>

On 6 February, UNOCHA reported that a total of 10,000 aid trucks had entered Gaza since 19 January (an average of 526 trucks a day).<sup>146</sup> To 2 March, Israel said that a total of around 25,200 trucks had entered Gaza (an average of 600 trucks a day), although Hamas says that less than half of the agreed-upon number of trucks carrying fuel were allowed in, and the entry of live animals was denied.<sup>147</sup> Tom Fletcher, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, said on 10 February that the threat of famine in Gaza was “largely averted” but that if the agreement did not hold “then very quickly those (famine-like) conditions will come back again”.<sup>148</sup>

Following the 19 January agreement, the World Health Organisation (WHO) also resumed a polio vaccination campaign. However, this was impacted by the halt on aid entry after 2 March 2025 (see next section). UNRWA, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, Unicef (the UN agency for children), and the World Food Programme are among the UN agencies active in Gaza.<sup>149</sup>

In March the Associated Press news agency reported that the [review and pause of US aid](#) announced by the Trump administration in January 2025 meant no US funding has been provided to aid groups in Gaza since 31 January. Some aid groups said they had cut down operations or staff.<sup>150</sup>

A summary of humanitarian activity in Gaza from 19 January to 18 March 2025 can be found in a report produced by UNOCHA: [Humanitarian response by the UN and humanitarian partners during stage one of the ceasefire](#) (17 March

<sup>145</sup> EU External Action, [Gaza-Israel ceasefire: EUBAM Rafah return to Rafah](#), 10 February 2025

<sup>146</sup> UN, [Gaza: 10,000 aid trucks reached enclave since ceasefire began](#), 6 February 2025

<sup>147</sup> Israeli Humanitarian Aid Efforts, [Weekly summary 23 Feb-1 March, week 6](#), accessed 6 March 2025; [Israel has cut off all supplies to Gaza](#), AP, 2 March 2025

<sup>148</sup> [Famine mostly averted but is a danger again if ceasefire collapses \[...\]](#), AP, 10 February 2025

<sup>149</sup> UNOCHA, [Humanitarian situation update 267 Gaza Strip](#), 25 February 2025; Reuters, [Israel steps up Gaza strikes, polio vaccination halted by blockade](#), 22 April 2025

<sup>150</sup> AP, [Aid efforts in Gaza slow as millions of promised USAID dollars do not arrive](#), 7 March 2025

2025). UNOCHA has also produced a one-page summary of the report: [Humanitarian response by the UN and humanitarian partners during phase one of the ceasefire](#) (PDF, 17 March 2025).

## March 2025 pause of all goods and electricity into Gaza

On 2 March 2025, the Israeli Government announced it would stop all goods and supplies from entering Gaza, saying Hamas was refusing to negotiate on an extension to stage one of the January 2025 agreement (see above, section 1.1). Israel also accused Hamas of “taking control of all supplies and goods” entering Gaza.<sup>151</sup> In April, the Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz said that “blocking this aid is one of the main pressure levers preventing Hamas from using it as a tool with the population”, and the Israeli Foreign Minister, Gideon Sa’ar, said that the diversion of aid by Hamas could not be allowed to continue.<sup>152</sup>

On 9 March, Israel also cut off electricity supplies into Gaza. Israeli media reported that only one such power line has been operating since October 2023, supplying water desalination plants. The Israeli Energy Minister said that this was to put pressure on Hamas to release the remaining hostages it holds. Hamas criticised the decision as “mass punishment”.<sup>153</sup>

## UK and international response to aid halt, March to May 2025

In early March, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Tom Fletcher, said that “International humanitarian law is clear: We must be allowed access to deliver vital lifesaving aid”.<sup>154</sup> UNRWA said “the situation [in Gaza] is deteriorating very, very quickly” and that there was the risk of a return to “deepening hunger” in Gaza “the more we go ahead” with aid blockages.<sup>155</sup>

On 5 March, the UK, Germany and France issued a statement calling on Israel to allow aid, for talks to continue and for all hostages to be released. The joint statement said that international humanitarian law should be upheld:

A halt on goods and supplies entering Gaza, such as that announced by the Government of Israel would risk violating International Humanitarian Law. Humanitarian aid should never be contingent on a ceasefire or used as a political tool.<sup>156</sup>

<sup>151</sup> Times of Israel, [Israel halt aid into Gaza, citing Hamas refusal](#), 2 March 2025

<sup>152</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Minister of Foreign Affairs remarks](#), 4 March 2025; France 24, [“No humanitarian aid will enter Gaza”, Israel defence minister says](#), 16 April 2025

<sup>153</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Israel cuts off electricity supply to Gaza](#), 10 March 2025

<sup>154</sup> UNOCHA, [Humanitarian situation update 269 Gaza Strip](#), 4 March 2025; BBC News, [Gaza food prices soar after Israel halt aid delivery](#), 6 March 2025

<sup>155</sup> Reuters, [Gaza hunger crisis could return if Israeli blockade continues \[...\]](#), 10 March 2025

<sup>156</sup> FCDO, [Humanitarian access in Gaza: F3 foreign minister’s statement](#), 5 March 2025

A later statement, issued on 14 March by G7 foreign ministers, “reaffirmed their support for the resumption of unhindered humanitarian aid into Gaza and for a permanent ceasefire”.<sup>157</sup>

The then UK Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, told the House of Commons on 20 March that “it’s difficult to see how denying humanitarian assistance to a civilian population can be compatible with international humanitarian law”.<sup>158</sup>

In response to the 5 March statement, the Israeli Foreign Ministry said “aid that goes to Hamas is not humanitarian” and reiterated that Hamas was unwilling to discuss the US-Israel proposal to extend the first stage of the agreement.<sup>159</sup> It has also questioned UN agency statements that essential humanitarian supplies were running low, saying sufficient supplies entered Gaza in January and February.<sup>160</sup>

In April and May, the UK Government issued further statements calling on Israel to end the block on aid entering Gaza and said that aid must not be used as a “pressure lever” in negotiations.<sup>161</sup> The German Government, which took office in May, also said aid must be allowed into Gaza, and the French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs said on 6 May that the Israeli “government is currently in clear breach of international law and international humanitarian law”.<sup>162</sup>

On 6 March, the US State Department said so long as “we can’t guarantee the safety of something [aid] moving in, that is going to be stopped. It is not a withholding [...] it’s a reflection of [...] the situation on the ground”.<sup>163</sup> The US says it was focused on a ceasefire to allow the safe resumption of aid:

making sure that there’s a situation on the ground that allows food to get to the people who need it, that allows aid to move through to the people who have been suffering because of the choices that Hamas has made throughout the years, and that is what we continue to work on.<sup>164</sup>

## Resumption of aid announced on 18 May 2025

On 18 May 2025 Israel announced a resumption of aid into Gaza. However, the levels of aid that have entered Gaza continue to be lower than levels recorded in earlier stages of the 2023-25 conflict (see below). Prime Minister Netanyahu

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<sup>157</sup> US DoS, [Statement of the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting in Charlevoix](#), 14 March 2025. The G7 is formed of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, United States, and the European Union

<sup>158</sup> FCDO, [Middle East: Foreign Secretary statement](#), 20 March 2025

<sup>159</sup> Times of Israel, [France, Germany and UK call on Israel to ensure ‘unhindered’ aid](#), 6 March 2025

<sup>160</sup> Reuters, [Israel says plenty of food in Gaza \[...\]](#), 1 April 2025

<sup>161</sup> FCDO, [Aid to Gaza. F3 foreign minister’s statement](#), 23 April 2025; FCDO, [The UK calls on Israel to lift its block on aid](#), 13 May 2025; FCDO, [Joint statement on the humanitarian situation in Gaza](#), 13 May 2025

<sup>162</sup> Reuters, [New German chancellor sends minister to Israel \[...\]](#), 7 May 2025; French Foreign Ministry, [Israel in clear breach of international law- Foreign minister](#), 6 May 2025

<sup>163</sup> US DoS, [Department press briefing](#), 6 March 2025

<sup>164</sup> [Israel block on Gaza coordinated with Trump administration](#), ABC News, 2 March 2025; US DoS, [Department press briefing](#), 17 March 2025

said that aid would be allowed to enter because of an IDF recommendation to “make certain that no starvation crisis develops” during the expanded military operation because a crisis would “endanger” the operation to defeat Hamas.<sup>165</sup> Some in his ruling coalition criticised the decision to allow aid to enter Gaza.<sup>166</sup>

UNOCHA called on Israel to open more aid corridors, simplify and expedite the checks that aid goes through before entering Gaza, to stop military operations where aid is being delivered, and allow UN teams to deliver food, gas, health, fuel, shelter and hygiene services.<sup>167</sup>

## Assessment of humanitarian situation, mid-2025

On 30 May UN spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said the limited amount of aid entering Gaza was “nowhere near sufficient” for the population, and the “catastrophic situation in Gaza is the worst since the war began”.<sup>168</sup>

On 13 May the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Tom Fletcher, told the UN Security Council that the [International Court of Justice](#) “is considering whether a genocide is taking place in Gaza” and asked members “will you act – decisively – to prevent genocide and to ensure respect for international humanitarian law”.<sup>169</sup>

On 30 May Mr Fletcher restated his comments in a BBC interview.<sup>170</sup>

Israel has strongly denied allegations of genocide: see section 2.8 of the Commons Library research briefing, [Israel and the OPTs: UK response and actions July 2024 to March 2025](#). Israel’s ambassador to the UN, Danny Dolan, said that charge was “invoke[d] [...] without evidence, mandate or restraint” and was “utterly inappropriate”. Mr Fletcher said he was mandated to report “honestly”.<sup>171</sup>

### Aid access and crossings: UN assessment

During the block on aid entering Gaza, no aid was able to enter Gaza. UNOCHA also reported, on 25 March, that “most movement requests [from aid agencies] requiring coordination with Israeli authorities are denied”.<sup>172</sup> On 21 May the UN has said that few trucks had been able to distribute aid since the Israeli Government announcement that aid deliveries could resume.<sup>173</sup>

<sup>165</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Prime Minister’s Office announcement](#), 18 May 2025

<sup>166</sup> Times of Israel, [Hawkish politicians and groups pillory Netanyahu](#), 19 May 2025

<sup>167</sup> UN, [UN aid chief welcomes Gaza aid resumption](#), 19 May 2025

<sup>168</sup> UN, [Daily press briefing by the office of the spokesperson for the Secretary General](#), 30 May 2025

<sup>169</sup> UNOCHA, [UN relief chief calls on Security Council to act decisively \[...\]](#), 13 May 2025

<sup>170</sup> BBC News, [Gaza subjected to forced starvation, top UN official tells BBC](#), 30 May 2025

<sup>171</sup> Reuters, [Israel blasts UN aid chief over call to prevent Gaza genocide](#), 16 May 2025

<sup>172</sup> UNOCHA, [Humanitarian situation update 275 Gaza Strip](#), 25 March 2025

<sup>173</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Humanitarian aid enters the Gaza Strip](#), 22 May 2025; UN, [Gaza: aid tricks still waiting for Israeli green light inside enclave](#), 21 May 2025

As of 12 November 2025, three crossings were open: Kissufim, Zikim, and Kerem Shalom.<sup>174</sup>

In July 2025, UNOCHA described several ongoing challenges to aid delivery in Gaza, including threats to aid workers, a breakdown in law and order, regular denials and delays by the IDF for coordinated movements, poor telecommunications, poor road conditions and supply lines, and limitations of humanitarian partners able to deliver and dispatch aid to Gaza.<sup>175</sup> UNOCHA has also reported that Israel has prohibited the storage of humanitarian cargo in Gaza, except for some food and nutrition, and that only a “very limited” number of aid agencies have permission to move cargo into Gaza.<sup>176</sup>

The UN also says it received no fuel deliveries for 130 days, until 10 July 2025.<sup>177</sup>

In June 2025, the UN Secretary General reported that from 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025, of the 5,320 planned aid movements through the Gaza Strip, 45% were facilitated by Israeli authorities (2,397). Of the remainder, 29% were denied, and the rest either faced impediments or were cancelled owing to security or logistical challenges.<sup>178</sup>

On 9 October, covering the period before the October 2025 agreement, UNOCHA reported that “delays and impediments of humanitarian movements” continued. From 1 October to 6 October, of the 99 requests for aid coordination with the IDF, 35 (36%) were facilitated, 16 (16%) were approved but then impeded on the ground, 34 (34%) were denied and 14 (14%) were withdrawn by organisers. UNOCHA said that out of the 2,700 planned movements coordinated with Israeli authorities from January to September 2025, 36% had been denied.<sup>179</sup>

### Aid access and crossings: Israeli assessment

Israel disputes the UNOCHA account described above and says that UN agencies need to take further steps to distribute aid. It says it allowed in 4,500 trucks since the block was lifted in May to July, or an average of 70 a day (the pre-October 2023 average was 500).<sup>180</sup> Data from Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) suggests that total tonnage of aid entering Gaza was highest in February 2025, at 295,000

<sup>174</sup> UNOCHA, [Reported impact snapshot: Gaza Strip](#), 5 November 2025; Reuters, [Israel reopens Zikim crossing in northern Gaza for aid trucks, COGAT says](#), 12 November 2025

<sup>175</sup> UNOCHA, [Considerations for the delivery of humanitarian aid during a ceasefire \[...\]](#), 24 July 2025

<sup>176</sup> UNOCHA, [Humanitarian situation update 315, Gaza Strip](#), 21 August 2025

<sup>177</sup> Reuters, [UN gets first fuel into Gaza in 130 days, says UN spokesperson](#), 10 July 2025

<sup>178</sup> UN, [Assistance to the Palestinian people: report](#), 20 May 2025, para 22

<sup>179</sup> UNOCHA, [Humanitarian situation update 329, Gaza Strip](#), 9 October 2025

<sup>180</sup> AP News, [Israel says hundreds of truckloads of aid are waiting to enter Gaza \[...\]](#), 25 July 2025; Times of Israel, [Israel blames UN for Gaza aid shortage, says Hamas exploiting famine claims at talks](#), 24 July 2025

tonnes. It fell to 20,200 in May, 37,500 in June and 57,200 in July 2025. It was 129,000 in August and 109,000 in September.<sup>181</sup>

In July, in response to international criticism that the humanitarian situation in Gaza was deteriorating (see below on food security), Israel said that it would commence 10-hour humanitarian pauses in fighting in some parts of Gaza, to allow more aid to be delivered. It also announced that airdrops would be allowed into Gaza and reconnecting a power line to support a desalination plant. It said combat operations would continue.<sup>182</sup>

Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir criticised the decision to introduce humanitarian pauses, arguing it was a “capitulation” to Hamas and that all aid should be stopped, and the Strip occupied.<sup>183</sup> Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has also been critical of allowing more aid to enter Gaza.<sup>184</sup>

In July 2025, Tom Fletcher said that while Israel’s announcement to allow in more aid was welcome, “vast amounts” of aid are “need[ed] to stave off famine and a catastrophic health crisis”.<sup>185</sup>

Earlier in July, the EU said it had reached an agreement with Israel to scale up aid. The content of the agreement has not been published but reportedly included more aid routes, fuel deliveries and infrastructure repairs.<sup>186</sup>

### Aid diversion by Hamas and looting

Throughout the conflict, Israel has accused Hamas of diverting and profiting from humanitarian aid, as has the Trump administration.<sup>187</sup>

UNOCHA has also reported a rise in looting, “reflecting the growing struggle for survival in Gaza”.<sup>188</sup> In May, there were reports of aid convoys and bakeries being looted. The IDF has said it has targeted some Hamas fighters near to aid convoys. Hamas also says it has been targeting looters.<sup>189</sup>

Cindy McCain, the head of the World Food Programme, said in May that she had “not” seen evidence that Hamas “in this round” had been responsible for stealing food aid.<sup>190</sup> In a statement in May, the head of the OPT UNOCHA office said it had no evidence that UN-coordinated aid had been diverted. He said that “the real theft of aid since the beginning of the war has been carried out

<sup>181</sup> COGAT, [Gaza humanitarian aid data](#), accessed 15 October 2025

<sup>182</sup> Times of Israel, [IDF announces daily 10-hour humanitarian pauses](#), 27 July 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Israel announces 10-hour localised truce in Gaza for aid distribution](#), 27 July 2025

<sup>183</sup> France 24, [Israel announces ‘tactical pause’ to fighting in 3 Gaza areas, aid airdrops begin](#), 27 July 2025

<sup>184</sup> Times of Israel, [Smotrich signals he won’t bolt coalition despite objecting \[...\]](#), 28 July 2025

<sup>185</sup> UNOCHA, [Statement on Gaza by Tom Fletcher \[...\]](#), 29 July 2025

<sup>186</sup> EU External Action Service, [Israel/Palestine: Statement by the High Representative](#), 10 July 2025; Times of Israel, [EU foreign policy chief confirms deal with Israel \[...\]](#), 10 July 2025

<sup>187</sup> Times of Israel, [Trump: We’ll help “starving” Gazans get food \[...\]](#), 5 May 2025

<sup>188</sup> UNOCHA, [Gaza humanitarian response update](#), 15 April 2025

<sup>189</sup> CNN, [In Gaza, limited food aid meets desperate crowds and looting](#), 24 May 2025; Reuters, [Hamas-led groups execute four for looting aid trucks amid some Gaza dissent](#), 26 May 2025

<sup>190</sup> Independent, [Cindy McCain refutes Israel’s claim that Hamas is stealing aid](#), 26 May 2025

by criminal gangs, under the watch of Israeli forces, and they were allowed to operate in proximity to the Kerem Shalom crossing point”.<sup>191</sup>

In June, the Israeli Government had also acknowledged that it has “made use” of groups in Gaza that are opposed to Hamas. Mr Netanyahu said it “saves the lives of IDF soldiers”.<sup>192</sup> One group has been linked to both the protection and looting of aid.<sup>193</sup>

According to a New York Times report of July 2025, the IDF had assessed UN aid routes as “relatively reliable and less vulnerable than other organisations,” but that smaller organisations did have some aid stolen by Hamas. UN agencies provide most of the aid to Gaza. A response from the IDF to the report said that Hamas “exploited humanitarian aid to fund terrorist activities” but did not dispute the assessment that there was no evidence Hamas regularly stole from UN sources.<sup>194</sup>

A review by the USAID agency, covering the period between October 2023 and May 2025 and surveying a reported 156 incidents of waste, fraud, and abuse in US aid, also found “no reports alleging [that] Hamas” had benefited.<sup>195</sup>

The UK Government has said it has “not seen clear evidence of systematic aid diversion to Hamas” but notes that direct UK monitoring and verification has not been possible during the conflict.<sup>196</sup>

## Food insecurity and famine confirmation in IPC assessment, July 2025

In May 2025 the UN-backed Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) warned in its projection covering May to September 2025 that Gaza was “confronted with a critical risk of famine and that up to 500,000 people would face “catastrophe/famine” levels of food insecurity if the situation did not change (“catastrophe/famine” is IPC Phase 5, the [highest level on the IPC classification scale](#) (PDF)).<sup>197</sup>

In July, the IPC issued an updated alert which said that a “worst case scenario of famine” was “unfolding” and that evidence suggested that “widespread

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<sup>191</sup> UNOCHA, [Press briefing by OCHA Head of Office for the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jonathan Whittall](#), 28 May 2025

<sup>192</sup> Times of Israel, [Netanyahu confirms arming Gazan clans](#), 5 June 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Anti-Hamas group chief 'coordinating' with Israel in Rafah](#), 6 July 2025; [Name in the News: Yasser Abu Shabab, Israel-backed Gaza militia leader](#), 11 July 2025

<sup>193</sup> Washington Post, [Netanyahu says Israel has “activated” some Palestinian clans](#), 6 June 2025

<sup>194</sup> New York Times, [No proof Hamas routinely stole UN aid \[...\]](#), 28 July 2025

<sup>195</sup> Washington Post, [Hamas facing financial and administrative crisis \[...\]](#), 21 July 2025; Reuters, [USAID analysis found no evidence of massive Hamas theft of Gaza aid](#), 25 July 2025

<sup>196</sup> PQ 40467 [[Gaza: Humanitarian Aid](#)], 6 April 2025

<sup>197</sup> IPC, [Gaza Strip: acute food insecurity situation for 1 April- 10 May 2025 \[...\]](#), 12 May 2025

starvation, malnutrition, and disease are driving a rise in hunger-related deaths”. It would be conducting a full analysis.<sup>198</sup>

In August 2025, the IPC issued a full report that said “famine, with reasonable evidence, is confirmed in the Gaza governorate” (one of the five governorates of Gaza). It said in a further two, Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, famine was projected between August and the end of September 2025. In the other two governorates, the IPC had either insufficient information (the case in north Gaza, though said it expected conditions to be “as severe or worse” as Gaza City) or considered it largely “depopulated” (Rafah). The IPC said that the famine was “entirely man-made” and “can be halted and reversed” with a ceasefire and immediate scaling up of aid.<sup>199</sup>

The IPC has previously confirmed famines occurred in three locations: Somalia (2011), South Sudan (2017 and 2020), and in parts of Darfur (2024).<sup>200</sup>

In Gaza, the IPC projected 1.98 million people (100% of the population) to be in “crisis level” (level three), “emergency” (level four) or “catastrophe/famine” (level five) [conditions of food insecurity](#) (PDF), from August to September 2025.<sup>201</sup>

The famine declaration is [based on three indicators](#) (PDF):<sup>202</sup>

- The proportion of households reporting very severe hunger. Measured by 20% of households facing “extreme” food shortage.
- Acute malnutrition rates. Measured by 30% of children acutely malnourished or 15% with Global Acute Malnutrition, measured by their mid-upper arm circumference “with evidence of rapidly worsening underlying drivers of acute malnutrition”.
- Non-trauma mortality rates. Measured by two adult or four child non-trauma deaths for every 10,000 each day, due to starvation or the interaction of malnutrition and disease.

A “famine, with reasonable evidence” means that the IPC has judged there is “clear evidence” two of the three thresholds have been met and there is “reasonable” evidence the third threshold has been met.<sup>203</sup>

In addition to information on public health and the humanitarian situation, the IPC assessment in Gaza was based on telephone interviews regarding food consumption (it assesses almost all households had a phone before October 2023), household surveys in some accessible areas, and field visits. It

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<sup>198</sup> IPC, [Alert: worst case scenario of famine unfolding in the Gaza Strip](#), 28 July 2025; AP News, [Why there hasn't been a formal declaration of famine in Gaza](#), 29 July 2025

<sup>199</sup> IPC, [Gaza Strip: Acute food insecurity situation for 1 July-15 August and projection \[...\]](#), 22 August 2025; IPC, [Famine review committee: Gaza Strip, August 2025](#) (PDF), 22 August 2025

<sup>200</sup> IPC, [Famine facts](#)

<sup>201</sup> IPC, [Gaza Strip: Famine confirmed in Gaza Governorate, projected to expand](#) (PDF), 22 August 2025

<sup>202</sup> IPC, [Fact sheet: the IPC famine](#) (PDF), August 2025, p1

<sup>203</sup> IPC, [Gaza Strip: Famine confirmed in Gaza Governorate, projected to expand](#) (PDF), 22 August 2025

judged its evidence base to be “medium” (the middle of the three evidence scores it uses). It said challenges in the Gaza Strip meant it was “unfeasible” to measure acute malnutrition on its “[weight-for-height](#)” score and rather used [Mid-Upper Arm Circumference \(MUAC\) screenings](#). The second method has been used since 2019 but Israel has criticised its application; see below.<sup>204</sup>

The IPC report reported a shortage of food was due to the “destruction of domestic food production systems, import limitations, and displacement of populations away from available food sources or production systems” and aid deliveries were insufficient. It said it took “full account” of food aid from the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF; see below, page 44).<sup>205</sup>

### Food insecurity and famine risk: Israeli, US and international reaction

Israel has been critical of past IPC reports, saying they lack transparency and have methodological issues.<sup>206</sup> In response to the August 2025 report, the Israeli Foreign Ministry said that the IPC assessment was based on “ Hamas lies” and the IPC “changed its own global standard” (see above for the methodology).<sup>207</sup> It called on the IPC to withdraw the report.<sup>208</sup> The IDF’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) said the report “deliberately disregards data that was provided to its authors” and overlooks improvements on humanitarian aid.<sup>209</sup>

In July, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, had said that “there is no policy of starvation in Gaza, and there is no starvation in Gaza” and Israel had allowed in the “amount [of aid] required by international law to come in”, blaming Hamas for its diversion.<sup>210</sup>

On 3 August, he said that “the terrorists of Hamas are deliberately starving our hostages [and] [...] the residents of the [Gaza] Strip as well, preventing them from receiving the aid”.<sup>211</sup>

On 11 August Mr Netanyahu said that “there hasn’t been starvation [...] there was a shortage”.<sup>212</sup>

On 28 July, President Trump said there is “real starvation” in Gaza, and the US would be supporting the establishment of further food distribution centres.<sup>213</sup> In response to the August 2025 report, the US told the UN Security Council

<sup>204</sup> IPC, [Famine review committee: Gaza Strip, August 2025](#) (PDF), 22 August 2025, pp35-6, 42, 48

<sup>205</sup> IPC, [Famine review committee: Gaza Strip, August 2025](#) (PDF), 22 August 2025, pp2, 8

<sup>206</sup> COGAT, [Humanitarian information centre: IPC](#) (PDF), 8 November 2024 and [Israeli Government, The IPC and Gaza: A case study in broken principles](#)

<sup>207</sup> Israel Foreign Ministry on Twitter/X, [The IPC just published a “tailor made” \[...\]](#), 22 August 2025

<sup>208</sup> Times of Israel, [Israel threatens to target UN hunger monitor’s funding \[...\]](#), 27 August 2025

<sup>209</sup> COGAT on Twitter/X, [COGAT categorically rejects the @theIPCinfo Gaza report \[...\]](#), 22 August 2025; Times of Israel, [Israeli review disputes UN-backed Gaza famine report as biased, methodologically flawed](#), 11 September 2025

<sup>210</sup> Israel National News, [PM Netanyahu slams Gaza starvation claims](#), 27 July 2025

<sup>211</sup> Prime Minister’s Office, [PM office announcement](#), 3 August 2025

<sup>212</sup> Times of Israel, [Netanyahu: If we wanted to commit genocide \[...\]](#), 11 August 2025

<sup>213</sup> Reuters, [Trump says many are starving in Gaza, vows to set up food centres](#), 28 July 2025

that the IPC report lacked “credibility and integrity” and “reject[ed] the falsehood that there is a policy of starvation in Gaza”.<sup>214</sup> All other members of the Security Council said they “trust the IPC’s work and methodology”.<sup>215</sup>

Earlier in August, the UK Government had issued a statement, alongside 25 countries including Canada, France, Italy and Japan, which said “famine is unfolding before our eyes” in Gaza and a “flood of aid” is needed.<sup>216</sup> Following the IPC assessment in August, the then Foreign Secretary David Lammy said a famine was occurring because of the “Israeli government’s refusal to allow sufficient aid” into Gaza and said Israel “must immediately act to stop the situation deteriorating”.<sup>217</sup>

The UN’s relief coordinator, Tom Fletcher, said that the IPC report in August confirmed a “famine that we could have prevented” and criticised systematic obstruction by Israel” of food aid (see above for aid access into Gaza).<sup>218</sup> A joint statement from four UN agencies, including the World Health Organisation and World Food Programme, said that “since July, food and aid supplies entering Gaza increased slightly but remained vastly insufficient, inconsistent and inaccessible compared to the need”.<sup>219</sup>

UN agencies and Israeli authorities have also disagreed on food prices: both state that food prices have fallen in August, but the UNOCHA says they “keep fluctuating based on speculations rather than actual availability” and the price of cooking oil had continued to increase.<sup>220</sup>

## Plan for non-UN-led aid operations

In May 2025, the Israeli cabinet agreed a plan for aid to be delivered through private companies, rather than UN agencies, at specific sites. The IDF would provide security, and efforts would be centred on southern Gaza.<sup>221</sup>

Israel has been critical of both UNRWA, earlier in the conflict, and UNOCHA, in 2025. In July, Israel alleged that some UNOCHA members have ties to Hamas and said any visas it issues for its staff will now be for no longer than a month. A spokesperson for the UN Secretary General said that “we have full confidence in OCHA’s professionalism and impartial work” and Mr Fletcher, head of OCHA, said it was the first time concerns had been raised and that Israel should share any information.<sup>222</sup> The Commons Library research

<sup>214</sup> US Mission to the UN, [Remarks at a UN Security Council briefing \[...\]](#), 27 August 2025

<sup>215</sup> FCDO, [We express our profound alarm and distress at the IPC data \[...\]](#), 27 August 2025

<sup>216</sup> FCDO, [Joint statement on the humanitarian situation in Gaza](#), 12 August 2025

<sup>217</sup> FCDO, [Foreign Secretary statement: Response to famine in Gaza governorate](#), 22 August 2025

<sup>218</sup> UNOCHA, [Remarks by Tom Fletcher \[...\] on famine in Gaza](#), 22 August 2025

<sup>219</sup> WFP, [Famine confirmed for first time in Gaza](#), 22 August 2025

<sup>220</sup> Times of Israel, [Global hunger monitor declares famine \[...\]](#), 22 August 2025; UNOCHA, [Humanitarian situation update: Gaza Strip 313](#), 13 August 2025

<sup>221</sup> [IDF planning major shift in Gaza aid delivery](#), Times of Israel, 2 May 2025

<sup>222</sup> Reuters, [UN aid chief demands evidence after Israel accuses staff of links to Hamas](#), 26 July 2025; UN, [Daily press briefing by the office of the spokesperson for the Secretary General](#), 23 July 2025

briefing, [UNRWA and UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip 2023-25](#), has information on the allegations and investigations into UNRWA in 2024—25.

The US backed the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF, see below, on page 44) to deliver aid securely against potential Hamas diversion and theft, and called on other humanitarian agencies and other states to work with Israel and the US.<sup>223</sup>

In May 2025, a spokesperson for UNOCHA said that “aid should be provide based on humanitarian need to whomever needs it” and it does “not accept the proposal” put forward by the Israeli security cabinet, as it risks a loss in impartiality and neutrality.<sup>224</sup> The UN Humanitarian OPT team also warned the plan risked leaving “large parts of Gaza, including the less mobile and most vulnerable people,” without aid or force them to enter militarised areas, and would not be participating.<sup>225</sup>

The UK, France, Germany and the EU were among those to criticise the Israeli plan as representing an undermining of humanitarian principles in the delivery of aid (impartially, neutrality, humanity and independence) and said UN agencies are ready to deliver, at the scale required.<sup>226</sup>

Hamas said the GHF arrangement was “unacceptable”, and that aid should be delivered through UN and other international organisations. It accused Israel of using the distribution network to “access information [...] to harm citizens [of Gaza]”.<sup>227</sup>

Separately, in August 2025 Israel announced it would allow controlled entry of foods and some other goods into Gaza by private suppliers.<sup>228</sup>

## Gaza Humanitarian Foundation

Israel and the US backed the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) to deliver aid in Gaza, initially through four distribution sites in southern and central Gaza, directly to Palestinian civilians. There were plans to expand this to 16, as of August 2025. The GHF used American contractors to provide security, with the IDF patrolling the perimeter. Some Palestinian staff were also intended to be employed. The source of GHF’s funding is unclear. The group says it would not share personally identifiable information of aid recipients with Israel and would not support the forced relocation of the Palestinian population.<sup>229</sup>

<sup>223</sup> US Mission to the UN, [Remarks at a UN Security Council briefing \[...\]](#), 13 May 2025

<sup>224</sup> UN, [Gaza humanitarian blockade OCHA-WHO](#), 6 May 2025

<sup>225</sup> UN, [UN warns of growing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza](#), 4 May 2025

<sup>226</sup> EU External Action, [Joint donor statement on humanitarian aid to Gaza](#), 19 May 2025

<sup>227</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Hammas-run interior ministry expresses concern \[...\]](#), 26 May 2025

<sup>228</sup> Reuters, [Israel says it will allow controlled entry of goods into Gaza \[...\]](#), 5 August 2025

<sup>229</sup> Reuters, [What is the new US-backed Gaza aid plan \[...\]](#), 23 May 2025; BBC Monitoring, [What are the concerns about the GHF?](#), 3 June 2025; FT, [US contractor hires obscure Gaza group for aid rollout](#)

## Proceedings at the International Court of Justice on Israeli obligations towards UN agencies

In May 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN’s highest court, is hearing a [case on Israeli government responsibility towards UN and humanitarian agencies](#). Section 5.6 of the Commons Library research briefing, [UK aid to the West Bank and UNRWA](#), provides background.

The case concluded in October. The court said that Israel had to “facilitate by all means at its disposal relief schemes on behalf of the population of the Occupied Palestinian Territory so long as that population is inadequately supplied”, including by UNRWA. The court also said that Israel had an obligation to ensure the “immunity of the property and assets of the Organization from any form of interference”.<sup>230</sup> The court also found that “Israel has not substantiated its allegations that a significant part of UNRWA employees ‘are members of Hamas...or other terrorist factions’”.<sup>231</sup>

The US said that the ICJ opinion was “politicised”, was “unfair” towards Israel and “gives UNRWA a free pass for its deep entanglement with and material support for Hamas”.<sup>232</sup> The UK welcomed the ICJ ruling as a “clear finding” that Israel has an obligation to provide aid in Gaza and “UNRWA has a critical role in delivering the humanitarian response”.<sup>233</sup>

The head of the GHF resigned the day before it began work in Gaza in May, saying it is “clear that it is not possible to implement this plan while also strictly adhering to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence”.<sup>234</sup>

On 26 May 2025, the GHF began its first aid delivery in Gaza, beginning in Rafah city. It intended to deliver 300 million meals within its first 90 days of operations and reach one million Palestinians in Gaza in the first week.<sup>235</sup> The foundation said it had delivered 185 million meals, to 10 October 2025.<sup>236</sup>

With the October 2025 hostage-ceasefire agreement, media organisations reported that the GHF was suspending its work and had closed its sites, with the expectation a UN-led system will be restored under the agreement. The

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[after local snubs](#), 28 May 2025; Times of Israel, [US envoy says GHF aid sites may begin operating 24 hours a day](#), 7 August 2025

<sup>230</sup> ICJ, [Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the UN, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory](#) (PDF), 22 October 2025

<sup>231</sup> ICJ, [Advisory Opinion of 22 October 2025](#), para 118

<sup>232</sup> US DoS on Twitter/X, [“Another corrupt ruling by the ICJ \[...\]”](#), 22 October 2025

<sup>233</sup> FCDO, [We must now build on the momentum of the ceasefire](#), 23 October 2025

<sup>234</sup> BBC News, [Head of controversial Israel-backed Gaza aid group resigns](#), 26 May 2025

<sup>235</sup> DW, [Gaza aid group, mired in controversy, begins operating](#), 27 May 2025

<sup>236</sup> GHF, [GHF—operational update](#), 10 October 2025

GHF said it has funding until the end of November and was making adjustments to how it functions in Gaza.<sup>237</sup>

The GHF is reportedly considering work in IDF-controlled areas of Gaza.<sup>238</sup>

In its July 2025 alert, the IPC said GHF efforts had been insufficient and poorly targeted:

[the GHF works] from four distribution sites, primarily in militarised zones along the Khan Younis–Rafah border—where less than a quarter of the population is located. [...] most of the food items are not ready-to-eat and require water and fuel to cook, which are largely unavailable. Reaching these distribution points requires long, high-risk journeys, with unequal access across governorates. Operating on a first-come, first-served basis, the most vulnerable groups are largely unable to access this food.<sup>239</sup>

Three of the four GHF distribution sites were close to Rafah, in the south, and one in central Gaza. There were no distribution sites in Gaza city or the north.<sup>240</sup> The UN-led system had around 400 sites during the January to March ceasefire.<sup>241</sup> The GHF says it had requested Israel to allow further sites.<sup>242</sup>

Since its launch, there have been several incidents leading to casualties at or near sites where the GHF were attempting to distribute aid. In the first incident, the IDF intervened. Israel and the GHF said that Hamas had tried to stop civilians from reaching the aid distribution point (Hamas denies the accusation).<sup>243</sup> The GHF has suspended operations on some days to allow the IDF to prepare safer access routes.<sup>244</sup>

ACLEED estimates that around 2,300 people had been killed at or around aid sites in Gaza from 27 May to 26 September 2025, with 60% around GHF sites.<sup>245</sup> This includes people seeking to access GHF sites and at the route of aid convoys.<sup>246</sup> On 1 August, the UN Human Rights Office in Palestine had said that it had “no information that these Palestinians were directly participating in hostilities or posed any threat to Israeli security forces or other

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<sup>237</sup> Times of Israel, [Officials say GHF aid sites being shut down \[...\]](#), 13 October 2025; GHF, [GHF—operational update](#), 10 October 2025; Reuters, [Israel cuts agreed aid into Gaza over slow release of hostage bodies](#), 14 October 2025; BBC News, [Aid group suspends Gaza operations after ceasefire](#), 16 October 2025

<sup>238</sup> FT, [US-backed Gaza aid group eyes new role after war](#), 22 October 2025; Reuters, [US mulls Gaza aid plan that would replace controversial GHF aid operation](#), 23 October 2025

<sup>239</sup> IPC, [IPC alert: worst case scenario of famine unfolding in the Gaza Strip](#) (PDF), 29 July 2025

<sup>240</sup> As above

<sup>241</sup> BBC News, [US-Israeli backed Gaza aid group must be shut down, say 170 charities](#), 1 May 2025

<sup>242</sup> GHF, [Myths vs facts about GHF – setting the record straight](#), accessed 31 July 2025

<sup>243</sup> Reuters, [Palestinians rush US-backed aid centre despite concerns over checks](#), 28 May 2025; BBC News, [UN calls for investigation into killings near Gaza aid distribution site](#), 2 June 2025; Times of Israel, [IDF says troops fired on suspects outside Gaza aid site](#), 3 June 2025; CBS News, [Dozens reportedly killed near GHF hub in 3<sup>rd</sup> consecutive day](#), 3 June 2025

<sup>244</sup> Times of Israel, [Gaza aid sites to be closed for day \[...\]](#), 4 June 2025; Reuters, [US backed GHF aid distribution sites are closed](#), 6 June 2025

<sup>245</sup> ACLEED, [Two years since 7 October: Israel's forever wars across the Middle East](#), 7 October 2025

<sup>246</sup> UNOCHA, [Humanitarian situation update 315, Gaza Strip](#), 21 August 2025

individuals”.<sup>247</sup> These figures are reported in the same way as other casualty figures; see below, page 49.<sup>248</sup>

The IDF has acknowledged it has killed and injured several civilians near aid sites and has investigated “reports of harm to civilians”. The IDF said that it only used live gun fire when a threat was posed to them and that some artillery fire had been “inaccurate”.<sup>249</sup> Hamas has denied a GHF, US and Israeli statement it was involved in an attack that injured two Americans at an aid site in July.<sup>250</sup>

## Response to GHF’s work (May to October 2025)

UN agencies continued to work in Gaza.

In May 2025, a UNOCHA spokesperson argued the GHF was a “distraction” from the actions that were needed, such as opening more crossing points into Gaza or Israel allowing a greater range of aid into Gaza.<sup>251</sup> In June, the UN Secretary General said that “any operation that channels desperate civilians into militarized zones is inherently unsafe” and the UN stood ready to resume its role.<sup>252</sup>

On 28 May, the UK said that Israel should “let aid in and enable the UN to operate, now”.<sup>253</sup> On 21 July 2025, the then Foreign Secretary David Lammy criticised the delivery of aid and “Israeli troops opening fire on people trying to access food” and Hamas “contributing to the chaos”:

The new Israeli aid system is inhumane and dangerous, and it deprives Gazans of human dignity. It contradicts long-established humanitarian principles. It creates disorder that Hamas are now exploiting, with distribution points reduced from 400 to just four. Almost 1,000 civilians have been killed since May seeking aid, including 100 this weekend alone. There are near-daily reports of Israeli troops opening fire on people trying to access food. Hamas are of course contributing to the chaos and taking advantage of it, but I utterly condemn the killing of civilians seeking to meet their basic needs.<sup>254</sup>

The then Foreign Secretary said he had also raised his concerns on the GHF with the United States.<sup>255</sup> On 21 July, the International Development Minister Baroness Chapman said the GHF “has failed, as it was clear it would”.<sup>256</sup>

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<sup>247</sup> UN, [Gaza: nearly 1,400 Palestinians killed while seeking food \[...\]](#), 1 August 2025

<sup>248</sup> UN, [Gaza: 875 people confirmed dead trying to source food \[...\]](#), 15 July 2025; N

<sup>249</sup> BBC News, [Israeli military investigates “reports of harm to civilians”](#), 30 June 2025; Times of Israel, [IDF admits killing several Gazan civilians near aid hubs \[...\]](#), 30 June 2025

<sup>250</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Statement by PM Netanyahu on the terror attack \[...\]](#), 5 July 2025; Reuters, [Hamas government office rejects US accusation of involvement \[...\]](#), 6 July 2025

<sup>251</sup> Reuters, [Gaza humanitarian group is a “distraction” from what is needed, UN says](#), 27 May 2025

<sup>252</sup> UN, [Secretary General’s press encounter](#), 27 June 2025

<sup>253</sup> FCDO, [Israel must immediately let aid into Gaza and to enable the UN to operate](#), 28 May 2025

<sup>254</sup> HC Deb, [21 July 2025](#), c595

<sup>255</sup> HC Deb, [21 July 2025](#), c606

<sup>256</sup> Jenny Chapman on Twitter/X, [“It is horrifying that over 800 Palestinians \[...\]”](#), 21 July 2025

In July, the US said it continued to support the GHF and has provided US\$30 million of funding to it. It said that the UN should coordinate with it.<sup>257</sup>

## Humanitarian aid delivery, from October 2025

Following the announcement that a hostage-ceasefire agreement had been reached between Israel and Hamas in October, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Tom Fletcher, said that the agency had a “60 day” plan to deliver aid to Gaza.<sup>258</sup>

He said that UNOCHA’s aims were to scale the number of trucks delivering aid to “hundreds of trucks every day” and aid workers would be taking steps to address food insecurity, nutrition, and healthcare and other services. On 9 October, he estimated that the UN had been delivering “probably less than 20% a day of what we should be getting in”.<sup>259</sup> Mr Fletcher also said that looting had decreased since the October 2025 agreement.<sup>260</sup>

He said success of the aid operation would rest on ten factors, including more fuel entering Gaza, more crossing points for aid, the re-establishment of infrastructure (in July 2025 the UN estimated 78% of all structures in Gaza were destroyed or damaged), sufficient funding, and protection for humanitarian workers. Mr Fletcher said that the “whole UN humanitarian family,” including UNRWA, was ready to support the delivery of aid.<sup>261</sup>

As of 3 November, the UN reports that no direct food aid convoys have reached northern Gaza since 12 September.<sup>262</sup> UNRWA has estimated about half of the 600 trucks are entering Gaza daily, as of 15 November.<sup>263</sup>

The status of UNRWA is uncertain. As set out in section 5 of the Library research briefing, [UNRWA and UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip 2023-25](#), no international staff from UNRWA have been able to enter Gaza since January and no UNRWA aid was allowed to enter from March. On 11 November, UNRWA said that Israeli authorities continue to block it from bringing humanitarian personnel and aid into the Gaza Strip.<sup>264</sup>

On 14 October Reuters news agency reported that “more than 50” aid organisations, including Oxfam and the Norwegian Refugee Council, had not received clearance by Israel for their supplies to enter Gaza.<sup>265</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> US State Department, [Department press briefing](#), 24 July 2025; Reuters, [State Department approves \\$30 million in funding for GHE](#), 26 June 2025; US Mission to the UN, [Remarks at a UN Security Council open debate on the situation in the Middle East](#), 23 July 2025

<sup>258</sup> UNOCHA, [UN relief chief outlines 60-day plan to deliver vital aid \[...\]](#), 9 October 2025

<sup>259</sup> UNOCHA, [UN relief chief outlines 60-day plan to deliver vital aid \[...\]](#), 9 October 2025

<sup>260</sup> Reuters, [Gaza needs massive boost in emergency aid after ceasefire \[...\]](#), 15 October 2025

<sup>261</sup> As above and UNOCHA, [Reported impact snapshot | Gaza Strip](#), 7 October 2025

<sup>262</sup> UN, [Gaza: Food access improves in the south \[...\]](#), 3 November 2025

<sup>263</sup> The Guardian, [Israel breaching international law by limiting Gaza aid, says UNRWA official](#), 15 November 2025

<sup>264</sup> UNRWA, [UNRWA Situation Report 196](#), 11 November 2025

<sup>265</sup> Reuters, [Israel cuts agreed aid into Gaza over slow release of hostage bodies](#), 14 October 2025

## Casualty estimates

Citing Israeli authorities and the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health, UNOCHA says that since 7 October 2023, over 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals have been reported killed and around 5,400 injured in Israel. At least 69,185 Palestinians have been reported killed and 170,698 injured (as of 5 November 2025).<sup>266</sup>

According to the West-Bank-based Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Gaza's population has fallen from 2.23 million in 2023 to about 2.1 million by mid-2025.<sup>267</sup>

Israeli authorities do not provide regular estimates of Palestinian casualties in Gaza.

In September, media reports suggested that the IDF's former Chief of Staff, Herzl Halevi, said that "there are in Gaza today more than 10% who were killed or injured, more than 200,000 [people]" since October 2023.<sup>268</sup>

More information on how casualty figures are reported and the challenges involved can be found in the following articles:

- BBC Verify, [How the dead are counted in Gaza](#) (16 November 2023)
- BBC Verify, [Gaza war: Why is the UN citing a lower death toll for women and children](#) (16 May 2024)
- Reuters, [Gaza death toll: how many Palestinians has Israel's offensive killed?](#) (15 January 2025)
- BBC News, [Gaza health ministry denies manipulating death toll figures](#) (23 April 2025)

In March 2025, the UK Government said that UNOCHA's casualty estimate is estimated by experts to be "a reasonable figure," based on consultation with academics, the WHO and others.<sup>269</sup>

A October 2025 article for the medical journal, The Lancet, also provides an [assessment of malnutrition in preschool-aged children](#).<sup>270</sup>

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<sup>266</sup> UNOCHA, [Reported impact snapshot: Gaza](#), 12 November 2025

<sup>267</sup> BBC Monitoring, [The impact of Israel's two-year war on Gaza's demographics](#), 8 August 2025

<sup>268</sup> CNN, [More than 10% of Gaza's population has been killed or injured, former Israeli military chief says](#), 15 September 2025

<sup>269</sup> PQ HL 5089 [[Gaza: Israel](#)], 10 March 2025; PQ 49910 [[Gaza: statistics](#)], 8 May 2025

<sup>270</sup> M Horino and others, [Assessment of malnutrition in preschool-aged children by mid-upper arm circumference in the Gaza Strip \(January 2024–August 2025\)](#), The Lancet, October 2025

## Aid worker deaths

According to UNOCHA, as of 12 November 2025, at least 579 aid workers have been killed since 7 October 2023.<sup>271</sup>

Since fighting resumed on 18 March, several incidents involving aid worker deaths were reported in connection with Israeli military action. Israel says that Hamas operatives are the targets of its operations, that the IDF takes steps to minimise civilian casualties, and that Hamas is exploiting civilian infrastructure. Humanitarian workers killed since fighting resumed include those working for the Palestine Red Crescent Society, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Palestinian Civil Defence and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA).<sup>272</sup>

In April 2025, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Tom Fletcher, said that “International Humanitarian Law could not be clearer – civilians must be protected [and] humanitarians must be protected”.<sup>273</sup>

The UN Security Council held a meeting on aid worker safety following a request from the UK, France and Algeria on 2 April. The UK called for all parties to comply with international humanitarian law and for a “thorough and swift investigation” into the [killing of Palestine Red Crescent Society staff on 23 March 2025](#).<sup>274</sup> The US told the same meeting that “Hamas has cynically misused civilian infrastructure to shield themselves” and that all parties should comply with humanitarian law.<sup>275</sup> The Israeli ambassador to the UN said that:

many of the so-called “aid workers” involved in the incident [on 23 March] were actually Hamas terrorists — some of whom even took part in the October 7th massacre.<sup>276</sup>

Similar comments have been issued by the Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister.<sup>277</sup> The IDF has since announced an [investigation into the 23 March incident](#). This will involve investigating discrepancies in [material released by the New York Times](#) and [IDF statements](#) on the nature of the event.<sup>278</sup> The IDF concluded that “professional failures” and a “breach of orders” resulted in the incident.

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<sup>271</sup> UNOCHA, [Reported impact snapshot Gaza strip](#), 12 November 2025

<sup>272</sup> Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Hamas-Israel conflict 2023: FAQs](#), December 2023, section 2. For example of reports, see CNN, [Israel strikes southern Gaza hospital \[...\]](#), 23 March 2025; BBC News, [Red Cross outraged over killing of medics by Israeli forces in Gaza](#), 31 March 2025; New York Times, [Some aid workers killed in Gaza were shot multiple times, say officials](#), 2 April 2025; Sky News, [Gaza ambulance “crushed” by IDF as aid attacks increase](#), 3 April 2025

<sup>273</sup> UN, [Gaza: UN relief chief demands “answers and justice” \[...\]](#), 31 March 2025

<sup>274</sup> FCDO, [We must strengthen international commitments to protect aid workers](#), 2 April 2025

<sup>275</sup> US Mission to the UN, [Remarks at a UN Security Council briefing](#), 2 April 2025

<sup>276</sup> Danny Danon on Twitter/X, [The Secretary General’s statements are biased \[...\]](#), 2 April 2025

<sup>277</sup> BBC News, [Survivor challenges Israeli account of attack on Gaza paramedics](#), 2 April 2025

<sup>278</sup> New York Times, [Video shows aid workers killed in Gaza under gunfire barrage \[...\]](#), 4 April 2025; Times of Israel, [IDF shares initial details from Gaza ambulance probe \[...\]](#), 5 April 2025

The Palestine Red Crescent Society said the report “shifts the responsibility to a personal error in the field command when the truth is quite different”.<sup>279</sup>

## 1.6 Situation in the West Bank

For events in the West Bank before 2025, including reports of casualties and the humanitarian situation, see section 1.3 of the Commons Library research briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict from July 2024 to March 2025](#).

### IDF operations in 2025

On 22 January 2025, the IDF launched a new operation against “terror infrastructure” in Jenin. IDF troops began to be drawn down from the operation in mid-May 2025, in anticipation of expanded action in Gaza.<sup>280</sup>

On the launch of operations in January 2025, the Israeli Minister of Defense, Israel Katz, was reported as saying that there would be “a change in the IDF’s security strategy in the [West Bank]” and that he would not allow an “eastern front” to be established against Israel.<sup>281</sup> In February, he also said that the IDF should prepare for a “prolonged presence” for the “coming year” to “prevent the return of the residents and the resurgence of terrorism”.<sup>282</sup>

The operation was reported by the UN as being the longest IDF operation in the West Bank for 20 years. As of February 2025, around 40,000 Palestinians had been displaced from refugee camps in the West Bank.<sup>283</sup> The IDF estimated that has killed “more than 700 terrorists in the northern West Bank” since 7 October 2023.<sup>284</sup>

UNRWA reported in February that “Palestinian armed groups are also increasingly active in the northern West Bank, deploying improvised explosive devices inside refugee camps, including near UNRWA facilities and civilian infrastructure”. The agency says all participants must protect civilians.<sup>285</sup>

In September 2025, UNOCHA reported that 690 Palestinians were killed in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, between 1 January 2024 and 30 September 2025. These included “667 by Israeli forces, 12 by Israeli settlers [and] 11 by Israeli forces or settlers”. During the same period, “42 Israelis [...]

<sup>279</sup> BBC News, [“Professional failures” led to killing of Gaza medics, IDF inquiry says](#), 22 April 2025

<sup>280</sup> IDF, [The Nahal Brigade concludes its counter terrorism activities \[...\]](#), 11 May 2025

<sup>281</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Israeli forces kill 10 Palestinians in West Bank operation](#), 22 January 2025; New York Times, [Israel embarks on an “extensive” military operation in the West Bank](#), 22 January 2025

<sup>282</sup> CNN, [Israel deploys tanks to occupied Bank for first time in more than 20 years](#), 24 February 2025

<sup>283</sup> UN, [Israeli military operation displaces 40,000 in the West Bank](#), 10 February 2025

<sup>284</sup> Times of Israel, [3 months into major Jenin operation IDF signals gains \[...\]](#), 7 May 2025

<sup>285</sup> UNRWA, [Large scale forced displacement in the West Bank \[...\]](#), 10 February 2025

including 4 children and 19 members of the Israeli forces” were killed by Palestinians in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.<sup>286</sup>

## IDF fires “warning shots” near diplomats, May 2025

On 21 May 2025, a delegation of diplomats visiting the West Bank’s Jenin refugee camp was fired upon by the IDF. No injuries were reported.

Among the reported 20-strong delegation were officials from the UK, China, Japan, Canada, Ireland, Spain, France, Germany, Egypt and Turkey.<sup>287</sup>

In a statement, the IDF said that the delegation had “deviated from the approved route and entered an area where they were not authorized to be”, and that the IDF soldiers “fired warning shots to distance them away”.<sup>288</sup>

Middle East Minister Hamish Falconer said that there must be a full investigation, and that “civilians must always be protected, and diplomats allowed to do their jobs”. The UN Secretary General, the EU and other countries have also criticised the incident and called for an investigation.<sup>289</sup>

## Settler violence

Violence between Israeli settlers and Palestinians continues to be reported in the occupied West Bank in 2025.<sup>290</sup> In July 2025, Israeli Defence Minister, Israel Katz announced that Israel would be increasing police enforcement and launching a joint taskforce to address settler violence in the West Bank. He also approved social projects targeted at younger Israelis. This followed Israeli settler violence against IDF in the area.<sup>291</sup>

In November, UNOCHA said that in October 2025 it “recorded the highest monthly number of Israeli settler attacks since OCHA began documenting such incidents in 2006”. There were a total of 260 attacks resulting in casualties, property damage, or both.<sup>292</sup>

In response to violence by Israeli settlers in November 2025, which included attacks on Palestinians and on the IDF, Israeli President Isaac Herzog said “such violence against civilians and against IDF soldiers crosses a red line

<sup>286</sup> UNOCHA, [West Bank. Monthly snapshot, as of July 2025](#), 5 November 2025

<sup>287</sup> France 24, [Outrage after Israeli army fires “warning shots” at French and other \[...\]](#), 21 May 2025

<sup>288</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [IDF spokesperson announcement](#), 21 May 2025

<sup>289</sup> Hamish Falconer MP on Twitter/X, [“Today’s events in Jenin are unacceptable”](#), 21 May 2025; UN, [UN alarmed after warning fired at foreign diplomats in the West Bank](#), 21 May 2025; CNN, [Foreign diplomats come under Israeli fire on official West Bank visit \[...\]](#), 21 May 2025

<sup>290</sup> Haaretz, [Defense officials detect rise in settler violence \[...\]](#), 21 July 2025

<sup>291</sup> Times of Israel, [Katz announces plans to curb settler violence against Israeli troops](#), 1 July 2025; Times of Israel, [PM condemns “fanatic few” settlers for attacking IDF](#), 30 June 2025

<sup>292</sup> UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Situation Update 337 | West Bank](#), 6 November 2025

and I condemn it severely”.<sup>293</sup> Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also said in November that “I intend to deal with this personally, and convene the relevant ministers as soon as possible to address this serious phenomenon”.<sup>294</sup>

## Closure of crossing point with Jordan for cargo

On 23 September 2025, Israel announced that it would close the Allenby/King Hussein Bridge crossing for cargo between the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Jordan (the only exit point for Palestinians from the West Bank). It did not provide a reason for the closure. Media reports noted that the announcement followed an attack that killed two IDF soldiers and the recognition of a Palestinian state by several countries.<sup>295</sup> The crossing remains closed.

The EU said that around a quarter of all aid to Gaza entered via the crossing and called on Israel to reopen it.<sup>296</sup>

## Expansion of Israeli settlements and E1 plan

A March 2025 report by the UN Human Rights Office describes a “significant consolidation and expansion of Israeli settlements” in the West Bank between November 2023 and October 2024, as well as violence by Israeli settlers.<sup>297</sup>

In May 2025, Israel announced that 22 new settlements would be legalised in the occupied West Bank. The sites are currently outposts, that exist without Israeli government authorisation. The Israeli Defence Ministry said that:

The new settlements are all placed within a long-term strategic vision, whose goal is to strengthen the Israeli hold on the territory, to avoid the establishment of a Palestinian state, and to create the basis for future development of settlement in the coming decades.<sup>298</sup>

The Defence Minister, Israel Katz, said that Israel would “build the Jewish Israeli state here on the ground [in the West Bank]” and this was a “decisive response” to Hamas as well as to suggestions by President Macron that France planned to recognise a Palestinian state (see the Commons Library research briefing on [French, Canadian and UK Government recognition](#)).<sup>299</sup>

In July, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that the government was seeking to move forward plans for construction in what is known as the E1 area of the occupied West Bank. The area has plans for around 3,400 houses to the east of occupied East Jerusalem and critics state that it would split the

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<sup>293</sup> BBC News, [Israeli settlers set fire to Palestinian warehouse and land \[...\]](#), 12 November 2025

<sup>294</sup> Reuters, [Netanyahu vows crackdown on Israeli violence \[...\]](#), 18 November 2025

<sup>295</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Israel closes sole West Bank crossing with Jordan 'indefinitely'](#), 24 September 2025

<sup>296</sup> European Council, [Israel/Palestine: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union](#), 27 September 2025

<sup>297</sup> UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, [Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory](#), A/HRC/58/73, 18 March 2025

<sup>298</sup> Times of Israel, [Defence Minister confirms government approval of 22 \[...\]](#), 29 May 2025

<sup>299</sup> New Arab, [Israel minister says “we will build Jewish Israeli state” in West Bank](#), 30 May 2025

West Bank into two and threaten the viability of a future Palestinian state (see below for the international response).<sup>300</sup>

In August, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said the government would approve tenders for over 3,000 houses in the region. The minister said that “the approval of the construction plans in E1 buries the idea of a Palestinian state and continues the many steps we are implementing on the ground as part of the de facto sovereignty plan”. Minister Smotrich said that the Prime Minister should “complete the move” and annex the West Bank.<sup>301</sup> Mr Netanyahu later signed an agreement on the E1 plan, saying “we are going to fulfil our promise that there will be no Palestinian state; this place belongs to us”.<sup>302</sup>

The E1 plan, first proposed in the 1990s, has been subject to extensive international criticism, including from the US, EU and UK, though planning has sometimes been resumed.<sup>303</sup>

In January 2025, the UN Secretary General reported that 2023 (the most recent year for UN monitoring data) had seen the highest rates of Israeli settlement activity since the UN began tracking the activity in 2017, though rates had fallen in 2024. Israel had previously approved plans for new settlements in the West Bank in August 2024, in response to Norway, Spain, Ireland and Slovenia recognising a Palestinian state in June 2024.<sup>304</sup>

## Knesset vote on sovereignty

On 22 October, a bill to apply Israeli sovereignty to all West Bank settlements passed its first stage in the Knesset. The bill must pass a further three stages to become law. Almost all members of the Prime Minister’s Likud party abstained from the vote, and the bill passed by a vote of 25-24 out of 120 lawmakers.<sup>305</sup> The Likud party said the bill “aimed at damaging our relations with the US and Israel’s great achievements in the [Gaza] campaign”.<sup>306</sup>

<sup>300</sup> Haaretz, [Israel renews plans for controversial construction that would effectively cut West Bank in two](#), 14 July 2025

<sup>301</sup> Times of Israel, [Smotrich to approve frozen E1 settlement homes](#), 14 August 2025; [All Israel News, Finance Minister Smotrich announces new settlement plan](#), 14 August 2025; Peace Now, [Final approval hearing for the E1 plan scheduled for next Wednesday in record speed](#), 14 August 2025; BBC News, [Israel approves controversial West Bank settlement project](#), 20 August 2025

<sup>302</sup> Times of Israel, [Netanyahu signs plan for E1 settlement expansion](#), 11 September 2025

<sup>303</sup> Times of Israel, [Netanyahu says he’s ordered 3500-home project \[...\]](#), 25 February 2020; Obama White House, [Remarks by President Obama \[...\]](#), 21 March 2013; EU External Action Service, [EU Statement – United Nations 4th Committee, 20 October 2020](#); PQ HL2864 [Israel], 8 November 2012

<sup>304</sup> See Commons Library research briefing, [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict July 2024 to March 2025](#), for background on settlement activity in 2024, p27

<sup>305</sup> Reuters, [Israel's parliament gives initial nod to occupied West Bank annexation](#), 22 October 2025; The Knesset, [Two bills approved in preliminary reading—one for application of sovereignty to Judea and Samaria settlement regions, and the other for application of sovereignty to Ma’ale Adumim](#), October 22, 2025

<sup>306</sup> Times of Israel, [Headed for Israel, Rubio says Knesset’s vote to annex \[...\]](#), 23 October 2025

A second bill, also by opposition party, which proposes the annexation of the Maale Adumim settlement, also passed by 31 to 9 votes.<sup>307</sup>

Marco Rubio said the sovereignty bill was “potential[ly] threatening to the [October 2025] peace deal”.<sup>308</sup> Vice President JD Vance said on a visit to Israel that “the policy of President Trump is that the West Bank will not be annexed. This will always be our policy”.<sup>309</sup> The President confirmed this statement.<sup>310</sup>

## Palestinian Authority, UK and US statements

In February 2025, the Palestinian Authority has accused Israel of a “grave escalation and a flagrant attempt to entrench genocide and forced displacement against our unarmed people”.<sup>311</sup> It also criticised the settlement announcement of May 2025, saying it was a “challenge to international legitimacy and international law”.<sup>312</sup> For more information about allegations of genocide, see section 2.8 of the Commons Library research briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict from July 2024 to March 2025](#).

The US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said in February that the role of Iran in West Bank violence “must be addressed”.<sup>313</sup> In March, the US told the UN Security Council that “as it relates to the West Bank, the United States supports the efforts of the Israel Defense Forces and the Palestinian Authority Security Forces to root out violent extremists in Jenin and Tulkarm [refugee camps]”.<sup>314</sup> In response to the expansion of the E1 settlements, Mr Rubio said that “you’re seeing [...] a counterreaction” by Israel of the decisions of the UK and [other countries to recognise a Palestinian state in September](#).<sup>315</sup>

President Trump has separately told Arab states that he would not allow Israel to annex the West Bank.<sup>316</sup>

On 1 April 2025, the then Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said the UK was “concerned at the Government of Israel’s war aims and operations in the West Bank” and had raised these concerns with the Israeli Government in March. He said that “civilians must be protected and the destruction of civilian infrastructure minimised”.<sup>317</sup> The government has been critical of the announcement to legalise Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank in

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<sup>307</sup> Times of Israel, [Headed for Israel, Rubio says Knesset’s vote to annex \[...\]](#), 23 October 2025

<sup>308</sup> As above

<sup>309</sup> Reuters, [Vance says Israeli vote on West Bank annexation was an “insult” \[...\]](#), 23 October 2025

<sup>310</sup> Reuters, [Trump dismisses bid by some Israeli lawmakers to annex West Bank](#), 23 October 2025

<sup>311</sup> PA Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Israel’s deployment of tanks is a systematic \[...\]](#), 23 February 2025.

<sup>312</sup> Wafa News Agency, [Abu Rudeineh: approval of 22 settlements in West Bank](#), 27 May 2025

<sup>313</sup> US DoS, [Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Israeli Prime Minister](#), 16 February 2025

<sup>314</sup> US Mission to the UN, [Remarks at a UN Security Council briefing](#), 21 March 2025

<sup>315</sup> US DoS, [Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to the Press](#), 15 September 2025

<sup>316</sup> Reuters, [‘Time to stop’: Trump vows Israel will not annex West Bank](#), 25 September 2025

<sup>317</sup> HC Deb, [1 April 2025](#), c151

May 2025, arguing they are a “deliberate obstacle to Palestinian statehood”.<sup>318</sup>

On 21 July 2025 the UK Government, alongside 30 other states, said that they “strongly opposed” territorial or demographic change in the OPTs. In particular, they said the E1 settlement plan in the West Bank (see above) “would divide a Palestinian state in two, marking a flagrant breach of international law and critically undermine the two-state solution”. The UK said there would be “consequences” for Israel, if it were to proceed.<sup>319</sup>

The UK joined a further statement in August, alongside 23 states and the European Union, saying Minister Smotrich’s announcement was “unacceptable and a violation of international law” and that it must be “retracted”.<sup>320</sup>

The then Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said in August that the “plans must be stopped now” and the UK “condemns the decision”.<sup>321</sup> The UK also summoned the Israeli ambassador in response to the announcement.<sup>322</sup> The UK has also said that “Israeli annexation of the West Bank cannot be allowed to happen”.<sup>323</sup>

The E1 plan was cited by the Canadian Government as one reason why it recognised a Palestinian state in September 2025.<sup>324</sup>

In response to Mr Smotrich’s announcement, a spokesperson for the US State Department said that “a stable West Bank keeps Israel secure and is in line with this administration’s goal to achieve peace in the region”.<sup>325</sup> The American ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, said it was a decision for Israel and “as a general rule [building settlements in the West Bank] it is not a violation of international law”.<sup>326</sup>

The Palestinian Authority condemned Mr Smotrich’s statement on the E1 plan in August and said it would hold Israel and the US to account.<sup>327</sup>

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<sup>318</sup> Hamish Falconer MP on Twitter/X, “[The Israeli Government’s approval \[...\]](#)”, 29 May 2025

<sup>319</sup> FCDO, [Occupied Palestinian Territories: joint statement](#), 21 July 2025; HC Deb, [21 July 2024](#), c610

<sup>320</sup> FCDO, [Occupied Palestinian Territories: joint statement](#), 21 August 2025 (updated 22 August)

<sup>321</sup> Reuters, [UK’s Lammy says Israel settlement plan](#), 14 August 2025; David Lammy MP on Twitter/X, “[The UK condemns the decision \[...\]](#)”, 20 August 2025

<sup>322</sup> FCDO, [UK summons Israeli ambassador following approval of E1 settlement](#), 21 August 2025

<sup>323</sup> FCDO, [Israeli annexation of the West Bank cannot be allowed to happen](#), 29 September 2025

<sup>324</sup> Prime Minister of Canada, [Statement by Prime Minister Carney on Canada’s recognition of a Palestinian state](#), 31 July 2025

<sup>325</sup> Reuters, [Israel’s Smotrich launches settlement plan to 'bury' idea \[...\]](#), 14 August 2025

<sup>326</sup> Middle East Eye, [US does not oppose Israeli development of West Bank settlements, Huckabee says](#), 18 August 2025

<sup>327</sup> WAFA, [Palestinian Presidency condemns new Israeli settlement plan in E1 \[...\]](#), 14 August 2025

## Further reading on the West Bank in 2025

- International Crisis Group, [Sovereignty in all but name: Israel's quickening annexation of the West Bank](#), 6 October 2025
- Foreign Policy, [As the war in Gaza winds down, the West Bank is a flash point](#), 15 October 2025
- Italian Institute for International Political Studies, [Israel's shadow over the West Bank](#), 5 June 2025
- Arab Center Washington DC, [Israeli practices in the occupied West Bank: Prelude to annexation](#), 7 May 2025
- Armed Conflict and Location Event Data, [Palestinian militancy and Israel's campaign to reshape the northern West Bank](#), 2 May 2025
- International Crisis Group, [Israel's West Bank incursions highlight the dilemmas of Palestinian politics](#), 4 March 2025
- ACAPS, [Thematic report: Palestine—West Bank. Current and anticipated developments](#), 3 March 2025
- International Crisis Group, [Stemming Israeli settler violence at its root](#), 6 September 2024

## 2

## Proposals for post-conflict Gaza

### Biden administration statement on post-conflict Gaza

Speaking in January 2025, the then US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, set out his position on the governing of post-conflict Gaza. He said:

- The Palestinian Authority (PA) should invite international partners to run an interim administration, in coordination with Israel. The interim administration would include PA members, following consultation with communities in Gaza, and Palestinians in Gaza. It would hand over to a reformed PA when “feasible”.
- An interim security mission would be formed of security forces from other states and vetted Palestinian personnel. It would help prevent smuggling and build conditions for reconstruction efforts. It would train a PA-led security force.
- These measures would be enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution.

He noted that some US partners said they would only contribute security forces if the PA is reformed and there is a pathway to a Palestinian state.<sup>328</sup> Section 2.4 has more on Palestinian Authority statements on reform in 2025.

## 2.1

### Trump administration proposal: early 2025

This section covers statements in the early part of 2025 from the Trump administration on Gaza’s future. Section 2.2 details the framework proposed in September/October which formed the basis for the Israel-Hamas agreement of October 2025.

#### Statement that Hamas cannot govern Gaza

The Trump administration has said Hamas “must be eliminated” and can no longer govern Gaza, telling the UN Security Council that in February 2025:

<sup>328</sup> Atlantic Council, [The Biden administration’s vision for postwar Gaza](#), 14 January 2025

As long as Hamas stands as a force that can govern, or as a force that can administer, or as a force that can threaten by use of violence, peace becomes impossible. Hamas must be eliminated. It must be eradicated.

Any plan for reconstruction in Gaza must ensure Hamas is fully removed from power and held accountable for its October 7 terrorist massacre.<sup>329</sup>

## Proposal for Palestinians to be relocated from Gaza and US to “take over” the Strip

On 26 January 2025, President Donald Trump said he had spoken to the Jordanian and Egyptian governments about the “temporary” or “long term” relocation of Palestinians in Gaza to other countries in the region. Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, and Egypt rejected the suggestion.<sup>330</sup> In response to a question in March, the President said that “nobody’s expelling any Palestinians”.<sup>331</sup>

The President reiterated these comments in a press conference with the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, on 5 February, in which he said that Palestinians “should go to other countries” and that the US “will take over the Gaza Strip”:

We should go to other countries of interest with humanitarian hearts, and there are many of them that want to do this, and build various domains that will ultimately be occupied by the 1.8 million Palestinians living in Gaza, ending the death and destruction and frankly bad luck.

This could be paid for by neighbouring countries of great wealth. It could be one, two, three, four, five, seven, eight, twelve. It could be numerous sites, or it could be one large site. [...]

The US will take over the Gaza Strip and we will do a job with it too. We’ll own it and be responsible for dismantling all of the dangerous unexploded bombs and other weapons on the site, level the site and get rid of the destroyed buildings. Level it out. Create an economic development that will supply unlimited numbers of jobs and housing for the people of the area. Do a real job. Do something different. Just can’t go back. If you go back, it’s going to end up the same way it has for a hundred years.<sup>332</sup>

President Trump also said that Gaza “would be turned over to the United States by Israel at the conclusion of fighting”.<sup>333</sup> He said that neither US troops nor financing would be used in Gaza.<sup>334</sup>

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<sup>329</sup> US Mission to the UN, [Remarks at a UN Security Council briefing](#), 25 February 2025

<sup>330</sup> BBC News, [Trump wants neighbours to take in Palestinians \[...\]](#), 26 January 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Palestinian factions condemn Trump’s “cleaning out” Gaza remarks](#), 26 January 2025; Reuters, [Timeline of Trump’s remarks on Palestinian displacement, Gaza takeover](#), 8 July 2025

<sup>331</sup> Times of Israel, [Trump says “nobody’s expelling any Palestinians” \[...\]](#), 13 March 2025

<sup>332</sup> Times of Israel, [Trump, at press conference with Netanyahu, says US will “take over” Gaza](#), 6 February 2025

<sup>333</sup> Reuters, [Trump says Israel would hand over Gaza \[...\]](#), 7 February 2025

<sup>334</sup> Times of Israel, [Top US officials say Trump only seeking to “temporarily” remove Gazans](#), 5 February 2025; Axios, [Trump claims no US troops needed for his Gaza takeover plan](#), 6 February 2025

On 9 February, President Trump restated that the US remained “committed to owning it [Gaza], taking it, and making sure that Hamas doesn’t move back” and added that some other states may be allowed to “[re]build sections of it”.<sup>335</sup>

In a meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu in April, President Trump said that “Gaza should never have been given away by Israel, I don’t know why they did it”, referring to Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. Regarding his proposal, he said that “there are other concepts too”.<sup>336</sup>

In May 2025 President Trump reiterated that the US could create a “freedom zone” in Gaza.<sup>337</sup> When asked in July about the plans, President Trump said it was “a concept that was really embraced by a lot of people, but also some people didn’t like it”.<sup>338</sup>

In April, the US State Department spokesperson had described President Trump’s statements as an “invitation for new ideas”.<sup>339</sup>

The box below provides links to analysis of the Trump administration’s proposal.

### Analysis of Trump administration proposal

- Washington Institute, [Voluntary refugee resettlement: a possible solution to clashing visions for Gaza reconstruction](#), 7 March 2025
- Middle East Institute, [President Trump’s Gaza ploy: Exercising leverage over Saudi Arabia?](#), 12 February 2025
- Chatham House, [Negotiating tactic or not, Trump’s Gaza plan has done irreparable damage](#), 7 February 2025
- Arab Center Washington DC, [For Jordan, Trump’s latest pronouncements threaten an extensional disaster](#), 7 February 2025

### Reports of requests to Arab states to take refugees

In March 2025 the Associated Press reported that US and Israeli officials had contacted officials in Sudan, Somalia and Somaliland about hosting Palestinian refugees. Sudanese officials said they rejected the US proposal and Somalia and Somaliland said they were not aware of any contact.<sup>340</sup> Sudanese and Somali officials have said any proposal would be unacceptable

<sup>335</sup> Reuters, [Trump wants US to own Gaza, could let Middle East states help rebuild](#), 10 February 2025

<sup>336</sup> Times of Israel, [Netanyahu says other countries want to take Gazans in](#), 7 April 2025

<sup>337</sup> CNN, [Israel ramps up strikes in Gaza, killing dozens, as Trump floats “freedom zone”](#), 15 May 2025

<sup>338</sup> BBC News, [US allies break with Trump to force diplomatic shift on Gaza](#), 31 July 2025

<sup>339</sup> US DoS, [Press briefing](#), 10 April 2025

<sup>340</sup> AP, [US and Israel look to Africa for moving Palestinians \[...\]](#), 14 March 2025; Financial Times, [US and Israel sound out African countries to resettle Gazans](#), 15 March 2025

(both are members of the Arab League, which rejects Palestinian displacement).<sup>341</sup> CBS News has also reported that the interim Syrian authorities have also been approached about the prospect of hosting Palestinian refugees, and NBC suggested Libya has also been considered.<sup>342</sup> Ethiopia and Indonesia have also reportedly been approached.<sup>343</sup>

## Israel had said implementation was a condition to end conflict

Reuters reported in May 2025 that the US and Israel had initial discussions about a temporary US-led administration in Gaza, though no agreement was then reached on the post-Hamas transition period.<sup>344</sup>

In early 2025, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Government cabinet ministers and major opposition party leaders all expressed support for President Trump's proposal for Palestinians to voluntarily leave Gaza.<sup>345</sup>

In May, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that among the conditions for Israel to end the conflict was " Hamas is totally disarmed, and we carry out the Trump plan".<sup>346</sup> However, implementation of the Trump administration's plan was not one of the five principles for ending the conflict adopted by the Israeli Security Cabinet in August 2025.<sup>347</sup> Mr Netanyahu has urged European leaders to back the US plan and suggested in August that Palestinians leave Gaza.<sup>348</sup>

In March 2025, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that the leaders of Hamas will be allowed to leave Gaza if they lay down their weapons, and that Israel would take on security responsibilities:

Hamas will lay down its weapons. Its leaders will be allowed to leave. We will see to the general security in the Gaza Strip and will allow the realization of the Trump plan for voluntary migration. This is the plan. We are not hiding this and are ready to discuss it at any time.<sup>349</sup>

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<sup>341</sup> Reuters, [Somalia and Somaliland say no talks on resettling Palestinians \[...\]](#), 14 March 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Sudan rejects any plan to relocate Palestinians from Gaza](#), 15 March 2025

<sup>342</sup> CBS News, [US interested in Sudan, Somalia and Syria for resettlement \[...\]](#), 16 March 2025; NBC News, [Trump administration working on plan to move 1 million Palestinians to Libya](#), 19 May 2025

<sup>343</sup> Axios, [Israel seeks US help on deals to move Palestinians out of Gaza](#), 18 July 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Israel denies plan to resettle Palestinians in South Sudan](#), 14 August 2025; CNN, [Israel says it is in talks with several countries \[...\]](#), 14 August 2025

<sup>344</sup> Reuters, [US, Israel discuss possible US-led administration in Gaza](#), 7 May 2025

<sup>345</sup> Barron's, [Israel PM says time to give Gazans "freedom to leave"](#), 3 March 2025; Times of Israel, [Smotrich says Trump's plan to move Gazans "excellent"](#), 26 January 2025; Haaretz [Israel's finance minister says he hopes plan to relocate Gazans \[...\]](#), 16 February 2025; Times of Israel, [Lapid says he supports Palestinians leaving Gaza \[...\]](#), 10 February 2025; Times of Israel, [Gantz welcomes Trump's comments](#), 5 February 2025

<sup>346</sup> Times of Israel, [Netanyahu: Implementation of Trump's Gaza relocation plan \[...\]](#), 21 May 2025

<sup>347</sup> Israeli Prime Minister's Office, [PM Netanyahu at a press conference \[...\]](#), 10 August 2025

<sup>348</sup> Israeli Prime Minister's Office, [Statement by PM Netanyahu](#), 19 May 2025; Reuters, [Israel pounds Gaza city \[...\]](#), 13 August 2025

<sup>349</sup> Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [PM Netanyahu's remarks at the start \[...\]](#), 30 March 2025

The Israeli Government also announced it had taken administrative steps to support voluntary emigration. These include easing blocks on leaving Gaza.<sup>350</sup> In February 2025, Israel’s Minister of Defense, Israel Katz said he would instruct the IDF “to prepare a plan that will allow any resident of Gaza who wishes to leave to do so, to any country willing to receive them”.<sup>351</sup>

In March 2025, the Israeli security cabinet established an office to “prepare for and enable” the “voluntary departure to third countries” of Palestinians from Gaza.<sup>352</sup>

In July, Israeli Foreign Minister, Israel Katz, said that he had instructed the IDF to establish a “humanitarian city” in Rafah, where Palestinians in Gaza would, after being screened to identify Hamas fighters, be sent and not allowed to leave (see above, section 1.2). At the same time, Mr Katz also said that Palestinians would be encouraged to leave (it is unclear whether the location is intended to act as the site for this).<sup>353</sup>

## UN Secretary-General opposes any forced displacement

Speaking about the future of Gaza and the January ceasefire-hostage agreement on 5 February 2025, the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, said that “it is vital to stay true to the bedrock of international law. It is essential to avoid any form of ethnic cleansing”. He also said that “we must reaffirm the two-state solution” of a “viable, sovereign Palestinian State living side-by-side in peace and security with Israel”.<sup>354</sup>

In April, the Secretary-General said that “Palestinians have the right to live in Palestine, in a Palestinian state, side by side with an Israeli state. To be forced to be moved away is something that is against international law”.<sup>355</sup>

## Arab League rejects displacement

President Trump’s statements were condemned by Arab states across the region. The Arab League summit statement in March 2025 set out “the clear Arab position of categorical rejection of any form of displacement of the Palestinian people from their land or internally” and that displacement would be “a gross violation of the international law, a crime against humanity and ethnic cleansing”.<sup>356</sup>

Egypt has reportedly warned the proposal endangers its peace treaty with Israel, in place since 1979, and displacement would have the aim of

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<sup>350</sup> FT, [Israel eases block on exits from Gaza after Trump urges resettlement](#), 6 May 2025

<sup>351</sup> Israel Katz on Twitter/X, [I have instructed the IDF \[...\]](#), 6 February 2025

<sup>352</sup> Times of Israel, [Security cabinet approves new directorate to enable “voluntary” \[...\]](#), 25 March 2025

<sup>353</sup> Times of Israel, [Katz calls for confining all Gazans in “humanitarian city” \[...\]](#), 7 July 2025

<sup>354</sup> UN, [Secretary General’s remarks to the opening of the 2025 session \[...\]](#), 5 February 2025

<sup>355</sup> UN, [Secretary-General’s press encounter on Gaza](#), 8 April 2025

<sup>356</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Arab summit warns Gaza displaced “threat” to regional peace](#), 5 March 2025

“eradicate[in]g the cause for Palestinian statehood”.<sup>357</sup> It “appreciated” the President’s statement in March that “nobody’s expelling any Palestinians”.<sup>358</sup>

The King of Jordan, Abdullah II, said he was “steadfast” against “the displacement of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank [and] this is the unified Arab position.”<sup>359</sup>

Saudi Arabia said that it would not establish diplomatic relations with Israel without the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and that this was “non-negotiable and not subject to compromises”.<sup>360</sup> President Trump has said negotiating a Saudi–Israeli agreement is one of his regional priorities.<sup>361</sup>

## UK Government support for a two-state solution

In February 2025, the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, said that Palestinians “must be allowed home. They must be allowed to rebuild, and we should be with them in that rebuild on the way to a two-state solution”.<sup>362</sup>

In February 2025, the Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer, said that while the UK would work with the US administration on the future and continuation of the January 2025 agreement, Palestinians must be allowed to return:

The UK is clear that Palestinian civilians must be permitted to return to their communities and rebuild. There must be no forcible transfer of Gazans from or within Gaza, nor any reduction in the territory of the Gaza Strip. We would oppose any effort to move Palestinians in Gaza to neighbouring Arab states against their will.<sup>363</sup>

The minister also said that “it is a right guaranteed under international law” for Palestinian civilians to be able to return to, and rebuild, their homes.<sup>364</sup>

The UK Government has long said that Gaza must form part of a future Palestinian state, that there be no annexation by Israel, and that there be no forced displacement of Palestinians.

Section 2 of the Commons Library research briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict July 2024 to March 2025](#) has more on UK position on these issues.

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<sup>357</sup> New Arab, [After Trump’s comments, Egypt and Jordan say they reject \[...\]](#), 27 January 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Arab summit warns Gaza displaced “threat” to regional peace](#), 5 March 2025

<sup>358</sup> France 24, [Egypt says it appreciates Trump’s remarks \[...\]](#), 13 March 2025; Egyptian Foreign Ministry on Twitter/X, [Press release: Egypt expresses appreciation](#), 13 March 2025

<sup>359</sup> BBC News, [Jordan’s king rejects Trump proposal to displace Palestinians](#), 11 February 2025

<sup>360</sup> Saudi Foreign Ministry on Twitter/X, [The Foreign Ministry affirms \[...\]](#), 5 February 2025

<sup>361</sup> New York Times, [Full transcript of President Trump’s speech to Congress](#), 4 March 2025

<sup>362</sup> HC Deb, [5 February 2025](#), c744

<sup>363</sup> PQ 29121 [[Gaza: Politics and government](#)], 5 February 2025

<sup>364</sup> PQ 29251 [[Gaza: politics and government](#)], 12 February 2025

In 2025, the government also says it has been in discussion with Qatar and Israel about arranging Hamas leaders leaving Gaza to a third country.<sup>365</sup>

## 2.2

## US administration framework: October 2025

### 20-point framework: Background

In September 2025, the Trump administration published a 20-point framework for an agreement to end the Israel-Hamas conflict and on the future of Gaza.<sup>366</sup> It said that no Palestinians will be forced to leave Gaza and any that do will be allowed to return. President Trump said the proposal is “not about Gaza alone, this is about long sought peace in the Middle East”.<sup>367</sup>

President Trump said that if Hamas did not accept the proposed text, Israel would have his “full backing to finish the job of destroying the threat of Hamas”.<sup>368</sup> He said the proposal followed negotiations with Arab, Muslim and European states.<sup>369</sup> Israel and Hamas agreed the initial phases of the agreement in October 2025—see above, section 1.4.

The phased nature of the plan echoes aspects of the June 2024 [UN Security Council Resolution 2735](#), which set out three stages to the post-conflict period, the Biden administration’s plan that began to be implemented in January 2025 (see above, section 1.1), the Arab League’s 2025 proposal (section 2.3) and the Saudi-French hosted conference on a two-state solution (see below, also section 2.3).

### UN Security Council resolution, November 2025

On 17 November 2025 the UN Security Council voted on the US-drafted resolutions to endorse the October framework and establish the framework for the ISF and Board of Peace. While Russia proposed an alternative resolution, this was not voted on. Differences between the two resolutions centred on the role and mandate of the Board of Peace and International Stabilisation Force, the Palestinian Authority’s role and progress towards a two-state solution.<sup>370</sup>

<sup>365</sup> Lords International Affairs Committee, [Oral evidence: Foreign Secretary](#), 26 March 2025, Q6

<sup>366</sup> Media reports suggest the plan originally had 21 points: Times of Israel, [US 21-point plan for ending Gaza war, creating pathway to Palestinian state](#), 27 September 2025 and [Netanyahu secured key edits to Trump plan](#), 30 September 2025

<sup>367</sup> Reuters, [Trump tells Israel to stop bombing Gaza, saying Hamas is ready for peace](#), 4 October 2025

<sup>368</sup> Fox News, [Trump unveils 20-point plan to secure peace in Gaza](#), 29 September 2025

<sup>369</sup> Times of Israel, [Seeking ‘eternal Middle East peace’: Full text of Trump, Netanyahu statements on deal to end Gaza war](#), 29 September 2025

<sup>370</sup> Security Council Report (not affiliated with the UN), [Vote on a Draft Resolution to Authorise an International Stabilization Force in Gaza](#), 16 November 2025; International Crisis Group, [What to Look for as the Gaza Peace Plan Comes to the UN Security Council?](#), 14 November 2025; US

The US-drafted resolution passed the Security Council, with 13 votes to 0.<sup>371</sup> China and Russia abstained. The UK voted in favour, saying it was a “critical staging post in the implementation of the Peace Plan” for Palestinians and Israelis.<sup>372</sup>

The full text of the resolution has not been published but will be recorded on the UN document website as [UN Security Council Resolution 2803 \(2025\)](#).

Several regional states including Qatar, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Türkiye backed the US draft resolution.<sup>373</sup> Israel also welcomed the resolution and called on states to expel Hamas from the region.<sup>374</sup> The Palestinian Authority also backed the resolution.<sup>375</sup>

In Israel, some of Mr Netanyahu’s coalition partners criticised the resolution as not ruling out the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Prime Minister said “our opposition to a Palestinian state in any territory has not changed”.<sup>376</sup>

Hamas and Palestinian Jihad reiterated their opposition to any foreign military presence and international “guardianship” of Gaza.<sup>377</sup>

## 20-point framework: Summary and full text

The White House released the full text of the proposal on 29 September.

In the immediate term, on Israel and Hamas agreeing, conflict and military action would end and aid would “immediately” be allowed into Gaza. Within 72 hours of an agreement, all hostages held in Gaza will be released. This would be followed by Israel releasing some Palestinian detainees. This forms the first phase, which came into effect in October.

The proposal also says that no Palestinian will be forced to leave Gaza and Israel will not annex or occupy the strip.

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Mission to the UN, [Explanation of vote following the adoption of a US drafted UN Security Council resolution](#), 17 November 2025

<sup>371</sup> UN, [UN Security Council authorizes temporary international force for Gaza](#), 17 November 2025; Reuters, [Russia proposes its own UN resolution on Gaza in challenge to US draft](#), 13 November 2025

<sup>372</sup> FCDO, [The United Kingdom voted in favour of this resolution as a critical step](#) and [UK urges major increase in humanitarian aid for Gaza](#), 17 November 2025

<sup>373</sup> US Mission to the UN, [Joint Statement on the UN Security Council Resolution on Gaza](#), 14 November 2025

<sup>374</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [PM Netanyahu's Statement on the UNSC resolution](#), 17 November 2025; Reuters, [After UN vote, Netanyahu calls for Hamas' expulsion \[...\]](#), 18 November 2025

<sup>375</sup> WAFA, [State of Palestine welcomes the UN resolution on Gaza](#), 18 November 2025

<sup>376</sup> Reuters, [Netanyahu faces far-right backlash after US-backed statement on Palestinian state](#), 16 November 2025

<sup>377</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Palestinian groups reject US draft UNSC resolution for Gaza](#), 17 November 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Palestinian factions criticise UNSC approval of US plan for Gaza](#), 17 November 2025

Later stages are yet to be fully agreed or to have an established timetable for action. On 14 October President Trump said that “phase two has started” and the “phases are all a little bit mixed in with each other”.<sup>378</sup>

Later stages include Hamas disarming and an amnesty for some members who agree to peaceful co-existence, the creation of a temporary transition committee, chaired by President Trump, to monitor a technocratic committee that contains neither Hamas nor Fatah, and the establishment of an International Stabilisation Force, which will take over security as the IDF withdraws. The Palestinian Authority, if certain conditions are met, will take over the government of Gaza. It also recognises Palestinian “aspirations” to statehood.

The full text released in September 2025 can be found below:<sup>379</sup>

1. Gaza will be a deradicalised terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbours.
2. Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough.
3. If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal.
4. Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned.
5. Once all hostages are released, Israel will release 250 life sentence prisoners plus 1,700 Gazans who were detained after 7 October 2023, including all women and children detained in that context. For every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release the remains of 15 deceased Gazans.
6. Once all hostages are returned, Hamas members who commit to peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons will be given amnesty. Members of Hamas who wish to leave Gaza will be provided safe passage to receiving countries.
7. Upon acceptance of this agreement, full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip. At a minimum, aid quantities will be consistent with what was included in the 19 January 2025 agreement [this will be around 600 trucks a day: see section 1.6 of the Commons Library research briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict July 2024 to March 2025](#)] regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of infrastructure

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<sup>378</sup> ABC News, [Trump, world leaders gather in Egypt for ceasefire deal \[...\]](#), 14 October 2025

<sup>379</sup> Text from BBC News, [Trump's 20-point Gaza peace plan in full](#), 30 September 2025. Also from: White House on Twitter/X, [“President Donald J. Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”](#), 29 September 2025

(water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads.

8. Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party. Opening the Rafah crossing in both directions will be subject to the same mechanism implemented under 19 January 2025 agreement [see section 1.6 of the Commons Library research briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict July 2024 to March 2025](#)]

9. Gaza will be governed under the temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza. This committee will be made up of qualified Palestinians and international experts, with oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body, the “Board of Peace,” which will be headed and chaired by President Donald J. Trump, with other members and heads of state to be announced, including Former Prime Minister Tony Blair [President Trump has said he is open to the board membership being expanded—see below]. This body will set the framework and handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza until such time as the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform programme, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump’s peace plan in 2020 [which can be found at: White House, [Peace to Prosperity](#)] and the Saudi-French proposal [of 2025, see section 2.3] and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza. This body will call on best international standards to create modern and efficient governance that serves the people of Gaza and is conducive to attracting investment.

10. A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energise Gaza will be created by convening a panel of experts who have helped birth some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East. Many thoughtful investment proposals and exciting development ideas have been crafted by well-meaning international groups, and will be considered to synthesize the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for future Gaza.

11. A special economic zone will be established with preferred tariff and access rates to be negotiated with participating countries.

12. No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return. We will encourage people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better Gaza.

13. Hamas and other factions agree to not have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form. All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarisation of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning, and supported by an internationally funded buy back and reintegration programme all verified by the independent monitors. New Gaza will be fully committed to building a prosperous economy and to peaceful coexistence with their neighbours.

14. A guarantee will be provided by regional partners to ensure that Hamas, and the factions, comply with their obligations and that New Gaza poses no threat to its neighbours or its people.

15. The United States will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilisation Force (ISF) to immediately deploy in Gaza. The ISF will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza, and will consult with Jordan and Egypt who have extensive experience in this field. This force will be the long-term internal security solution. The ISF will work with Israel and Egypt to help secure border areas, along with newly trained Palestinian police forces. It is critical to prevent munitions from entering Gaza and to facilitate the rapid and secure flow of goods to rebuild and revitalize Gaza. A deconfliction mechanism will be agreed upon by the parties.

16. Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States, with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens. Practically, the IDF will progressively hand over the Gaza territory it occupies to the ISF according to an agreement they will make with the transitional authority until they are withdrawn completely from Gaza, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat.


17. In the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above, including the scaled-up aid operation, will proceed in the terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF.

18. An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that can be derived from peace.

19. While Gaza re-development advances and when the PA [Palestinian Authority] reform programme is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognise as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.

20. The United States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous co-existence.

The White House also published an illustrative diagram of proposed IDF withdrawal lines for each stage of implementation. The final stage, as noted in point 16 of the proposal, is for an Israeli “security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat”. No further detailed map has been published.



Source: White House on Twitter/X, [“President Donald J. Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”](#), 29 September 2025

## How did Israel respond?

Prime Minister Netanyahu backed President Trump’s plan at a joint press conference on 29 September, saying “it achieves our war aims”. He said these included the release of hostages, the disarming of Hamas, that the Palestinian Authority would not govern Gaza (point 9 allows it to, if it is judged to carry out sufficient reforms) and “ensur[ing] that Gaza never again poses a threat to Israel”.<sup>380</sup> He said recognising a Palestinian state was “not written in the agreement” and that it allows the IDF to retain a presence in Gaza (point 19 “recognises” statehood as an “aspiration” of Palestinians).<sup>381</sup>

Mr Netanyahu welcomed the international committee and said that “if this international body succeeds, we will have permanently ended the war”.<sup>382</sup>

<sup>380</sup> Times of Israel, [Seeking ‘eternal Middle East peace’: Full text of Trump, Netanyahu statements on deal to end Gaza war](#), 29 September 2025

<sup>381</sup> Times of Israel, [Netanyahu claims Trump plan will allow IDF to remain in Gaza](#), 30 September 2025

<sup>382</sup> Times of Israel, [Seeking ‘eternal Middle East peace’: Full text of Trump, Netanyahu statements on deal to end Gaza war](#), 29 September 2025

The Israeli Cabinet formally agreed a framework for the release of hostages, reportedly covering the first stage of the plan, on 10 October.<sup>383</sup> However, [several members of the ruling coalition voted against](#), from the All Religious Zionist Party, Otzma Yehudit, Religious Zionist Party and Otzma Yehudit. Some ministers have called for the continuation of military action against Hamas.<sup>384</sup>

Mr Netanyahu also set out his expectations for Palestinian Authority (PA) reforms (see below, section 2.4 for PA commitments on reform in 2025):

That means ending ‘pay to slay’. Changing the poisonous textbooks that teach hatred of Jews to Palestinian children. Stopping incitement in the media. Ending lawfare against Israel at the ICC [International Criminal Court], the ICJ [International Court of Justice]. Recognizing the Jewish state, and many, many other reforms.

It won’t come as a surprise to you that the vast majority of Israelis have no faith that the PA leopard will change its spots. But rather than wait for this miraculous transformation, your plan provides a practical and realistic path forward for Gaza in the coming years, in which Gaza will be administered neither by Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority, but by those committed to a genuine peace with Israel.<sup>385</sup>

Israel has also previously said it opposes a role for UNRWA. Its status is uncertain under the agreement. See section 5 of the Commons Library research briefing, [UNRWA and UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip 2023-25](#), for Israeli legislation on UNRWA.

## How did Hamas respond?

Hamas says it has accepted the first phase of the framework. Analysts note there may be some divisions between the Hamas leadership based in Gaza and that elsewhere on how to proceed on negotiations.<sup>386</sup>

### Disarmament

It has opposed immediate disarmament, saying it has a “legitimate right” to have weapons. However, some Hamas officials have suggested decommissioning arms in the future or suggested that it is a “complicated issue” that requires “a Palestinian consensus” and is “tied to the [broader] political stance and solution” of Palestinians.<sup>387</sup> In October, Qatari mediators said that Hamas was open to discussing ways so not to “pose a threat to

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<sup>383</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Prime Minister's Office announcement](#), 10 October 2025

<sup>384</sup> Times of Israel, [Smotrich says he will oppose hostage deal](#), 9 October 2025; Ynet News, [Far-right ministers welcome hostage deal but weigh quitting government](#), 10 September 2025

<sup>385</sup> Times of Israel, [Seeking ‘eternal Middle East peace’: Full text of Trump, Netanyahu statements on deal to end Gaza war](#), 29 September 2025

<sup>386</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Pan-Arab daily suggests ‘division’ within Hamas leadership](#), 13 November 2025

<sup>387</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Hamas says disarmament ‘complicated issue’, requires consensus](#), 30 October 2025; Reuters, [Hamas aims to keep grip on Gaza security and can't commit to disarm, senior official says](#), 18 October 2025

Israel” but the way to achieve this did not form part of the initial talks.<sup>388</sup> An Egyptian official has also suggested that Hamas will “freeze its weapons, not to disarm”. Negotiations on the issue are ongoing.<sup>389</sup>

President Trump initially suggested on 13 October that Hamas had been allowed to conduct internal security operations in Gaza (see above, section 1.2). However, on the 14 October President Trump said “if they don't disarm, we will disarm them. And it will happen quickly and perhaps violently”. He said he had communicated this to Hamas.<sup>390</sup>

Vice President JD Vance has suggested Arab Gulf states will be responsible for confirming Hamas has disarmed.<sup>391</sup>

### Statements on stabilisation force

On 23 October, a Hamas spokesperson said the international military force is a “sensitive” issue for the group which would require “thorough discussion” before it took a position.<sup>392</sup> There have been some statements issued by Hamas officials, including that it, in principle, has agreed to the force, but also that any security forces must be under Palestinian control.<sup>393</sup>

In response to the UN Security Council resolution passed in November 2025, Hamas said that the ISF would be “a party to the conflict in favour of the occupation” if it were to participate in disarming the group.<sup>394</sup>

### Governance

Hamas has also signalled it is open to handing over governance of Gaza to a Palestinian body. However, they along with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine have issued a joint statement setting out their “absolute rejection of any foreign guardianship” in Gaza. While welcoming the potential for external participation in reconstruction, they said governance was an “internal” matter for Palestinians.<sup>395</sup>

Hamas has subsequently called for the “immediate” formation of an “independent” Palestinian committee to govern Gaza.<sup>396</sup> On 25 October, Hamas, alongside other Palestinian groups, issued a statement that governance of Gaza would be handed over to a committee of independent “technocrats” which would “manag[e] daily life and basic services in

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<sup>388</sup> New York Times, [Israel and Hamas were not ready for a comprehensive peace deal, mediator says](#), 12 October 2025

<sup>389</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Netanyahu vows Hamas will be disarmed, Gaza demilitarise](#), 11 October 2025

<sup>390</sup> Reuters, [Trump suggests Hamas has approval for internal security operations in Gaza](#), 13 October 2025; Reuters, [Trump says Hamas must disarm or be disarmed, perhaps violently](#), 14 October 2025

<sup>391</sup> Times of Israel, [Vance downplays renewed violence in Gaza](#), 20 October 2025

<sup>392</sup> Reuters, [From cargo hub, US plots complex goal of forming international force \[...\]](#), 24 October 2025

<sup>393</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Hamas leader says agreed with Fatah on Gaza](#), 27 October 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Hamas says Gaza international force proposal at UNSC “difficult to pass”](#), 4 November 2025

<sup>394</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Palestinian factions criticise UNSC approval of US plan for Gaza](#), 17 November 2025

<sup>395</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Palestinian groups reject “foreign guardianship” in Gaza](#), 11 October 2025

<sup>396</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Hamas urges ‘immediate’ formation of committee to govern Gaza](#), 17 October 2025

cooperation with Arab partners and international institutions”.<sup>397</sup> It would be in place until elections are held or national unity government formed across the OPTs. Fatah has reportedly agreed but no decision has been made on the committee’s chair.<sup>398</sup>

## How did the Palestinian Authority respond?

The Palestinian Authority welcomed the 20-point framework and has noted that talks have initially focused on its early stages rather than reconstruction and wider peacebuilding.<sup>399</sup>

The Authority says the framework will ensure there is no Israeli annexation of land and the forced displacement of Palestinians. It says it will work with the US for a “full Israeli withdrawal” and that it remains committed to its reform programme (see below, section 2.4). The Authority has previously called on Hamas to disarm and cede control of Gaza.<sup>400</sup>

Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa has said that the ultimate aim of talks must now be “unifying national institutions in the West Bank and Gaza”, “empowering the Palestinian government to fully perform its responsibilities in the Gaza Strip,” and “a political solution that realizes the Palestinian state on the ground”. He described this as the “real guarantee for peace and security”.<sup>401</sup>

## What has been the UK and international response?

### UK Government statements

Addressing the Commons on 14 October, Prime Minister Keir Starmer said the UK welcomed the framework and called for its full implementation. He said UK efforts would focus on reconstruction, disarming Hamas and supporting the international stabilising force, and facilitating reforms to the Palestinian Authority.<sup>402</sup>

The UK Government says it will support a “Palestinian-led recovery and reconstruction” and hosted a conference at Wilton Park on 13 October to discuss how to raise funds to achieve this. The government also said that reconstruction is also “about reconnecting Gaza and the West Bank,

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<sup>397</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Palestinian factions agree to hand Gaza to ‘technocrat committee’](#), 24 October 2025

<sup>398</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Hamas leader says agreed with Fatah on Gaza](#), 27 October 2025

<sup>399</sup> WAFA News Agency, [President Abbas: Peace summit a key step\[...\]](#), 14 October 2025

<sup>400</sup> WAFA News Agency, [Statement issued by the State of Palestine on efforts to end the war in Gaza](#), 30 September 2025

<sup>401</sup> WAFA News Agency, [PM Mustafa: Ready to implement the Gaza recovery and reconstruction plan \[...\]](#), 14 October 2025

<sup>402</sup> HC Deb, [14 October 2025](#), c218

economically, politically, socially” and maintaining the viability of a Palestinian state.<sup>403</sup>

The UK has deployed a “small number of UK planning officers” to support planning efforts for Gaza post-conflict stability. They are not monitoring the ceasefire agreement. Defence Secretary John Healey said the UK had “specialist experience and skills” that the government had “offered to contribute”.<sup>404</sup>

For more on the UK Government and Parliament response, see section 3.

### Regional states

Foreign ministers of states including Qatar, Jordan, UAE, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have welcomed the framework. They said they were committed to work to ensure a “comprehensive deal”:

They reaffirm their joint commitment to work with the United States to end the war in Gaza through a comprehensive deal that ensures unrestricted delivery of sufficient humanitarian aid to Gaza, no displacement of the Palestinians, the release of hostages, a security mechanism that guarantees the security of all sides, full Israeli withdrawal, rebuilds Gaza and creates a path for a just peace on the basis of the two state solution, under which Gaza is fully integrated with the West Bank in a Palestinian state in accordance with international law as key to achieving regional stability and security.<sup>405</sup>

The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Badr Abdelatty, has also said “we are counting on Trump to keep the implementation of this plan for all its phases”.<sup>406</sup>

President Trump has said he expects certain Arab and Muslim-majority countries to “deal with Hamas” under the agreement. If they do not, the President said, “Israel would have the absolute right and actually our full backing” to do so.<sup>407</sup> Regional states have not said if they would participate in the international stabilisation mission in Gaza and have previously suggested this will first require steps to be taken towards Palestinian statehood.<sup>408</sup>

### Other permanent UN Security Council members

In addition to the US and the UK, France, China and Russia are the other five permanent members of the Security Council.

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<sup>403</sup> FCDO, [Minister for the Middle East speech at Wilton Park conference](#), 13 October 2025; FCDO, [Communiqué from co-Hosts of the Wilton Park \[...\]](#), 16 October 2025

<sup>404</sup> Reuters, [UK deploys small number of military officers to Israel following US request](#), 21 October 2025; PQ 842343 [[Gaza: Peacekeeping Operations](#)], 27 October 2025

<sup>405</sup> Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers \[...\] welcome US President's sincere efforts to end the war in Gaza](#), 29 September 2025

<sup>406</sup> AP News, [Egyptian president says Trump's Mideast proposal is 'last chance' for peace in the region](#), 14 October 2025

<sup>407</sup> Times of Israel, [Seeking 'eternal Middle East peace': Full text of Trump, Netanyahu statements on deal to end Gaza war](#), 29 September 2025

<sup>408</sup> Commons Library research briefing, [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2023/24: US, EU and Middle East response](#), section 5.6

France welcomed the Trump administration’s plan and its reference to the [New York Declaration](#) that was agreed at the Saudi-French hosted conference in July 2025 (see below, section 2.3). In line with the declaration, France has called for the deployment of an international stabilization force mandated by the UN Security Council, and a “credible political horizon” for a Palestinian state.<sup>409</sup> It says it plans to support “security, governance, reconstruction and humanitarian aid”.<sup>410</sup>

The EU says it is ready to resume its support for the operation at the Rafah border crossing (via the civilian mission, [EUBAM Rafah](#)) and policing in the West Bank ([EUPOL COPPS](#)).<sup>411</sup>

Russia has backed the agreement but criticised it for not addressing the situation in the West Bank and its reference to Palestinian statehood in only “general terms”.<sup>412</sup> See above, for its [proposed resolution](#) in November.

China says it “supports all efforts” to “restore peace and ease the humanitarian crisis”. It says post-conflict Gaza must be governed by Palestinians.<sup>413</sup> China has not made reference to the [Beijing Declaration of July 2024](#), which it negotiated, and in which 14 Palestinian factions agreed on a “national government”. Both Fatah and Hamas signed the declaration.<sup>414</sup>

## What are the plans for implementation?

Many aspects of the framework, beyond the first phase of the agreement of October 2025, are yet to be agreed and timetable established. The further reading box includes more analysis on the framework and potential challenges to its implementation. Some issues, such as Hamas disarmament, are covered above.

### Israeli withdrawal (points 3 and 16)

Point 3 and 16 say that Israel will withdraw to set lines, though will maintain a security barrier around Gaza. The timeline of these moves has not been announced. Both President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu have also reiterated that they are willing to use force to ensure Hamas is disarmed (see above in this section).

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<sup>409</sup> France Diplomacy, [Israel/Palestine – Peace plan proposed by President D. J. Trump](#), 29 September 2025 and [Israel/Palestine – Conclusion of the first phase of a ceasefire agreement in Gaza \[...\]](#), 9 October 2025

<sup>410</sup> Reuters, [Europeans, Arabs flesh out Gaza transition ideas to weigh on Trump plan](#), 10 October 2025

<sup>411</sup> European Council, [Statement by President António Costa \[...\]](#), 13 October 2025

<sup>412</sup> Reuters, [Russia's Lavrov says Trump's plan is too vague on Palestinian statehood](#), 13 October 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Moscow announces support for Trump's Gaza plan](#), 8 October 2025

<sup>413</sup> China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian \[...\]](#), 13 October 2025

<sup>414</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Beijing caveats 'welcome' to Trump Gaza plan \[...\]](#), 30 September 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Palestinian factions sign China-brokered declaration after unity talks](#), 23 July 2024

Some Arab states have raised concerns that there is no timetable for Israel to withdraw further in Gaza.<sup>415</sup> Other diplomats have reportedly raised concerns that the Israeli withdrawal lines may become permanent or that reconstruction efforts will be focused in IDF-controlled areas of Gaza.<sup>416</sup>

### International stabilisation force (point 15)

While the US has announced that 200 troops are being deployed from the region to Israel to monitor the ceasefire, which countries will provide forces for the stabilisation force is uncertain. The planned force will reportedly be around 20,000 strong.<sup>417</sup>

Reports suggest the stabilisation force may be led by Egypt, with contributions from Azerbaijan, Turkey and Indonesia.<sup>418</sup> Other suggested countries include the UAE and Qatar, while Italy has said it is prepared to participate.<sup>419</sup> The UAE has said it will not participate in “current circumstances”.<sup>420</sup> Azerbaijan will reportedly only send personnel if all conflict between Israel and Hamas has ended.<sup>421</sup> Indonesia has not confirmed its participation, but says any troops deployed will concentrated on health and construction-related tasks.<sup>422</sup>

Media reports suggest the force could also be divided into two, with one responsible for policing within Gaza and another on the strip’s borders.<sup>423</sup>

The Jordanian King has said the country will not contribute to the force, due to the country being “too close politically” to the conflict (half the Jordanian population is of Palestinian descent), but that Jordan is open to helping train a local police force.<sup>424</sup>

Mr Netanyahu has said Israel will decide which foreign troops will constitute the force, and is opposed to Turkish participation.<sup>425</sup> US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, has said the members of the force will have to be “someone

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<sup>415</sup> Financial Times, [US and Israel’s controversial plan to build ‘New Gaza’ sparks alarm](#), 8 November 2025

<sup>416</sup> Reuters, [Partition of Gaza a looming risk as Trump’s plan falters](#), 11 November 2025

<sup>417</sup> Reuters, [US to start UN negotiations on Thursday on international Gaza force \[...\]](#), 6 November 2025

<sup>418</sup> The National, [Egypt expected to lead four-nation Gaza stabilisation force](#), 19 October 2025

<sup>419</sup> AA, [Italy ready to contribute to international stabilization force in Gaza \[...\]](#), 15 October 2025

<sup>420</sup> Reuters, [UAE rules out joining Gaza stabilization force for now](#), 10 November 2025

<sup>421</sup> Reuters, [Azerbaijan will only send peacekeepers to Gaza if fighting stops completely, source says](#), 7 November 2025

<sup>422</sup> Reuters, [Indonesia says its Gaza peacekeepers would focus on health, infrastructure tasks](#), 14 November 2025

<sup>423</sup> Reuters, [From cargo hub, US plots complex goal of forming international force \[...\]](#), 24 October 2025

<sup>424</sup> BBC News, [International troops won’t want to enforce Gaza peace, says King of Jordan](#), 27 October 2025

<sup>425</sup> Al Monitor, [Netanyahu hints at opposition to any Turkish forces in Gaza](#), 22 October 2025; Reuters, [Netanyahu says Israel will decide which foreign troops acceptable to secure Gaza ceasefire](#), 27 October 2025

that everyone's comfortable with, including Israel".<sup>426</sup> Turkey-Israel relations have been poor during the conflict.<sup>427</sup>

The [US draft resolution](#) proposed to the UN Security Council in November said that the force would oversee the process of demilitarisation in collaboration with Palestinian police forces, including the "permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups". The ISF will report to the board of peace.<sup>428</sup>

The New York Times has reported the concerns of some countries that the force may be perceived as taking action against Hamas on Israel's behalf and deploying without sufficient progress on a two-state solution.<sup>429</sup>

The UN Secretary General has said that "whatever entity that is created in Gaza should have the legitimacy of a mandate from the Security Council," and this includes the security force.<sup>430</sup>

### Board of Peace (point 9) and role of the Palestinian Authority (point 19)

Point 9 says President Trump will chair a board as a transitional authority in Gaza. He has suggested the board may be expanded in number.<sup>431</sup> Germany, France and the UK are reportedly seeking a place.<sup>432</sup> The President has questioned whether former UK Prime Minister Sir Tony Blair will serve on the board, as he needed to ensure that Sir Tony would be an "acceptable choice to everybody".<sup>433</sup>

Media reports suggest some concern in Arab states about Sir Tony's participation in the board, citing his support for the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the UK's governance of Mandatory Palestine from 1917 to 1948.<sup>434</sup>

Point 19 says that, subject to making reforms, the Palestinian Authority will govern both Gaza and the West Bank. The framework says these will be in line with the first Trump administration's "Peace to prosperity" proposal of 2020. This said that the Palestinian Authority must:

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<sup>426</sup> Times of Israel, [Addressing Turkey, PA role in Gaza, Rubio says \[...\]](#), 24 October 2025

<sup>427</sup> Arab Center Washington DC, [Beyond Gaza: The strategic fault lines in Turkey-Israel relations](#), 2 October 2025; France 24, [Turkey issues arrest warrant against Netanyahu for 'genocide' in Gaza](#), 7 November 2025

<sup>428</sup> Axios, [US seeks UN approval for Gaza security force with broad two-year \[...\]](#), 3 November 2025; Reuters, [US may ask UN to mandate international force in Gaza \[...\]](#), 5 November 2025; Rami Ayari on Twitter/X, ["Diplomats say the #US circulated their Gaza \[...\]"](#), 6 November 2025; Just Security, [The US draft security council resolution on Gaza: Initial concerns](#), 5 November 2025

<sup>429</sup> New York Times, [Nations hesitate to send troops to Gaza, fearing clashes with Hamas](#), 21 October 2025

<sup>430</sup> UN, [Potential Gaza stabilization force must have Security Council approval \[...\]](#), 4 November 2025

<sup>431</sup> New York Times, [Hostages and Palestinian prisoners are freed \[...\]](#), 12 October 2025

<sup>432</sup> Reuters, [EU should maximise influence on Gaza and join Board of Peace \[...\]](#), 14 October 2025; Politico, [Europeans to press for seat on Trump's Gaza 'Board of Peace'](#), 9 October 2025

<sup>433</sup> Reuters, [Trump unsure whether Tony Blair would be accepted \[...\]](#), 12 October 2025

<sup>434</sup> FT, [Arab states push back on Tony Blair role in overseeing postwar Gaza](#), 24 October 2025

Refrain from any attempt to join any international organization without the consent of the State of Israel;

Take no action, and shall dismiss all pending actions, against the State of Israel, the United States and any of their citizens before the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, and all other tribunals;

Take no action against any Israeli or United States citizen before Interpol or any non-Israeli or United States (as applicable) legal system;

Take all necessary actions to immediately terminate the paying of salaries to terrorists serving sentences in Israeli prisons, as well as to the families of deceased terrorists (collectively, the “PRISONER & MARTYR PAYMENTS”) and to develop humanitarian and welfare programs to provide essential services and support to Palestinians in need that are not based upon the commission of terrorist acts. The goal is to change the applicable laws, in a manner that is consistent with the laws of the United States, and completely cease making Prisoner and Martyr Payments by the time of signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement; and

Further the development of institutions necessary for self-governance<sup>435</sup>

From 2023 to 2025, the Palestinian Authority sought full membership of the UN, continued its membership of the ICC and joined the case against Israel at the ICJ. See the Library research briefing, [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2023-25: UN, ICC and ICJ statements and actions](#).

However, speaking on 24 October the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said that the Palestinian Authority must implement reforms but its role in Gaza’s future is “yet to be determined, if any role at all”.<sup>436</sup>

President Trump has also said Hamas and “other terrorist factions” would have no role on the transitional board. He also said the World Bank and others would be “responsible for recruiting and training a new government that will be made up of Palestinians, along with highly qualified experts”.<sup>437</sup>

### **Palestinian statehood (point 19)**

Israel has said the framework does not envisage a Palestinian state. The US President has also not confirmed his position on statehood. On 14 October he said “a lot of people like the one-state solution. Some people like the two-state solutions. We’ll have to see. I haven’t commented on that”.<sup>438</sup>

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<sup>435</sup> White House, [Peace to prosperity](#) (PDF), 2020 p39

<sup>436</sup> Times of Israel, [Addressing Turkey, PA role in Gaza, Rubio says \[...\]](#), 24 October 2025

<sup>437</sup> Times of Israel, [Seeking ‘eternal Middle East peace’: Full text of Trump, Netanyahu statements on deal to end Gaza war](#), 29 September 2025

<sup>438</sup> BBC News, [Trump reflects on “important day \[...\]”](#), 14 October 2025

## Funding and reconstruction (point 10)

The UN Development Programme says several countries are prepared to support the US\$70 billion reconstruction needs in Gaza, including those in the region as well as in North America and Europe.<sup>439</sup>

## The West Bank

The West Bank, including ongoing violence and the place of Israeli settlements, is not mentioned in the document. In a meeting with the Jordanian King, the UK Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, discussed “the importance of not losing sight of the West Bank as part of this process”.<sup>440</sup>

## Further reading

- Council for Foreign Relations, [A guide to Trump’s twenty-point Gaza peace plan](#), 10 October 2025
- European Council on Foreign Relations, [An imperfect promise: Where Trump’s peace plan for Gaza falls short](#), 3 October 2025
- Arab Center Washington DC, [The Trump-Netanyahu plan for Gaza](#), 9 October 2025
- Chatham House, [Egypt is crucial to Trump’s Gaza plan](#), 9 October 2025
- Foreign Policy, [The biggest hurdles to the next phase of Trump’s Gaza deal](#), 9 October 2025
- Foreign Affairs, [The Gaza deal is not too big to fail](#), 9 October 2025
- Foreign Policy, [What would it take to rebuild Gaza?](#), 3 October 2025
- Foreign Policy, [Trump’s approach just might end the war in Gaza, but the next stage is harder](#), 6 October 2025
- Arab State Washington Institute, [Another half-baked Trump Gaza plan](#), 1 October 2025
- Institute for International Political Studies, [A 20-point plan, but what peace for Gaza?](#), 2 October 2025
- The Telegraph, [So, how do you disarm Hamas?](#), 10 October 2025
- Foreign Affairs, [How to free Palestine: Turning the Gaza cease-fire into lasting peace](#), 14 October 2025
- Chatham House, [Netanyahu’s concepts collapsed, one by one, as Trump piled on pressure: What next for his government?](#), 14 October 2025

<sup>439</sup> Reuters, [UN says countries are willing to help fund Gaza’s \\$70 bln reconstruction](#), 14 October 2025

<sup>440</sup> Prime Minister’s Office, [PM meeting with King Abdullah II of Jordan](#), 13 October 2025

- Washington Institute, [“Deradicalization” in Gaza: The problem, the solution, and the measures of success](#), 17 October 2025
- Brookings Institute, [What could the Israel-Gaza deal mean for the Middle East?](#), 13 October 2025
- Chatham House, [Trump’s Gaza plan is still not a complete peace settlement](#), 17 October 2025
- International Crisis Group, [Gaza’s ceasefire is vital, but only a start](#), 21 October 2025
- Chatham House,  [Hamas can’t rebuild Gaza. For Trump’s plan to work, Palestinians must be given hope](#), 17 October 2025
- Just Security, [Implementing the Gaza ceasefire](#), 20 October 2025

## 2.3

### Arab League summit proposal, March 2025

#### Proposal for a three-stage plan

On 4 March 2025, an [Arab League](#) leaders’ meeting in Egypt agreed a proposal for post-conflict Gaza. This planned for three phases, including international funding for reconstruction and a two-state solution.

For the first six months of the plan, a “technocratic” committee would govern Gaza, with neither Hamas nor Fatah having members (Fatah forms most members of the Palestinian Authority, which governs the West Bank). Reconstruction would be contingent on Hamas no longer governing Gaza. An international force would provide security in place of Hamas. Media reports describe the proposal as a framework rather than a detailed plan for post-conflict governance or who would be responsible for security or reconstruction.<sup>441</sup>

The proposal suggested that the UK, US, EU and members of the [Organization of Islamic Cooperation](#) could monitor the international force and administrating committee.

Attending countries from the Arab League included Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. The Palestinian Authority President, Mahmoud Abbas, and the EU President, António Costa, also

<sup>441</sup> This section sourced from Al Monitor, [Arab summit adopts Egypt’s alternative plan to Trump Gaza \[...\]](#), 4 March 2025 and BBC News, [Arab leaders approve \\$53bn alternative \[...\]](#), 4 March 2025; Reuters, [Egypt’s alternative to Trump’s “Gaza Riviera”](#), 3 March 2023; BBC Monitoring, [Arab summit urges UNSC to deploy peacekeepers in Gaza, West Bank](#), 5 March 2025

attended. The EU President told the summit that “together, we should implement this plan”.<sup>442</sup>

In May 2025, the Arab League called on other countries and organisations “to provide prompt financial support” for its plan.<sup>443</sup>

The below box provides links to analysis of the Arab League’s proposal.

## Analysis on the Arab League proposal

- European Institute of the Mediterranean, [Gaza’s day after: it is not the plan that is missing but the will to implement it](#), 4 April 2025
- Chatham House, [Arab states must adapt their Gaza peace plan](#), 31 March 2025
- Emirates Policy Center, [Israel and the Arab plan to rebuild Gaza](#), 21 March 2025
- [Two post-war Gaza plans compete for viability without consensus](#), BBC Monitoring, 15 March 2025
- Chatham House, [Egypt’s plan for Gaza may have thwarted Trump’s “riviera” for now. But its loopholes need to be fixed](#), 7 March 2025
- Arab Center Washington DC, [An Arab plan for Gaza: obstacles and possibilities](#), 7 March 2025
- Italian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies, [Gaza’s future amid conflicting and uncertain prospects](#), 6 March 2025
- Atlantic Council, [The Egyptian plan for postwar Gaza is a good starting point—but it needs change](#), 5 March 2025
- Arab Center Washington DC, [Saudi Arabia and Trump’s Gaza proposal](#), 20 February 2025
- Washington Institute, [Two Arab summits hold the key to a viable Gaza plan](#), 19 February 2025

## 2025 conference on the two-state solution

From 28 to 30 July 2025, a conference on the implementation of a two-state solution was hosted by Saudi Arabia and France.<sup>444</sup> The conference was intended to “catalyse concrete, timebound and coordinated international action toward the implementation of the two-state solution”.<sup>445</sup>

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<sup>442</sup> European Council, [Speech by António Costa at the emergency summit](#), 4 March 2025

<sup>443</sup> Al Jazeera, [Arab League calls for funds to rebuild Gaza at summit](#), 17 May 2025

<sup>444</sup> French Ambassador, [Israel/Palestinian Territories—conference \[...\]](#), 16 July 2025

<sup>445</sup> UN, [High-level international conference for the peaceful settlement \[...\]](#), accessed 30 July 2025

The conference concluded with a joint statement issued by 19 participants, including the UK, the Arab League, the European Union, and the regional states of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar and Turkey.

The participants called on the UN General Assembly to endorse the document when it meets in its next session (September 2025). The declaration said that parties would take collective action:<sup>446</sup>

- To end the Israel-Hamas conflict. The declaration condemned the Hamas assault of 7 October 2023 and attacks by Israel on civilians and civilian infrastructure in Gaza. It also called for establishing transitional governance arrangements for Gaza, without Hamas.
- On “tangible, timebound, and irreversible steps” for a two-state solution, where “Palestine and Israel live side by side in peace and security with secure and recognised borders on the basis of the 1967 lines”, including Jerusalem. The 1967 lines refer to those lines from before the [Six Day War/Third Arab-Israeli War](#), when Israel captured the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
- To support the Palestinian Authority’s security forces and administration, including to combat radicalisation and violent extremism and to ensure the disarming of Hamas.

The conference also called on the Israeli leadership to issue a public commitment to a sovereign and viable Palestinian state and to renounce any annexation or settlement policy, and for all sides to adhere to the principles of non-violence and mutual recognition. The UN General Assembly backed the conference conclusions in a resolution in September 2025.<sup>447</sup>

## UK and European response

On 8 March 2025, France, Germany, Italy and the UK issued a joint statement welcoming the Arab League’s plan, saying “we urge all parties to build on the plan’s merits as a starting point”.<sup>448</sup> The UK Government also said the plan was “realistic”:

The government welcomes the Arab initiative of a recovery and reconstruction plan for Gaza. The plan proposes a realistic pathway to the reconstruction of Gaza and, if implemented, will alleviate the catastrophic living conditions for the Palestinians living in Gaza. Reconstruction must be based upon a solid political and security framework acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians.

<sup>446</sup> Times of Israel, [High level conference outcome document](#) (PDF), 30 July 2025, from Times of Israel, [In first, entire Arab League condemns Oct 7, urges Hamas to disarm](#), 30 July 2025 and BBC Monitoring, [Two-state solution conference petitions for PA control over Gaza](#), 30 July 2025

<sup>447</sup> UN, [General Assembly endorses New York declaration on a two-state solution](#), 12 September 2025; UN, [A/80/L.1/Rev.1](#), 10 June 2025

<sup>448</sup> FCDO, [Arab plan for the reconstruction of Gaza: foreign ministers’ joint statement](#), 8 March 2025

The Government is clear that Hamas must not govern Gaza, and there should be a central role for the Palestinian Authority.<sup>449</sup>

In April, Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer, said “I can confirm that we want to see all the hostages returned and a reconstruction plan for Gaza based on the Arab initiative, with the full involvement of the region—a reconstruction plan that can allow Palestinians to remain in their homes”.<sup>450</sup>

The UK has not set out any funding commitments.<sup>451</sup> The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) is currently co-chairing, along with Egypt, a working group on mobilising support for reconstruction and development. The UK has called on all states to consider what support for security, finance, economy and humanitarian need they can provide, to support a two-state solution.<sup>452</sup> In July 2025 the Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer, said that the group was continuing to work on the joint funding of aid projects.<sup>453</sup>

In July 2025, the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee said that the UK must help secure a pathway to a Palestinian state, to create confidence in Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia, to invest in Gaza’s reconstruction.<sup>454</sup>

## Hamas and Palestinian Authority welcomed proposal

Hamas rejected any foreign forces being allowed a presence in Gaza and says the group will not disarm but has reportedly welcomed the proposal. The Palestinian Authority has also welcomed it, and said it would be open to holding new elections if circumstances allowed (see below, section 2.4, for reform in 2024-25). There have been [no elections to the Palestinian Authority’s presidency since 2005](#) and [no elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council since 2006](#).<sup>455</sup>

## Israel and United States response

On 5 March, both Israel and the United States rejected the Arab League’s proposal. Israel said the plan was “rooted in outdated perspectives” and that President Trump’s proposal “should be encouraged”.<sup>456</sup> A White House spokesperson said the plan did “not address the reality that Gaza is currently uninhabitable” and “President Trump stands by his vision to rebuild Gaza free of Hamas”.<sup>457</sup>

<sup>449</sup> PQ HL 5529 [[Gaza: reconstruction](#)], 14 March 2025

<sup>450</sup> HC Deb, [2 April 2025](#), c323

<sup>451</sup> HC Deb, [5 March 2025](#), c259

<sup>452</sup> FCDO, [The Arab Plan for early recovery, reconstruction and development \[...\]](#), 23 May 2025

<sup>453</sup> FCDO, [The humanitarian pause in fighting in Gaza is essential \[...\]](#), 28 July 2025

<sup>454</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee, [Israel-Palestine conflict](#), 25 July 2025, para 101

<sup>455</sup> Reuters, [Arab states adopt Egyptian alternative to Trump’s “Gaza Riviera”](#), 5 March 2025

<sup>456</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [MFA statement regarding the emergency summit](#), 4 March 2025

<sup>457</sup> BBC News, [US and Israel reject Arab alternative to Trump’s Gaza plan](#), 5 March 2025

However, on 7 March, US Middle East Envoy, Steve Witkoff, said it was a “good faith first step”.<sup>458</sup> The US State Department reiterated this position in April, saying that “the Arab plan has not met the requirements of the Trump Administration in a couple of instances” but it was a “welcomed effort”.<sup>459</sup>

## 2.4

### Palestinian Authority changes in 2024 to 2025

The UK Government supports the Palestinian Authority assuming a “central role” in post-conflict Gaza, with no role for Hamas.<sup>460</sup> It has said it wants to see reforms to the Palestinian Authority, however, and said the UK would support them in implementing these.<sup>461</sup> This was also the position of the Biden administration (see the start of section 2, above).

This section provides an overview of changes announced by the Palestinian Authority in 2024 and 2025.

#### Government changes in 2024 and reforms in 2025

In March 2024, the Palestinian Authority’s President, Mahmoud Abbas, appointed a new Prime Minister, Mohammed Mustafa, along with a new cabinet.<sup>462</sup> In October 2025, President Abbas named his deputy, Hussein Al-Sheikh, as his successor to replace him “in the event of a vacancy”.<sup>463</sup>

The Biden administration and the UK Government welcomed the Prime Minister’s appointment and called for “credible and far-reaching reforms”.<sup>464</sup> Hamas criticised Mr Mustafa’s appointment.<sup>465</sup>

In 2025, the Palestinian Authority has announced further changes. These are interpreted by analysts as an attempt to strengthen claims to governing post-conflict Gaza and in response to external demands for reform:<sup>466</sup>

- The [Palestinian Authority’s Amended Basic Law of 2003](#) guarantees welfare support for the “families of martyrs, prisoners of war, injured and disabled”, including education, health and social insurance. The UK,

<sup>458</sup> Times of Israel, [After initial rejection, US sends mixed signals \[...\]](#), 7 March 2025

<sup>459</sup> US Department of State, [Press briefing](#), 10 April 2025

<sup>460</sup> PQ 39444 [[Gaza: politics and government](#)], 27 March 2025

<sup>461</sup> HC Deb, [20 March 2025](#), c523

<sup>462</sup> AP, [Palestinian Authority announces a new cabinet \[...\]](#), 28 March 2024

<sup>463</sup> Arab News, [Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas names successor ‘in event of a vacancy’](#), 26 October 2025; Reuters, [Palestinian President names interim successor \[...\]](#), 28 November 2024

<sup>464</sup> [Palestinian president appoints long-time adviser as prime minister](#), BBC News, 15 March 2024; HC Deb, [26 March 2024](#), c1394; HC Deb, [12 March 2024](#), c139

<sup>465</sup> [Hamas criticises new Palestinian appointment](#), BBC Monitoring, 19 March 2024

<sup>466</sup> Washington Institute, [Resetting US relations with the Palestinian Authority](#)2, 12 March 2025;

Washington Institute, [How to ensure the PL meeting goes beyond token reforms](#), 22 April 2025

Israel and the US have called for reforms to the law.<sup>467</sup> In February 2025, President Mohamoud Abbas issued a decree overturning the payment system. The decree confirmed that a new system would be introduced, but details have not yet been published (other than to confirm the continued eligibility of those already receiving payments).<sup>468</sup> Israel has questioned how much the reform will change.<sup>469</sup>

- Elections: in March 2025, President Abbas announced would hold presidential and parliamentary elections to the Palestinian Authority's institutions if "appropriate conditions are met in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem". In September, he said these would be held within a year of the conflict ending. Presidential elections were last held in 2005, and parliamentary elections were last held in 2006. Hamas won the most seats in the parliamentary elections.<sup>470</sup>
- Separately, elections to the [Palestinian National Council](#), an internal part of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and separate to the Palestinian Authority, have been pledged by Abbas by the end of 2025. The last time these elections took place was 2006. The council helps set policy for the PLO. Hamas has not participated in its meetings in the past, with one of the conditions being to recognise the Israeli state.<sup>471</sup>
- General amnesty: also in March, President Abbas announced a general amnesty for all dismissed Fatah members to "strengthen internal unity and organisational cohesion". This is seen as an attempt by Abbas to create unity and strengthen his legitimacy (polling suggests he has only minority support in the West Bank).<sup>472</sup>
- Vice president: in the same month, President Abbas announced he would appoint a vice president, seen as an attempt to create greater unity.<sup>473</sup> Hussein Sheikh, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was appointed to the role in April. This is the first time a vice-president role has existed. Hamas criticised the appointment, while Saudi Arabia invited him to visit the kingdom to discuss Palestinian issues.<sup>474</sup>

<sup>467</sup> See section 2.4 of the Commons Library research briefing, [UNRWA and UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip 2023-25](#), for sources and background on the issue.

<sup>468</sup> Al Monitor, [Palestinian Authority ends 'martyr' payments](#), 10 February 2025; Reuters, [Palestinian prisoner scraps prisoner payment system](#), 10 February 2025

<sup>469</sup> Times of Israel, [Israel dismisses PA 'pay to slay' reform](#), , 10 February 2025

<sup>470</sup> European Council on Foreign Relations, [Presidential elections 2005](#) and [legislative elections 2006](#); France 24, [Palestinian Authority president Abbas to hold elections](#), 4 March 2025; BBC Monitoring, [PA president promises elections in meeting with Starmer](#), 9 September 2025

<sup>471</sup> AA, [Palestinian president calls for new national council elections \[...\]](#), 19 July 2025; European Council on Foreign Relations, [Mapping Palestinian politics: PNC](#); BBC Monitoring, [Palestinian president sets national council election before year end](#), 20 July 2025

<sup>472</sup> Al Monitor, [What's behind Abbas' amnesty gesture \[...\]](#)2, 5 March 2025

<sup>473</sup> New Arab, [Abbas says will create Palestinian vice-president post \[...\]](#), 5 March 2025

<sup>474</sup> Al-Monitor, [Saudi Crown Prince hosts Palestinian VP Sheikh](#), 8 May 2025; BBC Monitoring, [Arab states welcome naming of Palestinian vice president](#), 27 April 2025; Arab Center Washington DC, [The Significance of Hussein al-Sheikh's Appointment as PLO Vice President](#), 17 June 2025

In June 2025, for the first time, President Abbas also condemned the Hamas assault of 7 October 2023 “as unacceptable and condemnable”. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, also welcomed commitments from Abbas made in the same statement to “conclude, within a clear and binding timeline” a peace agreement with Israel and resolution of all final status issues under international-supervised talks, and commitments to reform. These include increased transparency, educational curriculum reforms and elections.<sup>475</sup>

The Palestinian Authority has also said that Hamas should disarm, and it will draft a constitution that excludes those “who do not adhere to the political program of the Palestine Liberation Organization [and] international legitimacy”.<sup>476</sup> France is supporting its drafting.<sup>477</sup>

## Israeli statements and US actions

The Israeli Government argues that President Abbas “misrepresents reforms” and is not an effective “partner for peace”.<sup>478</sup> The Foreign Minister, Israel Sa’ar, said:

The Palestinians have had opportunities over time to pursue different approaches to achieve peace. We cannot afford to reach a situation where they endanger Israel's security.<sup>479</sup>

On 31 July, the US announced visa restrictions on [Palestinian Authority](#) and [Palestine Liberation Organization](#) members for “undermining prospects for peace”. The State Department said among the commitments the PLO and PA had breached included internationalising the conflict with Israel, such as through engagement in international courts, and supporting terrorism in its school textbooks and payments to terrorists and their families.<sup>480</sup>

## European Union and UK support

In September 2025, the UK was among 12 donors to launch the “Emergency Coalition for the Financial Sustainability of the Palestinian Authority”. Its three immediate purposes were to ensure that the Authority can govern, provide essential services, and maintain security.<sup>481</sup>

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<sup>475</sup> Emmanuel Macron on Twitter/X, “[I received a letter of hope, courage, and clarity](#)”, 12 June 2025; Times of Israel, [In first, Palestinian Authority’s Abbas condemns Hamas October 7 attack](#), 10 June 2025

<sup>476</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Hamas rejects PA president’s disarmament remark](#), 26 September 2025; Wafa News Agency, [President Abbas reaffirms Palestine’s commitment to a comprehensive reform agenda](#), 22 September 2025

<sup>477</sup> France 24, [France, Palestinian Authority announce joint panel](#), 11 November 2025

<sup>478</sup> Tzipi Hotovely [Israeli Ambassador to the UK], [Britain should resist Macron’s Napoleonic cosplaying](#), The Telegraph, 26 July 2025

<sup>479</sup> Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [FM Sa’ar meets with Kaja Kallas](#), 24 March 2025

<sup>480</sup> US State Department, [Sanctioning officials of the PA and members of the PLO](#), 31 July 2025

<sup>481</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, [Launch of the emergency coalition for the financial sustainability of the Palestinian Authority](#), 25 September 2025

In April, the European Union announced a US\$1.8 billion package of support for the Palestinian Authority for 2025 to 2027, which would support reforms to the Authority. Most is contingent on sufficient reforms being made.<sup>482</sup>

Also in April the UK announced a new memorandum of understanding with the Palestinian Authority. This coincided with a visit to the UK of the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, Mohammad Mustaf, the first visit of a Prime Minister since 2021.<sup>483</sup>

Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and Mr Mustafa agreed in their meeting that Hamas must not play a role in the future governance of Gaza. Sir Keir also said that the Palestinian Authority's reform plan is "critical".<sup>484</sup>

The memorandum of understanding has eleven articles, including topics such as security cooperation, trade relations, and climate change. The memorandum welcomes the Authority's reform plans, including holding new elections, supporting the rule of law and human rights, and enhancing the capacity and accountability of its security forces. The two also committed to work through the [existing Joint Committee of the UK-Palestinian Authority Political, Trade and Partnership Agreement](#) to strengthen trade relations.<sup>485</sup>

In July 2025, the government provided £7 million to help strengthen governance, accountability and civic space in the OPTs, including delivery of the Palestinian Authority reform agenda.<sup>486</sup> This followed £10 million to help pay public sector salaries, fund anti-corruption efforts, and support essential services, announced under the Conservative government in June 2024.<sup>487</sup>

The Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer, said in response to questions in the Commons on the agreement that the Palestinian Authority had made progress on issues including [the Martyrs Fund \(also referred to as "pay to slay"\)](#) and the content of school textbooks, and some UK aid to the OPTs in 2025/26 will go through the Authority.<sup>488</sup>

The government has also called on Israel to release funds to the Palestinian Authority, the restrictions on which were "harm[ful] [to] Israel's long-term interests".<sup>489</sup> Echoing actions taken in 2024, in June 2025 the Israeli Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich, cancelled the indemnity that Israeli banks have been given to correspond with Palestinian banks, following the decision by the UK and others to sanction him.<sup>490</sup>

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<sup>482</sup> [European Commission, Commission announces multiannual programme \[...\]](#), 14 April 2025

<sup>483</sup> FCDO, [Palestinian Authority and UK strengthen ties to continue work \[...\]](#), 28 April 2025

<sup>484</sup> PMO, [PM meeting with Prime Minister Mustafa of the Palestinian Authority](#), 28 April 2025

<sup>485</sup> FCDO, [Memorandum of Understanding on strategic cooperation \[...\]](#), 28 April 2025

<sup>486</sup> FCDO, [UK pledges lifesaving aid to Gaza](#), 21 July 2025

<sup>487</sup> FCDO, [UK contributes financial aid to the OPTs to increase stability](#), 1 June 2024

<sup>488</sup> HC Deb, [29 April 2025](#), c208

<sup>489</sup> HC Deb, [21 July 2025](#), c596

<sup>490</sup> Times of Israel, [Smotrich moves to paralyze Palestinian economy in response to Western sanctions](#), 11 June 2025

For more on these issues and UK aid, see section 2.4 of the Commons Library research being [UNRWA and UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip](#).

In July 2025, in its report on the conflict, the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee noted evidence on the lack of governance reform in the Palestinian Authority (such as on transparency and human rights) and challenges to it holding elections in Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem. The committee said that a “moderate voice and fresh approach” was needed from Palestinian leaders.<sup>491</sup>

## 2.5 Israeli statements on the post-conflict Occupied Palestinian Territories

For the Israeli response to proposals by the Trump administration and Arab League in January to October 2025, see sections 2.1 to 2.3 above.

### Post-conflict plans discussed by Israeli Government

#### No role for Hamas in Gaza and Palestinian Authority, and voluntary migration

The Israeli Government, alongside governments such as those of the United States and the UK, has stated that Hamas cannot play any role in the government of post-conflict Gaza.<sup>492</sup>

Israel has also said it opposes a role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza after the conflict.<sup>493</sup>

#### February 2024 discussion plan of the Israeli Government

In February 2024, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, presented a discussion plan to the Israeli security cabinet on post-conflict Gaza. Reports suggest it included:

- Civilian management of Gaza by “local representatives” not affiliated with Hamas. The Palestinian Authority is not mentioned in the plan.
- The closure of UNRWA and its replacement by other aid groups. In October 2024, Israel passed legislation that will ban the agency from engaging with Israeli officials, but aid through other UN bodies would continue.

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<sup>491</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee, [Israel-Palestine conflict](#), 25 July 2025, paras 105-7

<sup>492</sup> Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, [Statement by PM Netanyahu](#), 21 January 2024

<sup>493</sup> Times of Israel, [Netanyahu reiterates neither Hamas nor Palestinian Authority will rule Gaza after the war](#), 17 February 2025

- The demilitarisation of Gaza, save for weapons “necessary to maintain public order”, after which reconstruction will be carried out by countries “acceptable to Israel”.
- An Israeli presence on the Gaza–Egypt border to prevent smuggling and the creation of a border security zone on Israel’s border with Gaza.<sup>494</sup>

The Palestinian Authority rejected the discussion plan presented to the Israeli security cabinet as “continuing Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories and preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state”.<sup>495</sup>

### Netanyahu address to US Congress in July 2024

In an address to the US Congress on 25 July 2024, Mr Netanyahu reiterated his position on the governing of post-conflict Gaza and said that Israel would maintain responsibility for security. He did not explicitly mention a role for the Palestinian Authority:

My vision for that day is of a demilitarized and deradicalized Gaza. Israel does not seek to resettle Gaza. But for the foreseeable future, we must retain overriding security control there to prevent the resurgence of terror, to ensure that Gaza never again poses a threat to Israel.

Gaza should have a civilian administration run by Palestinians who do not seek to destroy Israel [...]

A new generation of Palestinians must no longer be taught to hate Jews but rather to live in peace with us [...]

Following our victory, with the help of regional partners, the demilitarization and deradicalization of Gaza can also lead to a future of security, prosperity and peace [...]<sup>496</sup>

On 26 July 2024, the Chair of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General CQ Brown, had said that for the US there had not been “a lot of detail” from the Israeli Government on post-conflict plans, though discussions were continuing.<sup>497</sup>

In December 2024, the Israeli Minister of Defense said that Israel “will ensure that security control is in the hands of the IDF, which will be authorised to act anywhere to prevent threats”.<sup>498</sup>

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<sup>494</sup> Axios, [No reconstruction in Gaza without demilitarisation](#), 22 February 2024; US Institute for Peace, [Plan for Gaza’s future highlights the challenges that lie ahead](#), 29 February 2024; BBC Monitoring, [Netanyahu presents plan for post-war Gaza](#), 23 February 2024

<sup>495</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Palestinians reject Netanyahu’s plan for post-war Gaza](#), 24 February 2024

<sup>496</sup> Times of Israel, [“We’re protecting you: Full text of Netanyahu’s address to Congress](#), 25 July 2024

<sup>497</sup> Reuters, [US not seen a detailed post-war plan from Israel, Gen. Brown says](#), 26 July 2024

<sup>498</sup> Times of Israel, [In Gaza, Katz says IDF will hold onto security control of strip](#), 25 December 2024

## Vote against recognising a Palestinian state

In July 2024, the Israeli Knesset (parliament) voted for a motion opposing a Palestinian state.<sup>499</sup> The motion was passed by 68 votes to 9 (membership of the Knesset is 120). The motion followed the decisions of Spain, Norway, Slovenia and Ireland to recognise a Palestinian state in 2024.

The motion said the “establishment of a Palestinian state in the heart of the Land of Israel would pose an existential danger to the State of Israel and its citizens [and] perpetuate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” and “it will only be a matter of a short time until Hamas takes over the Palestinian state”.<sup>500</sup>

The Palestinian Authority and Arab governments criticised the resolution.<sup>501</sup> The UK Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said the vote was “hugely disappointing”.<sup>502</sup>

Mr Netanyahu was not present for the vote. In February 2024, the cabinet approved a resolution rejecting international recognition of a Palestinian state without direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.<sup>503</sup>

## Vote on annexing the West Bank

In July 2025, the Israeli Knesset backed a non-binding motion calling for the annexation of the occupied West Bank. The motion was carried by 71 votes to 13 and said that the area was an “inseparable part of the land of Israel” and that the government should apply Israeli law and sovereignty to existing settlements there. Members of the ruling coalition parties voted for the motion, but the two largest opposition parties (Yesh Atid and Blue and White) abstained.<sup>504</sup>

Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Justice Minister, Yariv Levin, had said earlier in July that “the time to apply sovereignty” to the West Bank “has come”, and that this would contribute to Israeli security and do “justice” to the settlers and settler movement.<sup>505</sup>

Israeli annexation of land currently occupied by settlements in the West Bank was part of the proposals of the 2020 Trump Peace Plan for the Middle East. At the time, Israel was reportedly making plans to implement annexation but

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<sup>499</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [PM Netanyahu's remarks at the start of a government meeting](#), 18 February 2024 and [Israel opposes 'unilateral' imposition](#), Reuters, 18 February 2024; [Knesset votes resoundingly \[...\]](#), Times of Israel, 22 February 2024

<sup>500</sup> Knesset, [Knesset Plenum votes in favour of declaration \[...\] \[on\] a Palestinian state](#), 18 July 2024

<sup>501</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Israeli resolution opposing Palestinian state \[...\]](#), 19 July 2024

<sup>502</sup> HC Deb, [19 July 2024](#), c310

<sup>503</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Israel rejects international recognition of a Palestinian state](#), 18 February 2024

<sup>504</sup> Times of Israel, [Knesset votes 71-13 for non-binding motion calling to annex West Bank](#), 23 July 2025

<sup>505</sup> Times of Israel, [Justice minister calls for government to actively advance West Bank \[...\]](#), 2 July 2025

did not do so.<sup>506</sup> In November 2024, the UK Government had said that “annexation would be illegal and we would stand opposed to it”.<sup>507</sup>

As stated above, in section 1.6, in September 2025 President Trump said he will not allow annexation in the West Bank. The October 2025 framework also says Israel will not annex Gaza.

## Statements on establishing settlements in Gaza

Israeli settlements in Gaza were removed when [Israel disengaged from the Strip in 2005](#).

In July 2024, Prime Minister Netanyahu told a joint session of the US Congress that “Israel does not wish to resettle Gaza” but wants “for the foreseeable future [...] overriding security control” to “prevent the resurgence of terror”,<sup>508</sup> The then US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, also said in October 2024 that it was, “to the best of my understanding, the policy of the Israeli government” not to “reoccupy” Gaza.<sup>509</sup>

In October 2024, Israeli ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and May Golan called for Palestinians to be encouraged to leave Gaza, while Bezalel Smotrich said establishing Israeli settlements in Gaza would be a means of ensuring security.<sup>510</sup> These statements were condemned by the Biden administration and the UK Government, among others.<sup>511</sup> In February 2025, some Israeli ministers called for Israeli settlements to be established in Gaza.<sup>512</sup>

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<sup>506</sup> Commons Library, [Annexation of the West Bank](#), June 2020

<sup>507</sup> HC Deb, [26 November 2024](#), c617

<sup>508</sup> Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, [PM Netanyahu’s address to joint meeting of US congress](#), 24 July 2024

<sup>509</sup> US DoS, [Secretary Antony Blinken remarks to the press](#), 23 October 2024

<sup>510</sup> Times of Israel, [Senior ministers call for new settlements in Gaza \[...\]](#), 21 October 2024

<sup>511</sup> Times of Israel [US, UK, France blast Israeli conference on Gaza resettlement](#), 30 January 2024

<sup>512</sup> Times of Israel, [Senior minister call for resettling Gaza, expelling Gazans \[...\]](#), 25 February 2025

## 3 UK Government statements and actions

### Actions and statements before March 2025

This section includes statements and actions from the UK Government following the ending of the January 2025 ceasefire-hostage agreement to the UN Security Council vote on the US framework on 17 November 2025.

For information on the Labour government and its opposition statements and actions before this, see the briefings listed below in section 3.5.

For information on recognition, see the Commons Library research briefing, [UK, Canada, France statements on recognising a Palestinian state 2025](#).

For the actions of the Conservative government and the UK Parliament from October 2023 to July 2024, see sections 2 to 4 of the Commons Library research briefing [Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024](#).

### Further reading on UK and European responses in 2025

- UK FCDO and Ministry of Defence, [Conflict, hunger and international humanitarian law: a practitioner's legal handbook](#), April 2025. It says the text “reflects the UK’s view on the law and attempts to clarify areas of uncertainty”.
- Carnegie Endowment, [Should the EU suspend its association agreement with Israel?](#), May 2025
- Sanam Vakil (Chatham House), [International opinion has rounded on Israel, but it's not enough to force Netanyahu's hand](#), The Guardian, May 2025
- Institute for International Political Studies, [EU-Israel relations face scrutiny amid escalating Gaza conflict](#), May 2025
- Crisis Group, [Europe on Israel: words are not enough](#), June 2025
- Arab Center Washington DC, [The shifting sands of European diplomacy: The EU's evolving alignment with Israel](#), June 2025
- Joseph Borell (former EU Foreign Affairs chief) and Kalypso Nicolaidis, [Europe must get off the sidelines in the Middle East](#), June 2025
- Foreign Affairs Committee, [Israel-Palestine conflict](#), HC 488, July 2025. The government will publish a response.

## 3.1

## Support for a renewed ceasefire and more aid

**UK Government backed the January 2025 agreement**

The UK Government welcomed the three-stage agreement of January 2025 and said it should be implemented “in full”. The then Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said it was a chance “not just for a lasting ceasefire but for a lasting peace, and to break the cycle of violence”.<sup>513</sup>

Mr Lammy said the government was “committed to sustaining momentum” and would convene partners for the financing and coordinating of reconstruction and recovery. He also said the UK would provide support to the Palestinian Authority to recover basic services and to “lay the groundwork for an inclusive Palestinian governance in Gaza”.<sup>514</sup>

**Support for pause and concern for IDF actions in March**

Following the announcement of the renewal of Israeli military operations in Gaza in March (see above, section 1.2) the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, said he was “deeply concerned about the resumption of Israeli military action” and that the government would do “all that we can to ensure the resumption of the ceasefire” to recover the hostages and deliver aid to Gaza.<sup>515</sup>

The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Minister (FCDO), Lord Collins, also told the House of Lords on 20 March that the UK wanted the January 2025 agreement to be implemented in full:

We do not want to see a return to fighting. The reported civilian casualties resulting from these strikes are appalling. Our priority is urging all parties to return urgently to dialogue and to ensure that the ceasefire agreement is implemented in full and becomes permanent. The fighting must stop; hostages must be released, and civilians must be protected.<sup>516</sup>

In April 2025, while stating that Israel has “the right to legitimate self-defence consistent with international law”, the Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer, said the UK had concerns about the “risk of a breach to international law” in the renewed military action from March.<sup>517</sup> The minister also said that the UK Government “does not support” the expansion of Israeli military operations across Gaza which was announced on 2 April. The government raised this directly with the Israeli Government.<sup>518</sup>

The then Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, had told the House in March that talks between Israel and Hamas had been “gridlocked for several weeks”,

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<sup>513</sup> HC Deb, [16 January 2025](#), c511

<sup>514</sup> HC Deb, [16 January 2025](#), c511

<sup>515</sup> HC Deb, [19 March 2025](#), c338

<sup>516</sup> HL Deb, [18 March 2025](#), c1120

<sup>517</sup> HC Deb, [2 April 2025](#), c324

<sup>518</sup> HC Deb, [2 April 2025](#), cc313, c321

and that he had been in talks with Israeli, Palestinian, American, European and UN officials about encouraging a re-engagement with negotiations.<sup>519</sup>

## Concern about May and August 2025 IDF action

Following the reported approval of the Israeli Security cabinet plan in May to expand IDF operations in Gaza (see above, section 1.3) on 6 May the Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer, said that the UK was “strongly opposed” to the plans, is against any annexation or demographic change, and that Hamas must release the hostages and not divert any aid:

Any attempt to annex land in Gaza would be unacceptable. Palestinian territory must not be reduced or subjected to any demographic change. We want this war to end. We want an immediate ceasefire, the release of all hostages, the urgent provision of humanitarian aid and a pathway to a political solution. [...] Hamas must not divert aid for their own financial gain or use civilian infrastructure for military purposes. We repeat our demand for the immediate release of the hostages, but an expansion of this conflict is not the route to achieve their safe return.<sup>520</sup>

Following the 18 May announcement that Israel would begin a new offensive across Gaza, on 19 May the UK issued a joint statement with France and Canada criticising the level of aid entering Gaza and the announcement of an expanded military offensive, saying they would take steps if it did not stop.<sup>521</sup>

In a statement to the Commons on 20 May, Prime Minister Starmer told the Commons that the situation in Gaza was “utterly intolerable” and that he “want[ed] to put on record today that we are horrified by the escalation from Israel”. He set out steps he hoped to see:

We repeat our demand for a ceasefire, as the only way to free the hostages; we repeat our opposition to settlements in the West Bank; and we repeat our demand to massively scale up humanitarian assistance to Gaza. [...]

The recent announcement that Israel will allow a “basic quantity of food” into Gaza is totally and utterly inadequate, so we must co-ordinate our response, because this war has gone on for far too long. We cannot allow the people of Gaza to starve.<sup>522</sup>

In response to the joint UK-Canada-France statement, the Israeli Prime Minister said that “by asking Israel to end a defensive war for survival” the three countries were “offering a huge prize” for Hamas. Mr Netanyahu said the leaders should accept President Trump’s then plan for post-conflict Gaza (as set out in section 2.1).<sup>523</sup>

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<sup>519</sup> HC Deb, [20 March 2025](#), cc519, 520

<sup>520</sup> HC Deb, [6 May 2025](#), c578

<sup>521</sup> FCDO, [Joint statement from the leaders of UK, France and Canada on the situation in Israel and the West Bank](#), 19 May 2025

<sup>522</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), c889

<sup>523</sup> Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, [Statement by PM Netanyahu](#), 19 May 2025; BBC News, [Netanyahu accuses Starmer of being on “wrong side of humanity” and siding with Hamas](#), 23 May 2025

In a separate statement to the House on 20 May, the then Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said that the Israeli offensive “is morally unjustifiable, wholly disproportionate and utterly counterproductive, and [...] not the way to bring the hostages safely home”.<sup>524</sup>

## Visit of two MPs to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, April 2025, and September 2025

In April 2025, two UK MPs were detained and refused entry to Israel by local immigration authorities. Abtisam Mohamed MP and Yuan Yang MP were part of a parliamentary delegation organised by the [Council for Arab-British Understanding](#) and [Medical Aid for Palestinians](#) intending to visit humanitarian aid projects in the occupied West Bank. They had entry clearance confirmed and were permitted to travel to the airport. The MPs were detained for six hours and then released and allowed to leave Israel following talks between Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) ministers and their Israeli counterparts.<sup>525</sup>

In September 2025 two further MPs, Simon Opher and Peter Prinsley, were denied entry to Israel from the West Bank.<sup>526</sup>

In April 2025 the then Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said it was “unacceptable, counterproductive and deeply concerning” that the MPs had been detained and refused entry.<sup>527</sup> The Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer, gave a statement to the Commons on 7 April, in which he said the detainment of the MPs was “no way to treat democratically elected representatives of a close partner nation”.<sup>528</sup>

The minister also said that he would keep the Commons updated on whether travel by other MPs may be affected in the future. He believed it to be the first incident involving MPs. He acknowledged Israel has the right to control its own borders.<sup>529</sup>

The Israeli embassy in the UK said that the MPs’ visit was intended to “provoke anti-Israel activities”:

These individuals had accused Israel of false claims, were actively involved in promoting sanctions against Israeli ministers, and supported campaigns aimed

<sup>524</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), c924

<sup>525</sup> Yuan Yang MP on Twitter/X, [Joint statement, Yuan Yang MP and Abtisam Mohamed MP](#), 6 April 2024; HC Deb, [7 April 2025](#), c614 and HC Deb, [7 April 2025](#), c615; HC Deb, [7 April 2025](#), c611

<sup>526</sup> The Guardian, [Two British MPs ‘denied entry’ into Israel during official West Bank visit](#), 16 September 2025; Peter Prinsley MP in the Guardian, [I’m a British MP, a doctor and Jewish. This is what happened when I tried to enter Israel](#), 20 September 2025; Simon Opher MP in the New Statesman, [Israel must let us help Palestine](#), 16 September 2025

<sup>527</sup> FCDO, [Foreign Secretary statement following the detention of two British MPs](#), 5 April 2025

<sup>528</sup> HC Deb, [7 April 2025](#), cc611-12

<sup>529</sup> HC Deb, [7 April 2025](#), c617

at boycotting the State of Israel. The two parliament members chose not to exercise their right under Israeli law to petition the court to reconsider the decision. [...]

The visit was intended to provoke anti-Israel activities at a time when Israel is at war and under attack on seven fronts. Its purpose was to harm Israel and Israeli citizens and spread falsehoods about them. The State of Israel has both the authority and the duty to prevent the entry of individuals whose presence in the country is intended to cause harm to its citizens — just as such authority exists in the United Kingdom.<sup>530</sup>

The Leader of the Opposition, Kemi Badenoch, said Israel “should be able to control its borders”. The Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Dame Emily Thornberry, said “Israel is badly advised to try and alienate them [the MPs]” and it was an “insult to Parliament”. The Liberal Democrat International Development Spokesperson, Monica Harding, said the party “wholeheartedly support [the minister’s] rebuke of the Israeli Government” for its actions.<sup>531</sup>

As noted in FCDO travel advice for Israel, foreign nationals may be refused entry if they have publicly called for a boycott on Israel or Israeli settlements or belong to an organisation that has called for a boycott.<sup>532</sup> In 2025, the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) has passed legislation to extend the prohibition on issuing a residence permit or visa for entering Israel for individuals who call for a boycott of Israel. The prohibition has been extended to those who publish statements denying the Holocaust or the October 7 assault by Hamas, or who support the international prosecution of those who have served in the IDF and Israeli security branches.<sup>533</sup>

In February 2025, two Members of the European Parliament (from Ireland and France) critical of Israeli policy were also refused entry to Israel.<sup>534</sup>

Mr Lammy said he had “made clear that Israel’s actions are intolerable” with Israeli ministers, at the UN Security Council, at the International Court of Justice, and with other governments.<sup>535</sup>

However, he said that “I do not foresee a ceasefire deal at this stage. That is why the only way forward is through more diplomacy, not less”.<sup>536</sup>

The UK also set out its opposition to the expanded August offensive (see section 1.3, above). The Prime Minister said it was “wrong” and “what we need is a ceasefire, a surge in humanitarian aid, the release of all hostages by

<sup>530</sup> Israeli embassy in the UK on Twitter/X, [The State of Israel has the duty \[...\]](#), 6 April 2025

<sup>531</sup> BBC News, [Two MPs “astounded” after being denied entry to Israel](#), 6 April 2025; HC Deb, [7 April 2025](#), c615

<sup>532</sup> FCDO, [Travel advice: Israel: Entry requirements](#)

<sup>533</sup> Knesset News, [Approved in final readings: prohibition on entry to Israel of Holocaust and Oct. 7 massacre deniers \[...\]](#), 20 February 2025

<sup>534</sup> Politico, [2 MEPs denied entry to Israel](#), 25 February 2025

<sup>535</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), c924

<sup>536</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), c934

Hamas and a negotiated solution”. He reiterated the government’s position that Hamas should disarm and leave Gaza.<sup>537</sup>

The Conservative Party Chair Kevin Hollinrake said that “there was no other plan on the table” to remove Hamas from control in Gaza and to secure the release of hostages than that endorsed by the Israeli Security Cabinet. He said the party “did not want to see an escalation”.<sup>538</sup>

The Liberal Democrat Leader Sir Ed Davey said “it’s increasingly clear that [Prime Minister Netanyahu’s] goal is ethnic cleansing” and the government should stop all arms exports and sanction the Israeli leadership.<sup>539</sup>

In August, the First Minister of Northern Ireland, Michelle O’Neill and leader of laid Cymru Rhun ap Iorwerth, as well as representatives from the Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party, Social Democratic and Labour Party, Scottish Greens, Alliance and People Before Profit wrote to the Prime Minister requesting a recall of Parliament to impose sanctions on Israel and support a ceasefire and delivery of humanitarian aid.<sup>540</sup>

## Statement in support of the October 2025 agreement and framework

The UK Government welcomed the October 2025 agreement and framework.<sup>541</sup>

Addressing the Commons on 14 October, Sir Keir Starmer told the House that the UK would back the agreement and President Trump’s framework through supporting reforms to the Palestinian Authority, the reconstruction of Gaza, and monitoring stabilisation and the ceasefire. He said the UK was willing to apply its experience in Northern Ireland in disarming Hamas and more aid was needed to enter Gaza “as the next step”, including via UN agencies.<sup>542</sup> The Prime Minister said the agreement represented the “first real chance we have had of a two-state solution since the Oslo Accords [of the 1990s]”.<sup>543</sup>

Mr Starmer reiterated as a “red line” the election or appointment of individuals or parties to the Palestinian Authority who “are not committed to a peaceful process,” and said the Authority had committed to this.<sup>544</sup>

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<sup>537</sup> PMO, [PM statement on the Israeli government’s decision to further escalate \[...\]](#), 8 August 2025

<sup>538</sup> Sky News, [Conservative minister on the fence over Gaza](#), 8 August 2025

<sup>539</sup> Liberal Democrats, [Davey on Starmer’s Gaza statement](#), 8 August 2025

<sup>540</sup> The Herald, [Letter urges Prime Minister to recall Parliament over Gaza emergency](#), 18 August 2025

<sup>541</sup> PMO, [PM statement on Gaza peace deal](#), 9 October 2025; [PM statement on the Middle East](#), 3 October 2025; [PM statement on the new US initiative to deliver an end to the war in Gaza](#), 29 September 2025

<sup>542</sup> HC Deb, [14 October 2025](#), cc217-18, 223, 227, 232, 234

<sup>543</sup> HC Deb, [14 October 2025](#), c218

<sup>544</sup> HC Deb, [14 October 2025](#), c222, 236

He also said he “hope[d]” there would be a UN Security Council resolution establishing a mandate for the international stabilisation force.<sup>545</sup>

On the potential role of former Prime Minister Sir Tony Blair on the board of peace, Sir Keir Starmer said membership is something for others to determine.<sup>546</sup> Health Secretary Wes Streeting also cited Sir Tony’s “legacy in Northern Ireland” and that he “can bring that considerable skill-set to bear of being able to broker peace between enemies”.<sup>547</sup>

In response to the Trump framework, Sir Tony Blair said the plan “offers us the best chance of ending two years of war” and the President’s “willingness to chair the Board of Peace to oversee the new Gaza is a huge signal of support” to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.<sup>548</sup>

In response to continuing violence after the agreement came into effect, the government called for de-escalation, for Hamas to release the bodies of all remaining hostages, and for the “unrestricted flow of aid into Gaza”, including by Israel opening more crossings.<sup>549</sup> In the House, the Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer, said he is “reluctant to be drawn into a day-by-day commentary on the actions of both sides [but] what is key is that we keep the ceasefire going”.<sup>550</sup>

The UK Government also hosted a three-day conference at Wilton Park on reconstruction. The resulting communiqué said recovery would require both public and private funding and expertise and must involve Palestinians. A [later conference on reconstruction will be held in Egypt, in November](#).<sup>551</sup>

### Response in the UK Parliament

The Leader of the Opposition, Kemi Badenoch, welcomed the first stage of the US framework as a “significant breakthrough” and said she hoped other Arab states would now normalise their relations with Israel under the [Abraham Accords](#).<sup>552</sup> Shadow Foreign Secretary Dame Priti Patel also said “aid delivery to innocent civilians in Gaza must ramp up too”.<sup>553</sup>

The Leader of the Liberal Democrats, Sir Ed Davey, also welcomed the agreement and said the UK needed to ensure more aid entered as soon as

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<sup>545</sup> HC Deb, [14 October 2025](#), cc226-7

<sup>546</sup> HC Deb, [14 October 2025](#), c242

<sup>547</sup> The Independent, [Hamas ‘reviewing Trump’s Gaza plan in good faith’](#), 30 September 2025

<sup>548</sup> Tony Blair Institute, [Statement by Tony Blair in response to President Trump’s announcement](#), 29 September 2025

<sup>549</sup> HC Deb, [30 October 2025](#), c311

<sup>550</sup> HC Deb, [30 October 2025](#), c317

<sup>551</sup> FCDO, [Communiqué from co-Hosts of the Wilton Park conference](#), 16 October 2025

<sup>552</sup> HC Deb, [14 October 2025](#), c219

<sup>553</sup> Dame Priti Patel on Twitter/X, [“News overnight that the initial phase of the peace plan is coming together is of course encouraging \[...\]”](#), 9 October 2025

possible.<sup>554</sup> He added that Sir Tony Blair “needs to come before Parliament and give evidence about his role in Trump’s Gaza peace plan”.<sup>555</sup>

## UK votes at the UN in 2025

### Draft Security Council resolution vetoed by US in June 2025

At the UN Security Council on 4 June 2025, the US vetoed a resolution demanding an immediate and permanent ceasefire, the release of hostages, and increase of aid into Gaza. All other members, including the UK, voted in support of the resolution.<sup>556</sup>

### UN General Assembly resolution for a hostage-ceasefire agreement, June 2025

On 12 June, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) backed a resolution calling for an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire and the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages. UNGA votes are not binding.<sup>557</sup>

The UK voted in favour of the resolution, alongside 148 others. 12 states voted against, including Israel, the United States and Hungary. The UK said that it did so “in line with our unwavering determination to end the suffering in Gaza, bring the hostages home and move towards lasting peace in the region”.<sup>558</sup>

### UN Security Council vote on the US framework, November 2025

On 17 November 2025 the UN Security Council voted in favour of a US-drafted resolution to endorse the October framework and establish the basis for the international security force and Board of Peace.<sup>559</sup>

The UK voted in favour, saying the resolution was a “critical staging post in the implementation of the Peace Plan” for Palestinians and Israelis.<sup>560</sup>

For information on past council resolutions during the conflict, and how the UK has voted, see sections 2.2 and 2.6 of [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2023-25: UN, ICC and ICJ statements and actions](#).

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<sup>554</sup> HC Deb, [14 October 2025](#), c223

<sup>555</sup> Sir Ed Davey on Twitter/X, [“Tony Blair needs to come before Parliament \[...\]”](#), 30 September 2025

<sup>556</sup> UN, [US vetoes Security Council resolution demanding permanent ceasefire in Gaza](#), 4 June 2025; UN, [Security Council fails to adopt resolution \[...\]](#), 4 June 2025; US Mission to the UN, [Explanation of vote on a UNSC resolution \[...\]](#), 4 June 2025; FCDO, [UK statement at the UN Security Council](#), 4 June 2025

<sup>557</sup> UN, [UN General Assembly adopts Gaza ceasefire resolution by overwhelming majority](#), 12 June 2025

<sup>558</sup> As above and FCDO, [The UK voted in favour in line with our unwavering determination to end the suffering in Gaza \[...\]](#), 12 June 2025

<sup>559</sup> Security Council Report (not affiliated with the UN), [Vote on a Draft Resolution to Authorise an International Stabilization Force in Gaza](#), 16 November 2025

<sup>560</sup> FCDO, [The United Kingdom voted in favour of this resolution as a critical step](#) and [UK urges major increase in humanitarian aid for Gaza](#), 17 November 2025

## May 2025: UK suspends some engagement with Israel and July: statement of potential further action

On 20 May, the Foreign Secretary announced that the UK would suspend negotiations with Israel on a free trade agreement and review cooperation under the 2023 road map on bilateral relations between the two: see below, section 3.3.

In July 2025 Mr Lammy said “we will” take further measures against Israel if conditions worsen in Gaza. He suggested these measures would be taken in coordination with allies but did not set out what these would include.<sup>561</sup>

Also in July, the Prime Minister met President Trump in Scotland to discuss “what more can be done to secure the ceasefire urgently”, to secure the release of the hostages, and provide more aid to Gaza.<sup>562</sup> On 29 July, the UK Government announced it would recognise a Palestinian state in September, if Israel did not meet certain conditions; see section 3.2, below.

## UK Government opposition to aid as a “political tool”

On 20 March 2025 the Foreign Secretary said that it was “difficult to see how denying humanitarian assistance to a civilian population can be compatible with international humanitarian law”.<sup>563</sup>

However, the Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer, has said it is “not for ministers to act as courts” and determine if breaches [in international law] had occurred, but that “on the determination of risk, we take action”. He said there are “competent international courts that make such determinations”.<sup>564</sup>

The Middle East Minister has also reiterated the government’s position that “aid should never be used as a political tool” and “Israel must restart the flow of aid immediately”. In April he said that Israel’s “blocking [of] goods supplies and power from entering Gaza risks breaching international humanitarian law, and it should not be happening”.<sup>565</sup> He says land routes are the only means to deliver sufficient aid into Gaza:

We have been involved in discussions about airdrops. There is a role for them and we have spoken with partners in the region who have been keen to see airdrops as a contribution, particularly given the pressures on aid, and I am not ruling them out. However, given the scale of humanitarian aid that is needed, I must be clear with the House that helicopter airdrops can only reach a certain level, so while that aid would be welcome, it would be a very partial response to the scale of need that we see.<sup>566</sup>

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<sup>561</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee, [Oral evidence: the work of the FCDO](#), 8 July 2025, Q278; HC Deb, [21 July 2025](#), c605

<sup>562</sup> PMO, [Prime Minister to meet President Trump for wide ranging talks](#), 27 July 2025

<sup>563</sup> HC Deb, [20 March 2025](#), c520

<sup>564</sup> HC Deb, [2 April 2025](#), cc319, 323

<sup>565</sup> HC Deb, [2 April 2025](#), c313

<sup>566</sup> HC Deb, [6 May 2025](#), c591

Mr Falconer said while the UK had been in discussions with its partners on ensuring aid enters Gaza, he acknowledged on 2 April that UK efforts to “prevent the [aid] blockade from continuing [...] have not been effective”.<sup>567</sup>

## Opposition to aid delivery via non-UN mechanisms

The UK Government has criticised the delivery of aid through the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (see section 1.5, above). In May 2025, Mr Lammy said there “is a UN plan to deliver aid at the scale needed, with mitigation against aid diversion”.<sup>568</sup>

The UK signed a statement with 23 other states and the EU on 19 May, criticising the Israeli plans as undermining humanitarian aid principles (humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence).<sup>569</sup>

On 21 July, the UK issued a further statement with other 30 countries, including Canada, France, Italy, Japan and Spain, which said that the Israeli government’s “aid delivery model is dangerous, fuels instability and deprives Gazans of human dignity”. The countries said that “the Israeli Government’s denial of essential humanitarian assistance to the civilian population is unacceptable”. They collectively called on Israel to lift restrictions on aid into Gaza and allow UN agencies to work effectively.<sup>570</sup>

In July 2025 the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee also described GHF operations as having “led to the unnecessary deaths of hundreds of civilians” and called for it to be replaced with an UN-established and led system.<sup>571</sup>

Israel rejected the joint statement as “disconnected from reality” and said Hamas had been “deliberately acting to increase friction and harm to civilians who come to receive humanitarian aid”.<sup>572</sup> Hamas welcomed the joint statement, saying the GHF’s aid mechanism was “brutal” and “criminal”.<sup>573</sup>

The American ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, said “blaming Israel is irrational” and accused Hamas of rejecting “every” proposal to end the conflict.<sup>574</sup>

In the UK Parliament, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Dame Priti Patel, has said the UK Government has not provided sufficient information on its work with Israel to address aid diversion and “find practical solutions [...] to get aid in”. She has questioned how UK non-participation in the Israeli plan on the GHF will help aid enter Gaza.<sup>575</sup> The Shadow FCDO Minister, Lord Callanan,

<sup>567</sup> HC Deb, [2 April 2025](#), c316

<sup>568</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), c925

<sup>569</sup> FCDO, [Joint donor statement on humanitarian aid to Gaza](#), 19 May 2025

<sup>570</sup> FCDO, [Occupied Palestinian Territories: joint statement](#), 21 July 2025

<sup>571</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee, [The Israel-Palestine conflict](#), 25 July 2025, para 16

<sup>572</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Israel rejects the joint statement published \[...\]](#), 21 July 2025

<sup>573</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Hamas praises, Israel condemns UK-led call to halt Gaza war](#), 22 July 2025

<sup>574</sup> Ambassador Huckabee on Twitter/X, [“Disgusting! 25 nations put pressure on Israel”](#), 21 July 2025

<sup>575</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), c926

has also said that the “Israeli Government are rightly extremely suspicious of UNRWA” and questioned why the UK is “committed to supporting the current failing model”.<sup>576</sup>

Liberal Democrat spokesperson for the FCDO, Lord Purvis, has said “not a penny of British money [should] be channelled through” the GHF.<sup>577</sup>

## Call for more aid to enter Gaza, 2025

In July 2025, following reports of a significant famine risk in Gaza, the UK Government described the situation in Gaza as “humanitarian catastrophe”.<sup>578</sup>

It welcomed Israel’s announcement of daily humanitarian pauses to allow aid access and the decision to allow airdrops of aid into Gaza (see section 1.5, above), and said it would support these. However, the Foreign Secretary said that further barriers on aid delivery needed to be removed, that “land routes serve as the only viable and sustainable means of providing aid”, and a hostage-ceasefire agreement and end to the conflict is needed.<sup>579</sup>

The International Development Committee Chair, Sarah Champion, has said airdrops will provide only a “tiny” amount of the aid needed and Israel should open all border crossings into Gaza immediately.<sup>580</sup>

## UK surveillance flights over Gaza

The UK Government has previously said that since December 2023 the UK has been conducting surveillance flights over the Eastern Mediterranean. This includes in air space over Israel and Gaza. It has said their sole purpose was to locate the hostages and this was the only information passed onto Israel. With the October 2025 agreement, the Ministry of Defence announced that the surveillance flights ended on 10 October 2025.<sup>581</sup>

## Medical evacuations and students from Gaza

On 26 April 2025, two children from Gaza entered the UK for medical treatment. They were the first to have been granted temporary UK visas to access medical care during the 2023-25 conflict.<sup>582</sup>

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<sup>576</sup> HL Deb, [22 May 2025](#), c365

<sup>577</sup> HL Deb, [22 May 2025](#), c366

<sup>578</sup> PMO, [PM statement on Gaza](#), 24 July 2025

<sup>579</sup> Daily Mirror, [Keir Starmer: “The humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza must end now”](#), 25 July 2025; FCDO, [Statement from the Foreign Secretary on the situation in Gaza](#), 27 July 2025

<sup>580</sup> Sarah Champion MP on Twitter/X, [“Utterly ridiculous for Israel to say \[...\]”](#), 25 July 2025

<sup>581</sup> Ministry of Defence, [Statement on UK military activity in the Eastern Mediterranean](#), 16 October 2025

<sup>582</sup> BBC News, [Two Gazan girls first to arrive in the UK for medical treatment](#), 1 May 2025

One further child has reportedly been brought to the UK separately.<sup>583</sup> In March 2025, the Minister for the Middle East, Hamish Falconer, had told the International Development Committee that the UK priority was for most children in need of medical assistance to be treated in the region, judging this most appropriate:

We will [...] support Project Pure Hope in a very small number of cases, to help Gazan children leave Gaza and get access to medical treatment here. There are few cases where that is going to be the most appropriate intervention. Most Gazan children will need to be looked after in Gaza; a smaller number will need to be looked after in the region; for a very small number, there will be a medical case for them to be treated here. I do not want to raise the Committee's expectations about this, but in a small number of those cases, the UK will work with Project Pure Hope to ensure they get assistance here.<sup>584</sup>

However, in July the Prime Minister said that the UK was “urgently accelerating efforts” to bring children from Gaza to the UK who require specialist medical treatment.<sup>585</sup> In September, the Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, said the first group of children were due to arrive.<sup>586</sup> The Times newspaper reported in August that up to 300 young people may be allowed to enter the UK for specialist care.<sup>587</sup> The BBC reports the initial tranche will be between 30 and 50 people.<sup>588</sup>

In the same month, the US has said it has paused visitor visas from Gaza (these include on medical grounds), while a review is conducted.<sup>589</sup>

In August, a group of 96 MPs, led by Labour MP Dr Simon Opher, wrote to the government requesting it “launch the medical evacuation scheme without delay”. The MPs said that evacuees “must not” be returned to Gaza and the UK should provide some funding so they are not dependent on private sources.<sup>590</sup>

After the October hostage-ceasefire agreement was reached, the Prime Minister confirmed that UK evacuations would continue.<sup>591</sup>

The government is also seeking pathways to enable British nationals and other eligible people to leave Gaza to take up their university places in the UK and is engaging with regional countries to facilitate this.<sup>592</sup> In August, it was reported that nine students with full scholarships to study in the UK were

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<sup>583</sup> HL Deb, [7 May 2025](#), c1636; The Observer, [More Gazan children will come to UK for treatment](#), 25 July 2025

<sup>584</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee, [Oral evidence: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict](#), 11 March 2025, Q 224

<sup>585</sup> Daily Mirror, [Keir Starmer: “The humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza must end now”](#), 25 July 2025

<sup>586</sup> BBC News, [First sick children have left Gaza for UK – Cooper](#), 14 September 2025

<sup>587</sup> The Times, [Sick children to be evacuated from Gaza war for NHS treatment](#), 3 August 2025

<sup>588</sup> BBC News, [First group of Gaza children to be brought to UK 'in coming weeks](#), 18 August 2025

<sup>589</sup> Reuters, [US charity says halt in visitor visas for Gazans will harm wounded kids](#), 19 August 2025

<sup>590</sup> ITV News, [UK must bring in sick and injured children from Gaza 'without delay' \[...\]](#), 17 August 2025

<sup>591</sup> HC Deb, [14 October 2025](#), c232

<sup>592</sup> HC Deb, [7 July 2025](#), c653; The Guardian, [Ministers urged to help students trapped in Gaza with places at UK universities](#), 23 July 2025

being supported with evacuation, and in September the government said it was helping all students with funded university places and those with Chevening scholarships to come to the UK. Reportedly 80 students in Gaza have places at UK universities.<sup>593</sup>

In October, the government announced that the families of students coming to study in the UK from Gaza would be allowed to accompany them. At least 75 students have arrived under the scheme, to 30 October.<sup>594</sup>

## 3.2 Recognition of a Palestinian state

In July 2025, the Prime Minister announced that the UK would recognise a Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly in September. The UK decision was conditional on Israel not making sufficient progress to address the humanitarian situation in Gaza, reaching a hostage-ceasefire agreement with Hamas, and committing to “a long-term sustainable peace” and a two-state solution. The UK Government also reiterated that it expects Hamas to disarm, release all the hostages it holds, and no longer govern Gaza.

On 21 September, Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer announced that the UK formally recognised the state of Palestine. He reiterated that Hamas could play no future role in Gaza.<sup>595</sup>

Mr Starmer told the Commons in October that recognition had helped support the [New York Declaration](#) in July ([endorsed by the UN General Assembly in September](#)) and the condemnation by the Arab League (a collection of Arab states) of Hamas’ assault of 7 October and their call for it to disarm.<sup>596</sup> Section 2.3 of the Library’s [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2023-25: UN, ICC and ICJ statements and actions](#), has more on the UN General Assembly vote and international response.

In an address to the UN General Assembly in September 2025, the Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, said “two states is the only path to security and lasting peace for Israelis and Palestinians alike” and argued UK recognition “has helped cement the rejection of Hamas across the Arab world”.<sup>597</sup>

The government has not announced a change in its position that the final determination of the borders of the two states and the status of Jerusalem are matters for Palestinians and Israelis. It says it has recognised Palestinian

<sup>593</sup> The Guardian, [UK to evacuate nine Gaza students with university scholarships](#), 20 August 2025; FCDO, [Government supports top students out of Gaza to take up UK scholarships](#), 22 September 2025

<sup>594</sup> BBC News, [Dependants of Gazan students can join them in UK, government says](#), 30 October 2025

<sup>595</sup> PMO, [PM statement on the recognition of Palestine](#), 21 September 2025. See also FCDO, [UK formally recognises Palestinian State](#), 21 February 2025 and PMO, [Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s letter to President Abbas](#), 21 September 2025

<sup>596</sup> HC Deb, [14 October 2025](#), c218

<sup>597</sup> FCDO, [I stand before you today, beneath the emblem of the UN \[...\]](#), 22 September 2025

statehood “over provisional borders”, [based on 1967 lines](#), “with equal land swaps”.<sup>598</sup> It has also said that UK recognition of the state of Palestine does not alter the status of Palestinian refugees, which remain an issue for negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians.<sup>599</sup> It also considers that the level of control Israel retains over the Occupied Palestinian Territories (West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza) “amounts to occupation under international law”.<sup>600</sup>

In the UK Parliament, the Liberal Democrats welcomed the recognition. The Leader of the Opposition, Kemi Badenoch, said recognition was “rewarding terrorism” and had delayed negotiations on a hostage-ceasefire agreement.<sup>601</sup>

Canada, France, and Australia also confirmed their recognition in September 2025.<sup>602</sup> Andorra, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Portugal, and San Marino also did so.<sup>603</sup> Belgium said it would recognise a Palestinian state once Hamas has released all the hostages it holds and Hamas no longer has any involvement in Palestinian government.<sup>604</sup>

The Israeli Government rejected the announcements recognising a Palestinian state, arguing they “further destabilize the region and undermine the chances of achieving a peaceful solution in the future”.<sup>605</sup> Prime Minister Netanyahu reiterated his position that there “will be no Palestinian state”.<sup>606</sup> US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, described the announcements as “largely irrelevant” as the “only time there’ll ever be [a Palestinian state] is if there is a negotiation with Israel”.<sup>607</sup> In September President Trump told the UN General Assembly that he judged recognition as “encourag[ing] continued conflict”.<sup>608</sup>

For more information on the decision, its background, and reaction, see the separate Commons Library research briefing, [UK, Canada, France statements on recognising a Palestinian state 2025](#).

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<sup>598</sup> PQ HL HL10927 [[Jerusalem](#)], 10 December 2020; PQ HL10876 [[Palestine: Recognition](#)], 13 October 2025; PQ HL 11540 [[Palestine: Recognition of states](#)], 13 November 2025

<sup>599</sup> HL Deb, [13 November 2025](#), c346-7

<sup>600</sup> PQ 60175 [[Occupied territories: Official publications](#)], 25 June 2025

<sup>601</sup> HC Deb, [14 October 2025](#), c220, 223

<sup>602</sup> Australia Minister for Foreign Affairs, [Australia recognises the State of Palestine](#), 21 September 2025; Prime Minister of Canada, [Statement by Prime Minister Carney on Canada’s recognition of the State of Palestine](#), 21 September 2025; Le Monde, [Macron’s full speech on France’s recognition of the State of Palestine](#), 22 September 2025

<sup>603</sup> Monaco Tribune, [Monaco officially recognises Palestine: Prince Albert II calls for two-state solution at UN](#), 24 September 2025; Times of Israel, [Luxembourg, Malta and Andorra declare recognition of Palestinian state](#), 23 September 2025; UN, [Portugal formally recognises the Palestinian State](#), 21 September 2025; UN, [San Marino: His Excellency Luca Beccari Minister \[...\]](#), 27 September 2025

<sup>604</sup> Belgian Premier, [Statement by Mr Bart De Wever, Prime Minister of Belgium \[...\]](#), 22 September 2025

<sup>605</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Israel categorically rejects the one-sided declaration of the recognition of a Palestinian state](#), 21 September 2025

<sup>606</sup> Times of Israel, [‘There will be no Palestinian state’: Netanyahu signs plan \[...\]](#), 11 September 2025

<sup>607</sup> US DoS, [Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Tony Dokoupil of CBS Mornings](#), 23 September 2025

<sup>608</sup> Reuters, [Trump says Palestinian statehood would reward Hamas](#), 24 September 2025

## Further reading on recognising a Palestinian state

- Washington Institute, [Palestine recognition boosts the PA, not Hamas](#), 21 September 2025
- Chatham House, [UK recognition of Palestine: Will it make any difference?](#), 23 September 2025
- Foreign Affairs, [Israel can no longer wish Palestine away](#), 23 September 2025
- Carnegie Endowment, [America's peace to end all peace](#), 24 September 2025
- Chatham House, [Recognition of Palestine can be more than symbolic if Europe and Gulf states remain aligned](#), 26 September 2025
- International Crisis Group, [Can the world make recognition of Palestine's statehood matter?](#), 26 September 2025
- Manara Magazine, [The politics of recognition: Palestine at the crossroads](#), 6 October 2025

### 3.3

## Suspension of free trade talks and review of 2023 road map on UK-Israel relations

### UK Government announcement

On 19 May, the UK issued a joint statement with France and Canada criticising the level of aid entering Gaza and the announcement of an expanded military offensive. The statement said the governments were willing to take “further concrete actions” if Israel did not cease its military offensive and lift restrictions on humanitarian aid entering Gaza.<sup>609</sup>

On 21 July, together with 30 countries, the UK said it was willing to take further measures to secure a ceasefire, beyond those announced in May and set out below. It did not say what these could be.<sup>610</sup>

On 20 May, in a statement to the Commons, the Foreign Secretary said that the UK would suspend talks on a free trade agreement with Israel and review the 2023 roadmap Israel-UK relations. The government also summoned the

<sup>609</sup> FCDO, [Joint statement from the leaders of UK, France and Canada on the situation in Israel and the West Bank](#), 19 May 2025

<sup>610</sup> FCDO, [Occupied Palestinian Territories: joint statement](#), 21 July 2025

Israeli ambassador. Mr Lammy also said that Hamas should release the hostages, immediately and unconditionally.<sup>611</sup>

Mr Lammy said that the UK remained committed to Israeli security, countering the threat from Iran and terrorism, and addressing antisemitism.<sup>612</sup>

In response to the May announcement, the Israeli Foreign Ministry said that “external pressure will not divert Israel from its path in the struggle for its existence and security against enemies seeking its destruction”.<sup>613</sup> In response to the July statement, Israel said that “Hamas [...] started this war and is prolonging it” and “claims should be directed” at the group, not Israel.<sup>614</sup>

## What is in the 2023 road map?

The [2023 road map](#) covers 12 issues including cooperation on defence and security and trade and investment:

- On defence, it says the UK and Israel will work together to “keep our people safe from cyber, criminal and terrorist threats” and would build on the 2020 military cooperation agreement (see below). This includes provision for joint training exercises, medical training, and defence education, as well as cooperating against terrorism and Iran.
- On trade, roadmap said that the two would advance trade and investment opportunities, negotiate on a free trade agreement (see below), and increase investment.

In his 20 May announcement, the Foreign Secretary said defence cooperation with Israel to counter the threat from Iran would not be affected.<sup>615</sup> In March 2025, the Armed Forces Minister Luke Pollard, said any future defence cooperation with Israel is subject to “rigorous assessment”:

Any future defence activity with Israel will be subject to a rigorous overseas security and justice assistance assessment to assess compliance with human rights obligations and international humanitarian law. Although we recognise and respect Israel’s right to defend itself following 7 October [2023] and condemn the brutal attacks by Hamas in the strongest possible terms, we have had, and continue to have, concerns about Israel’s conduct.<sup>616</sup>

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<sup>611</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), cc923, 924; HC Deb, [4 June 2025](#), cc303

<sup>612</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), cc924

<sup>613</sup> Times of Israel, [UK pauses free trade talks with Israel](#), 20 May 2025

<sup>614</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Israel rejects the joint statement published \[...\]](#), 21 July 2025

<sup>615</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), c929

<sup>616</sup> HC Deb, [18 March 2025](#), c107WH

## What is the status of UK-Israel trade talks?

Talks on a UK-Israel free trade agreement were launched in 2022.<sup>617</sup> The Labour Government says these continued after it took office in July 2024.<sup>618</sup>

The talks were intended to replace the existing trade and partnership agreement between Israel and the UK, which is an agreement largely rolled over from when the UK was a member of the EU. Provisions on human rights and respect for democratic principles are included in the agreement.<sup>619</sup> The agreement primarily relates to goods, rather than services.<sup>620</sup>

Following the announced suspension, on 23 May 2025 the UK trade envoy for Israel, Lord Austin, visited Israel “to show our support and solidarity [with Israel] and to drum up business for Britain”.<sup>621</sup> The government says Lord Austin did not directly deal with the Israeli government or have responsibility for free trade talks on his visit.<sup>622</sup>

In response to a question in April 2025 on whether the government would consider suspending the wider UK-Israel partnership agreement, the then Trade Minister, Douglas Alexander, did not say the government had plans to do so:

We believe that having strong diplomatic and economic relationships with partners allows us to have frank discussions on important issues. The UK Government continues to work with our allies and partners, including across the region, to find a path towards permanent peace.<sup>623</sup>

For information on UK-Israel trade more generally, including how trade with Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is treated under UK-Israel trading arrangements, see section 2.4 of the Commons Library research briefing, [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict July 2024 to March 2025](#), April 2025.

## EU review of its agreement with Israel, May 2025

On 20 May, the same day of the UK Government decision, the EU announced that it would be reviewing its trade agreement with Israel under [Article 2 of its agreement](#) (PDF), which deals with human rights.<sup>624</sup> In the Commons, the Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said he had been in discussions with EU leaders on their potential review of the agreement.<sup>625</sup>

The EU’s High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, said that there was a “strong majority” of EU leaders in favour of the review. She said that “aid must flow immediately without obstruction [into Gaza] and at scale” and that “pressure is necessary to change the situation”.<sup>626</sup>

According to media reports, 17 of 27 EU member states backed the review, which was proposed in the meeting by the Netherlands.<sup>627</sup>

In response to the EU decision, the Israeli Foreign Office “call[ed] on the EU to exert pressure where it belongs — on Hamas”.<sup>628</sup>

In June, High Commissioner Kallas said that the review’s findings had been “very clear” and Israel had to address its “breach” of its human rights obligations under the agreement.<sup>629</sup> Ten proposals have reportedly been put forward for EU action, including full suspension of the agreement or its partial suspension, such as on trade. Other suggestions included barring Israeli participation in EU programmes or halting visa-free travel for Israelis.<sup>630</sup> As of October 2025, of the ten proposals, only partially suspending Israel from participation in the Horizon Europe research programme had been formally proposed to EU ministers, and which did not gain sufficient support to pass.<sup>631</sup> In September, the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, had said sanctions on extremist ministers and violent settlers and the partial suspension of the Association Agreement would be proposed to EU leaders. Preferential trade was also to be amended. However, no changes in EU policy came into effect before the October 2025 agreement.<sup>632</sup>

Following the October 2025 agreement, the European Commission said it would postpone its review of bilateral support to Israel. The proposed sanctions to be discussed involved nine against Israeli ministers and the settlers and 10 against Hamas.<sup>633</sup>

In July, the EU had reached an agreement with Israel to increase the level of aid entering Gaza. The EU High Commissioner said that “all options” were on the table if Israel did not implement the agreement.<sup>634</sup> An internal report,

<sup>617</sup> [Minister of State of Trade Policy to Chair of the International Trade Select Committee](#) (PDF), 9 November 2022

<sup>618</sup> PQ 27438 [[Trade agreements: Israel](#)], 7 February 2025

<sup>619</sup> Foreign and Commonwealth Office, [UK/Israel Trade and Partnership Agreement 2019](#)

<sup>620</sup> PQ 22594 [[Trade agreements: Israel](#)], 26 April 2024

<sup>621</sup> Lord Austin for Politics Home, [We would be foolish to sever our trade links with Israel](#), 23 May 2025

<sup>622</sup> HC Deb, [2 June 2025](#), c139

<sup>623</sup> PQ 43554 [[Trade agreements: Israel](#)], 9 April 2025

<sup>624</sup> European Council, [Foreign Affairs Council and Foreign Affairs Council Defence \(20 May 2025\)](#) and Official Journal of the EU, [Euro-Mediterranean Agreement](#) (PDF), June 2000

<sup>625</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), c933

<sup>626</sup> EU External Action Service, [Press remarks by High Representative](#), 20 May 2025

<sup>627</sup> BBC Monitoring, [Israel believes European over Gaza mostly “declarative”](#), 21 May 2025

<sup>628</sup> Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Israel rejects EU High Representative \[...\] statement](#), 20 May 2025

<sup>629</sup> EU External Action, [Foreign Affairs Council: remarks by High Representative Kallas](#), 23 June 2025

<sup>630</sup> Reuters, [EU outlines options for political action against Israel](#), 10 July 2025

<sup>631</sup> EU LEX, [Proposal for a council decision on \[...\] Horizon Europe](#), 28 July 2025; Euro News, [EU fails to agree Israeli suspension from research fund over Gaza](#), 30 July 2025

<sup>632</sup> European Commission, [Commission proposes suspension of trade concessions with Israel and sanctions on extremist ministers of the Israeli government and violent settlers](#), 17 September 2025

<sup>633</sup> European Commission, [Commission proposes suspension of trade concessions with Israel \[...\]](#), 17 September 2025; EU External Action, [Foreign Affairs Council: press remarks by High Representative Kaja Kallas after the meeting](#), 20 September 2025

<sup>634</sup> Al Monitor, [All options on the table if Israel does not deliver on Gaza pledges \[...\]](#), 22 July 2025

published by Politico in August, reported resumed fuel deliveries, but “obstructive factors” hindered wider aid delivery.<sup>635</sup>

While no EU-wide sanctions have been announced against Israeli ministers, in July 2025 the Netherlands and Slovenia both introduced some restrictions on Ministers Ben Gvir and Smotrich.<sup>636</sup> Slovenia has also introduced a travel ban on Mr Netanyahu.<sup>637</sup>

## Other European responses to the conflict in 2025

In 2025, the Irish Government is separately drafting legislation to restrict trade with Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.<sup>638</sup>

The Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, has described the situation in Gaza as a “catastrophic situation of genocide”, the most senior European leader to do so. Israel has strongly rejected the allegation as “demonizing”.<sup>639</sup> Spain’s parliament also voted for a full arms embargo on Israel.<sup>640</sup>

Following the announcement of the planned “takeover” of Gaza city in August, Germany said it would stop the export of arms to Israel that could be used in Gaza. Germany is the second-largest source of Israeli arms imports (mainly for naval forces), after the United States. Prime Minister Netanyahu described the German action as “rewarding Hamas terrorism”.<sup>641</sup> Germany said it would resume arms exports to Israel after the October agreement.<sup>642</sup>

In September 2025, Italian Prime Minister Giorgio Meloni told the UN General Assembly that “Israel has crossed [the] line” of adhering to the “principle of proportionality” in conflict and had “ended up violating humanitarian norms, causing a slaughter of civilians” in Gaza. However, she said “it is Hamas that can bring Palestinians’ suffering to an end”.<sup>643</sup>

Norway’s government has also ordered its sovereign wealth fund to review its investments to ensure it does not include Israeli companies involved in the West Bank or conflict in Gaza.<sup>644</sup>

<sup>635</sup> Politico, [Humanitarian aid to Gaza still below what was agreed with Israel \[...\]](#), 7 August 2025

<sup>636</sup> France 24, [Slovenia bars two far-right Israeli ministers](#), 17 July 2025; Reuters, [Dutch summon Israeli ambassador, impose travel ban on ministers](#), 29 July 2025

<sup>637</sup> Reuters, [Slovenia imposes travel ban on Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu](#), 26 September 2025

<sup>638</sup> Reuters, [Ireland to press ahead with trade ban on Israeli-occupied areas](#), 27 May 2025

<sup>639</sup> Le Monde, [Spain PM accuses Israel of genocide in Gaza](#), 27 June 2025

<sup>640</sup> Euractiv, [Spanish parliament backs Sánchez's arms embargo on Israel](#), 8 October 2025

<sup>641</sup> Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [PM Netanyahu speaks with German chancellor](#), 8 August 2025; Politico, [Germany halts Gaza-related arms exports to Israel](#), 8 August 2025; SIPRI, [How top arms exporters have responded to the war in Gaza](#), 3 October 2024. See its 2025 update: [How top arms exporters have responded to the war in Gaza: 2025 update](#) and also Washington Post, [These countries no longer arm Israel. It's not making much difference](#), 16 October 2025

<sup>642</sup> BBC News, [Germany to resume arms exports to Israel after ceasefire](#), 17 November 2025

<sup>643</sup> Italian Government, [President Meloni's address to the 80<sup>th</sup> UNGA](#), 24 September 2025

<sup>644</sup> Reuters, [Norway to review sovereign wealth fund's Israel investments](#), 5 August 2025

## Parliamentary reaction to the review and suspension

The Shadow Foreign Secretary, Dame Priti Patel, said that “strong words will do little to resolve the real challenges and the suffering that we are seeing” and it should be a “cause for concern” that:

we have reached a situation where the statements and actions that have been echoed by the Government today—I am referring to the Prime Minister’s joint statement with France and Canada—have now been supported by Hamas, a terrorist organisation that I proscribed as Home Secretary [...]

The Foreign Secretary’s decision to tear up trade negotiations with Israel and stop the bilateral road map will not [help] [...]

how is this going to help now when it comes to wider security issues and threats from Iran? How do we know that this will not be self-defeating in any way? [...]<sup>645</sup>

Mr Lammy said in response that “what is happening is morally wrong and unjustifiable, and it needs to stop”. He said that Shadow Secretary of State should have “condemn[ed] what is happening”.<sup>646</sup>

The Liberal Democrat spokesperson for Foreign Affairs, Callum Miller, welcomed the review, but said the UK should also sanction Israeli Ministers Ben Gvir and Smotrich (the UK Government announced these in June—see section 3.4), and suspend the full 2030 road map if the situation does not change. He also called upon the UK to recognise a Palestinian state.<sup>647</sup> Separately, Mr Miller has said that the UK should sanction the Defence Minister, Israel Katz, following the legalisation of 22 outposts in May 2025.<sup>648</sup>

In July 2025, the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that the trade talks should not be restarted until there is an internationally recognised peace settlement to the conflict. It also said that the government should “prepare” a ban on the import of goods from the illegal settlements in the West Bank and sanction further companies and businesses that are facilitating the building of settlements in the occupied West Bank.<sup>649</sup>

## Suspension of Israeli participation at defence college

In September 2025, the UK Government announced that Israeli students will be refused entry to the Royal College of Defence Studies. It said this was a response to the IDF’s expanded operations in Gaza. The director general of Israel’s Ministry of Defence criticised the decision as “discriminatory”.<sup>650</sup>

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<sup>645</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), c927

<sup>646</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), c927

<sup>647</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), c928

<sup>648</sup> Calum Miller MP on Bluesky, “[They must use the UK’s sanctions regime \[...\]](#)”, 29 May 2025

<sup>649</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee, [The Israel-Palestine conflict](#), 25 July 2025, paras 64-5, 77

<sup>650</sup> Reuters, [Britain bans Israelis from London defence college over Gaza escalation](#), 15 September 2025

The International Development Minister, Baroness Chapman, said that current students would be unaffected and not expected to leave. She said the UK wanted to reinstate Israeli participation, but this would require “a change of course by the Government of Israel”.<sup>651</sup> The government says 28 IDF personnel have attended the college since 2000.<sup>652</sup>

Also in September, the UK banned the Israeli Government from running a national pavilion at London's Defence and Security Equipment International event. However, Israeli arms companies continued to participate in the event.<sup>653</sup> Minister for Defence, Lord Coaker, said the decision reflected the Israeli Government's “decision to further escalate its military operation” in Gaza.<sup>654</sup>

## 3.4

# UK sanctions on Israeli settlers and ministers

## Israeli ministers

In June 2025, alongside Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway the UK announced its sanctions against the Israeli Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, and Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich.

The five governments said their decision was a result of the two ministers “incit[ing] extremist violence and serious abuses of Palestinian human rights” and that that “extremist rhetoric [has] advocat[ed] the forced displacement of Palestinians and the creation of new Israeli settlements”. The governments said they remained committed to Israeli security.<sup>655</sup>

The ministers are sanctioned in a personal capacity. The sanctions will introduce an asset freeze against the two individuals and travel ban.<sup>656</sup>

The two Israeli ministers criticised the decision. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Israel Katz, said “we will hold a special government meeting early next week to decide on our response to this unacceptable decision”.<sup>657</sup> The US State Department issued a statement “condemning” the decision, “remind[ing] our partners not to forget who the real enemy is”, and called for its reversal.<sup>658</sup>

In May 2025, Lord Ahmad, Middle East Minister in the Sunak Government, has said that the Conservative Government had been considering sanctions

<sup>651</sup> HL Deb, [17 September 2025](#), cc2268-71

<sup>652</sup> PQ HL10721 [[Israel Defence Forces and Mossad: Royal College of Defence Studies](#)], 2 October 2025

<sup>653</sup> Reuters, [UK blocks Israeli officials from its biggest defence show](#), 29 August 2025

<sup>654</sup> PQ 10683 [[Arms trade: Trade fairs](#)], 2 October 2025

<sup>655</sup> FCDO, [Foreign ministers joint statement on measures targeting \[...\]](#), 10 June 2025; HC Deb, [10 June 2025](#), cc913-46

<sup>656</sup> FCDO, [UK and partners unite to sanction ministers inciting West Bank violence](#), 10 June 2025

<sup>657</sup> Times of Israel, [Smotrich vows new settlements, Ben Gvir expresses his “contempt”](#), 10 June 2025

<sup>658</sup> US DoS, [US condemns UK, Canada, Norway, New Zealand, Australia sanctions](#), 10 June 2025

against the two ministers, who “are touting things that the Israelis [citizens] reject”.<sup>659</sup>

## Calls for further ministers to be sanctioned

Some MPs, including the Liberal Democrat leadership, have called on the government to sanction further ministers and some generals in response to Israeli actions in Gaza, including the Defence Minister, Israel Katz, and the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.<sup>660</sup> The sanctioning of Mr Netanyahu was raised again after Israel’s September 2025 strike on Qatar.<sup>661</sup>

In July, the Foreign Secretary said that “some of the language we are seeing from senior politicians in Israel, such as Minister Katz, is reprehensible”. In response to a question on whether the government would sanction him, the Foreign Secretary said that “you have heard my statements about what Minister Katz has said [...] [and] my previous statements about Ministers Smotrich and Ben-Gvir” and the sanctions announced on them.<sup>662</sup>

## Proscription of Palestine Action

In July 2025, the Commons voted to proscribe Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation. Once it was proscribed, [membership and support for the group become offences](#) (alongside other offences). The decision follows some members of Palestine Action entering RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire in June 2025. The decision has been criticised by human rights groups, including Amnesty International, as a “grave misuse of anti-terrorism powers”.<sup>663</sup>

Home Office Minister Dan Jarvis said the move was necessary as the group had “orchestrated a nationwide campaign of attacks that have resulted in serious damage to property and crossed the threshold between direct criminal action and terrorism” and included a willingness to use violence.<sup>664</sup> Palestine Action is planning a judicial review.<sup>665</sup>

## Israelis involved in settler violence

In May 2025, the UK Government announced a fourth round of sanctions against those involved in Israeli settler violence in the West Bank.

<sup>659</sup> HL Deb, [22 May 2025](#), c372

<sup>660</sup> Liberal Democrats, [Ed Davey: Tougher sanctions needed on Israeli government](#), 22 July 2025; HC Deb, [16 July 2025](#), c290

<sup>661</sup> HC Deb, [10 September 2025](#), c870

<sup>662</sup> International Development Committee, [Oral evidence: development work of the FCDO](#), 16 July 2025, Q 30

<sup>663</sup> Amnesty International, [UK: proscribing Palestine Action would be “grave misuse \[...\]”](#), 1 July 2025

<sup>664</sup> HC Deb, [2 July 2025](#), c350. See also the [Home Secretary’s statement: HCWS729, 23 June 2025](#).

<sup>665</sup> Reuters, [Palestine Action wins bid to challenge UK ban under anti-terrorism laws](#), 30 July 2025

The new sanctions target three individuals, two illegal outposts and two organisations. A further 18 individuals, entities and companies are already subject to UK sanctions.<sup>666</sup>

Previous UK sanctions were announced in February, May and October 2024. These are set out in section 3.5 of the Commons Library research briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict July 2024 to March 2025](#), April 2025.

In May 2025, the Foreign Secretary said that the spread of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and continued violent activity by settler groups “endangered” the viability of a two-state solution. Mr Lammy said that the government had been “repeatedly pressing for a change in course and direction” in the West Bank.<sup>667</sup>

### Plans for further sanctions against Hamas

In September 2025 the Prime Minister said that UK would apply additional sanctions on Hamas, which is already a proscribed terrorist group and subject to sanctions. He said that the UK would “sanction other Hamas figures in the coming weeks”. No further announcements were made.<sup>668</sup>

## 3.5

### UK Government statements and actions, October 2023 to March 2025

Section 2 of the Commons Library research briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict July 2024 to March 2025](#) sets out statements made by the Labour government that took office in the UK in July 2024. These include statements on the:

- Hamas assault of 7 October 2023.
- Israeli military response from October 2023 to March 2025.
- Suggestions of Israeli annexation of territory.
- Israeli legislation banning its officials from engaging with the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). See also section 5 of the separate Commons Library research briefing [UNRWA and UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip 2023-25](#).

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<sup>666</sup> FCDO, [UK sanctions hit West Bank violence network](#), 20 May 2025

<sup>667</sup> HC Deb, [20 May 2025](#), c924

<sup>668</sup> PMO, [PM statement on the recognition of Palestine](#), 21 September 2025

- Trade between the UK and Israel and Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs).
- Two-state solution and the UK's past position on recognising a Palestinian state.
- Role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and arrest warrants. See also section 4 of the separate Commons Library research briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2023-25: UN, ICC and ICJ statements and actions](#).
- Role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), including both the case brought by South Africa against Israel under the Genocide Convention in 2023 and the July 2024 advisory opinion issued by the court on a 2022 case. See also section 3 of the separate Commons Library research briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2023-25: UN, ICC and ICJ statements and actions](#).

As of November 2025, the government says it is continuing to consider its response to the July 2024 opinion.<sup>669</sup>

- Allegations of genocide against Israel. In June 2025, there was a debate in Westminster Hall on the UK's obligations under the [1948 Genocide Convention](#). The Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer said that the determination of genocide was a matter for courts but "the government understand our legal obligation under the Genocide Convention and we have met it". He cited steps such as supporting implementation of ICJ provisional orders on the conflict, introducing sanctions, and supporting measures on aid delivery and a hostage-ceasefire agreement at the UN.<sup>670</sup> In September 2025, Liberal Democrat leader, Sir Ed Davey, described "what is happening in Gaza [as] a genocide".<sup>671</sup>

In July 2025, two Israeli human rights groups, B'TSLEM and Physicians for Human Rights (PHRI) published reports alleging Israel's "broad assault on Palestinians as a group" as "genocidal practice" in Gaza (B'TSLEM) and "the collapse of Gaza's health system as a central method of inflicting genocidal conditions" through destruction and "measures designed to prevent its recovery" (PHRI).<sup>672</sup>

In August the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) "declare[d] that Israel's policies and actions in Gaza meet the legal definition of genocide" and Hamas had committed "international crimes" on 7 October.<sup>673</sup> The BBC reports that out of the IAGS's 500 members,

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<sup>669</sup> PQ 77515 [[Trade Agreements: Israel](#)], 13 October 2025

<sup>670</sup> HC Deb, [17 June 2025](#), cc63WH. See also Business and Trade Sub-Committee, [Oral evidence: Arms exports to Israel](#), 15 September 2025 and HL Deb, [18 September 2025](#), cc2240-3

<sup>671</sup> Liberal Democrats, [Davey: What is happening in Gaza is a genocide \[...\]](#), 16 September 2025

<sup>672</sup> B'TSLEM, [Our genocide](#) (PDF), July 2025, p18; PHRI, [Destruction of conditions of life: a health analysis of the Gaza genocide](#) (PDF), July 2025, para 19

<sup>673</sup> [IAGS Resolution on the Situation in Gaza](#) (PDF), August 2025

28% took part in the vote and 86% of those who voted supported the resolution.<sup>674</sup>

In September 2025, the UN's Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory also concluded that "the State of Israel bears responsibility for the failure to prevent genocide, the commission of genocide and the failure to punish genocide against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip". The Commission staff is separate to the UN but is appointed by the UN Human Rights Council.<sup>675</sup>

Israel strongly rejects allegations of genocide as "false" and says its actions have been taken in self-defence (see above, sections 1.1 to 1.2 and 1.5 for Israeli objectives in Gaza and statements on aid deliveries).<sup>676</sup> It previously announced its end to engagement with the UN Human Rights Council in February, saying it was "obsessively pursuing Israel".<sup>677</sup> The case brought under the Genocide Convention by South Africa at the ICJ remains ongoing.

- Reports of sexual violence and mistreatment by Hamas and Israel. In August, the UN Secretary General's report on conflict related sexual violence listed Hamas as one group "credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape or other forms of sexual violence". The report found "reasonable grounds to believe that some hostages taken to Gaza were subjected to different forms of sexual violence [...] and clear and convincing information that sexual violence also occurred during the attacks of 7 October".<sup>678</sup>

The report also listed Israel as "on notice for potential listing" in next year's report. It said the office had received "credible information of violations by Israeli armed and security forces, perpetrated against Palestinians in several prisons, a detention centre and a military base" and there was "limited information" on accountability measures taken to date.<sup>679</sup> Israel says these are "baseless accusations".<sup>680</sup>

- Terrorist threat to the UK.

<sup>674</sup> BBC News, [Israel committing genocide in Gaza, world's leading experts say](#), 1 September 2025

<sup>675</sup> Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, [Legal analysis of the conduct of Israel in Gaza pursuant to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, A/HRC/60/CRP.3](#) (PDF), 16 September 2025; UN, [Top independent rights probe alleges Israel committed genocide](#), 16 September 2025

<sup>676</sup> UN, [Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remarks at the 79<sup>th</sup> session \[...\]](#), 27 September 2024

<sup>677</sup> Times of Israel, [Sa'ar tells UN Human Rights Council Israel is leaving \[...\]](#), 6 February 2025

<sup>678</sup> Reuters, [UN chief puts Israel, Russia "on notice" over conflict-related sexual violence accusations](#), 12 August 2025; UN, [Conflict-related sexual violence: Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 August 2025, Annex; Office of the Special Representative [...] on Sexual violence in conflict, [New UN report calls for scaled-up comprehensive services \[...\]](#), 14 August 2025

<sup>679</sup> UN, [Conflict-related sexual violence Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 August 2025, Appendix

<sup>680</sup> AP, [Israel rejects UN allegations that its forces have sexually abused detained Palestinians](#), 12 August 2025

Section 3 of the Commons Library research briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict July 2024 to March 2025](#) sets out actions that the UK Government has taken in relation to the conflict, primarily since July 2024 but with some coverage of actions taken under the Conservative government from October 2023 onwards.

Areas covered include support for people leaving Gaza, sanctions and the suspension of some arms export licences to Israel. See also the separate Commons Library research briefing [UK arms exports to Israel](#).

For information on UK humanitarian aid to the OPTs and to UNRWA, see the Commons Library research briefing [UNRWA and UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip 2023-25](#). The UK has pledged £101 million in aid to the OPTs in 2025/26.<sup>681</sup>

Further information on how the UK has voted at the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly on the 2023 to 2025 Israel– Hamas conflict is provided in section 2 of the Commons Library research briefing [Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2023-25: UN, ICC and ICJ statements and actions](#).

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<sup>681</sup> FCDO, [UK pledges lifesaving aid for Gaza](#), 21 July 2025

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